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Social embeddedness
1 and social norms have been shown to matter in a host of 
situations: the garment industry (Uzzi 1996), corporate finance (Uzzi and Gillespie 
2002), North African bazaars (Geertz 1978), rotating credit associations (Anthony 
2005), the Sicilian mafia (Gambetta 1993), natural resource management (Ostrom 
1990), and cattle ranching (Ellickson 1991), to name a few.  Embeddedness and social 
norms in these situations provide actors with better information and reduce an actor’s 
exposure to opportunism.   
The policy process also can be thought of as a collective action problem for 
which one solution is the use of trust-based norms of cooperation and reciprocity 
(Heckathorn 1996; Anthony 2005).  Gaps in the formal institutions of government 
provide ample opportunity for informal interaction (Amenta et al., 1992).  As a result, 
a significant portion of lobbying is informal in nature.  Lobbyists provide a variety of 
informal resources and services, including information, feedback, and “kitchen 
cabinet” activities (e.g., drafting of legislative and regulatory language).   
This research project makes two claims regarding informal lobbying.  First, 
embedded social relationships and trust-based social norms enable and underpin 
everyday policy interactions among lobbyists and politicians.  Second, these same 
social relationships and norms inhibit participation in the political process by outside 
actors.  This research focuses on the role of trust-based social norms that govern 
                                                 
1 By embeddedness, I mean an actor’s position of durable long-lasting social ties to other actors.  
 
 
informal interactions within networked communities of lobbyists:
2 that such networks 
of trust are neither all good nor all bad but are ambiguous in that they can improve 
policy making and fuel collusion.  I study a particular policy domain of 392 lobbying 
organizations over a seven-year time period using quantitative data, network 
measures, and interviews with lobbyists, activists, and policymakers.  In summary, I 
find that a policy domain can be characterized by a set of durable and ‘thick’ relations 
that provide benefits in everyday lobbying activity, particularly with regard to joint 
activity and perceived influence.  However, these same embedded relations are often 
perceived as collusive by outsiders, and outsiders incorporate these perceptions in the 
policy claims that they make.  The study concludes with a note on the influence on 
risk perceptions and the social ambivalence of lobbying. 
 
                                                 
2 The discussion focuses primarily on lobbying organizations and their personnel as opposed to 
independent lobbyists who hold themselves out as the proverbial ‘guns-for-hire.’  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Americans continue to suffer from a notoriously short attention span.  
They get mad as hell with reasonable frequency, but quickly return to 
their families and sitcoms.  Meanwhile, the corporate lobbies stay right 
where they are, outlasting all the populist hysteria. 
 
- Eric Alterman  
 
Two Stories
3 
Mary, who is a lobbyist working for a trade association that represents large 
corporate employers, gets a call from Steve, who is on the staff of a congressional 
committee with jurisdiction over Mary’s issues.  “Mary,” says Steve, “as you know, 
we are working on some 204(h) legislation.  We have a draft bill, and I wanted to 
know if your members could give some feedback.”   
The proposed legislation dealt with a sensitive topic for employers who sponsor 
retirement plans: Section 204(h) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the 
main legal framework governing pensions and healthcare in the U.S., requires 
employers to notify employees whenever future pension benefits are reduced.  As both 
Steve and Mary knew, many employers were in the process of reducing pension 
benefits, and how those reductions would be communicated to employees was a 
critical point of contention among different players on retirement policy: employers, 
unions, activists, and financial service providers.  Steve’s boss, a liberal Democratic 
Senator who chairs the committee, wanted to introduce a bill that would increase the 
amount of information given to workers, including numerical examples of how the 
benefit cutbacks would specifically affect individual workers. 
                                                 
3 The account is taken from personal observation, but the names of the people, organizations, and issues 
have been changed in order to preserve confidentiality.  
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Mary, who had known Steve for some time, said, “Sure, we’d be happy to get you 
some feedback,” and the two discussed the specific issues covered by the bill, the kind 
of feedback requested, and the timing of the response.  They did not discuss whether 
Mary could identify Steve as the source of the information, whether Mary could make 
the specific issues more public beyond her advisory group of member companies (who 
would be asked to keep the information confidential), or whether Steve would use the 
feedback from Mary’s organization as an endorsement when the bill is introduced.  
Rather, Mary assumed, and Steve expected, that Steve’s request would be handled in a 
certain manner in which confidentiality would be paramount.  Both Mary and Steve 
knew that that bill would not be supported by Mary’s trade association even if Steve 
accepted the suggestions of Mary’s trade association members.  
Why would Steve call Mary if Mary’s trade association would lobby against the 
bill after its introduction?  Why would Mary agree to review a bill that her 
membership would vehemently oppose? 
The second story takes place several weeks after the exchange between Mary and 
Steve.  Steve’s boss introduced the 204(h) bill in the Senate, and Mary is on Capitol 
Hill with a few other lobbyists to lobby against it.  They have an appointment with a 
Senate aide (not Steve) with regard to the 204(h) bill.  Also present are Pat, who 
represents a small trade association similar to Mary’s and Rob, who represents a large, 
broad-based trade association.  All three associations of Pat, Rob, and Mary have 
some overlap in terms of their members.  Pat, Rob, and Mary previously decided to 
form a steering committee for a coalition against Steve’s bill.  The group is loosely 
organized, with Mary’s trade association and a few other trade associations taking the 
lead in setting up appointments with staffers.   
Sarah, the Senate staffer, comes into the reception area to meet the lobbyists and 
usher them into a conference room.  After greetings and some chit-chat, Mary, as the  
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one who set up the appointment, takes the lead:  “Sarah, as you know, we are here 
today to discuss the 204(h) bill that has just been introduced.  We have some more 
detailed information in our leave-behinds,” Mary said, patting the folder in front of 
her, “but I thought I would take a minute to outline the bill’s main provisions and why 
the employer community is concerned about it.”  Mary mentions that Pat will cover 
the practical problems of implementing the bill as his membership includes many 
financial service providers and that Rob will cover the effects on employer-employee 
relations as well as alternatives.  The three lobbyists follow their scripts as they go in 
turn, which had been decided beforehand in the hallway outside, with Sarah just 
asking clarifying questions.  They also give accurate accounts of the reasons for 
supporting the bill but then give their take on these arguments.  When they finish their 
brief presentations, Mary closes by asking for the support of Sarah’s boss when the 
bill makes it to the Senate floor for a vote. 
At this point, Sarah asks more pointed questions like, “What’s wrong with giving 
employees more information, particularly when their benefits are being reduced?”  
“How much more trouble is it to produce a piece of paper that details the effects of a 
change on individual workers?”  The lobbyists expected most of the questions, 
conceding that some ideas in the bill were good but that industry should be given more 
flexibility.  Other questions are more strategic:  “Who is out in front in support?”  
“Can you find an employer in my boss’s state who can speak to the bill?”  The 
meeting closes with the lobbyists promising to following up on some questions and 
highlighting the written materials in their ‘leave-behinds’, including both material 
from individual trade associations and from the coalition fighting the 204(h) bill. 
This vignette highlights the following questions:  Why do groups work together 
instead of pushing separate agendas?  What were the norms and assigned roles that the 
lobbyists followed in their meeting with Sarah, and why did they follow them?    
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The Rest of the Chapter – The two stories just relayed provide both a glimpse into 
the practice of lobbying as well as some preliminary issues.  The next section delves 
more deeply into the motivating questions and issues for this research.  Following the 
discussion on motivations, I present the argument of this paper, including 
propositions, with reference to supporting theoretical and research literatures.  This 
introductory chapter then concludes with an outline of the rest of the dissertation. 
Motivations 
This is a study about lobbying and social norms.  Despite a wealth of theorizing 
and research about each concept, lobbying and norms still raise a number of 
interesting issues.  Lobbying engenders debate about its effects on the political process 
and on policy development.  Sociologists and other social scientists remain concerned 
about how norms emerge, the content of norms, how widely they are distributed, and 
how they are enforced.  This paper looks at the social norms of lobbying and how such 
norms work in a general framework of other norms and legal institutions in the 
political process.  From this perspective, there are a number of motivations for this 
study:  
·  Why do lobbyists and politicians engage in cooperative behavior?   
·  How does cooperative behavior in lobbying affect the political process?   
·  How do social norms in the political world interact with each other?   
·  Is lobbying distinct from activism?   
This section discusses these motivating questions in more detail.   
Why do lobbyists and politicians cooperate?  The story of Mary and Steve 
provides an example of cooperation in lobbying, but it might be helpful to ask first, 
what is lobbying?  I will explore this question in more detail in Chapter 2, but an 
initial discussion here would be useful for the rest of this chapter.  While no standard 
definition of lobbying exists in the academic literature (see the discussion in  
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Baumgartner and Leech 1998),
4 the dictionary definition of lobbying refers to the 
attempt to persuade or influence a decision maker (such as a public official) towards a 
desired decision or outcome.
5  Lobbying can include a number of efforts that are tied 
to the formal political process, as when a trade organization presents testimony at a 
hearing, publicly releases a statement in support of (or in opposition to) legislation, or 
submits an amicus curiae brief in a court case.  Lobbying also includes a variety of 
informal activities such as meeting privately with an aide to a member of Congress, 
gathering with other lobbyists to discuss strategy or swap gossip, monitoring the 
progress of a bill by reading press reports, sharing technical expertise with 
policymakers in an informal setting, holding a fundraiser, or talking “off the record” to 
the media.  While much of lobbying is centered on the transmission of information, 
lobbyists also provide a variety of resources and services for politicians
6 and for each 
other, including financial resources, technical advice on proposals, summaries of 
legislation, and “kitchen cabinet” activities like drafting legislative language.  But 
while these activities may occur once or in sporadic fashion, they often concatenate 
over time such that lobbying is less a specific act or set of actions than a process, 
containing a number of interrelated mechanisms like brokerage and exchange. 
There are numerous opportunities for lobbying.  Formal political processes often 
invite the opinions of individuals and groups such as when a congressional committee 
holds a hearing.  However, formal procedures make up a relatively small part of the 
day-to-day work of official Washington.  The process of government is slow with 
                                                 
4 Definitions of key terms and their operationalization are problematic in the social sciences.  For 
example, see the discussion of terms that are of interest or related to this study in Portes (1998) on 
social capital; Hechter and Opp (2001) on social norms; Moody and White (2003) on embeddedness. 
5 Merriam-Webster online (www.m-w.com).  See also Berry (2004:9001) who defines lobbying as “the 
effort of organized interests to inform policy makers and persuade them to choose particular policy 
choices.” 
6 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term ‘politician’ broadly to include all political decision-
makers, whether they are elected to office or appointed to a bureaucratic position.  
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many and long periods of time in which action on legislation appears to come to a 
standstill.  Such gaps in the formal institutions of government provide ample 
opportunity for informal interaction (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992).   
As shown in the example that began this chapter, informal lobbying is often (but 
not always) a two-way street of information and services; it is often an exchange.  
Because of Steve’s request to have Mary’s association review his bill, Mary now 
knows which way a key legislator wants to go on a policy issue of interest to Mary’s 
membership.  This knowledge is something of value that Mary can use in a number of 
different ways, and Steve undoubtedly is aware of that fact.  However, the exchange 
can be generalized in that Mary may feel more comfortable in later calling Steve on an 
unrelated issue.  From this exchange, Steve and Mary each receive a benefit. 
But such interactions can be risky and costly.  These costs are influenced by 
political institutions that shape the interests and interactions of actors.  For example, 
public comment and criticism occurs late in the process after the politician has taken a 
public position or action.  To reduce the risk of such a negative reaction, politicians 
informally might seek advance information and services from lobbyists (Milbrath 
1963; Chubb 1983).  The politician may be seen as biased in favor of special interests, 
however, if these consultations become public.  Steve’s boss the Senator may not want 
to be publicly associated with the business lobby on this issue, so Steve hopes that 
Mary will treat their communications as confidential.  And while it might appear that 
lobbyists would have every incentive to cooperate with the politician, there are risks to 
the lobbyist as well.  In the story that opened this chapter, Mary may not want it 
broadly known that her organization provided review and feedback on a bill that it 
would ultimately oppose.   
Moreover, politicians have decision-making power at several points in the political 
process, such as when they introduce or vote on a bill.  As the focal point of lobbying  
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before decisions are made, politician may be able to play one lobbyist off against 
another, or perhaps more likely, politicians will not give a lot of weight to the 
arguments of lobbyists who are acting alone and/or on their own behalf.  Thus, 
lobbyists – like Mary, Pat, and Rob – will have an incentive to work together to offset 
their weakness at these decision points, but they may have to compromise their 
individual positions in order to adopt a consensus position.  Joint activity also has 
logistical costs that flow from planning and coordination.  Finally, coalition members 
may defect, behave opportunistically, or free-ride.  For example, Mary, Pat, and Rob 
may take the lead in setting up meetings with congressional staffers to discuss Steve’s 
bill, but other members of the coalition may not make similar efforts to make 
appointments on Capitol Hill. 
Given the costs and risks for all parties, why do politicians risk the wrath of the 
public by seeking feedback on proposals?  Why do competing lobbyists cooperate 
with each other?   
The research literature provides some directions.  One set of models that attempt to 
explain lobbyist activities include the “Iron Triangle” or subgovernment model, which 
claims that many policy areas are dominated by small sets of political actors working 
in impermeable, long-term relationships (Freeman 1965; Cater 1964).  The 
subgovernment model might have been valid in an era when institutional relationships 
were more simple, but the model fell into disfavor, however, because of the 
recognition that policies resulted from an environment in which political relationships 
were more permeable, numerous, and transient than the iron triangle concept allowed 
(Lowi 1969; Heclo 1978; Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury 1993; Hula 1999).  
Another framework – the “issue network” –views interest groups as independent 
actors who move in and out of loose issue-based networks and without the presence of  
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core players around which stable networks would attach (Heclo 1978; Heinz et al. 
1993). 
Some political scientists have recognized the value of stable relationships in 
policymaking.  For example, lobbying groups that have a long tenure or track record 
are often successful with bureaucratic lobbying because such a group will likely be of 
use to the agency in the future (Costain 1978).
7  Informal social relationships in 
lobbying exist and can serve useful ends (Chubb 1983; Milbrath 1963).  However, the 
political science literature has not explored the mechanisms and implications of social 
relationships and social norms among lobbyists.  
Lobbying also could be conceived as a bargaining situation in which actors 
exchange political resources (e.g., Becker 1983).  Economists, particularly in the 
public choice school, view the lobbying process as a market exchange in which 
lobbyists (representing firms and industries) receive policy outcomes in exchange for 
payments to policymakers (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976).
8  In addition, Krugman 
(1998) has articulated a ‘crony capitalism’ view that argues for the intermeshed 
interests of political and economic actors that lead to extreme moral hazard and 
adverse selection. 
However, I argue that cooperative exchanges among lobbyists and politicians 
make sense because they are underwritten by trust and trust-related norms that flow 
from close-knit relationships.  Such close relations take the form of enduring 
interactions both among lobbyists and between lobbyists and policymakers.  Close-
knit relations and associated social norms provide actors with concrete benefits such 
                                                 
7 In contrast, a number of organized interests are known best for their outsider reputations as either 
dissidents or non-specialists.  “These groups appear to contribute little of direct value to specific policy 
decisions because the costs of making their proposed policy changes are very high” (Browne 1989).     
8 One model is a lottery in which the probability of success for the lobbyist is a function of the 
lobbyist’s expenditures relative to total expenditures, and another is an auction model in which the 
highest expenditure wins the policy ‘prize’ given policy makers’ preferences (Fang 2002; Besley and 
Coate 2001; Tullock 1975, 1980).  
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as more credible and fine-grained information, and they reduce the costs to exchange 
by, for example, lowering an actor’s exposure to opportunism.   
If politicians can get better and faster feedback on proposals through those 
relationships that underpin informal lobbying, then the final policy product – 
legislation and regulation – is likely to be better in the aggregate.  In the story that 
opened this chapter, Steve’s bill will be improved by input from people in Mary’s 
trade association, who will look for technical flaws and suggest revisions.  The 
suggestions are not offered to improve the bill’s chances of passage, but if the bill 
were enacted, Mary’s members at least would want the law to be workable in a 
‘technical’ sense.  In addition, there is less likelihood that the law will need 
corrections from subsequent legislation or regulation, which makes Steve and his boss 
look better.  Durable relationships among policy actors leads to a second motivating 
issue: 
How does cooperative behavior in lobbying affect the political process?  Writing 
in 1897, Raymond Bridgman of The Atlantic Monthly relates the following exchange: 
 
When Henry M. Whitney was examined in 1890, at the West End 
investigation, by the House committee of the Massachusetts legislature, he 
was asked the following question:  “Do you state, then, that your corporation, 
as an applicant for legislation here at the State House, finds such a condition 
of things that a regular body of men, known commonly as the lobby, stands 
between the legislature and applicants for legislation, and that, in order to 
avoid having opposition in the legislature, it is necessary to retain them?”  To 
which he replied: “That was my view of the case entirely.”  Mr. Whitney 
testified further that he believed that the employment of those men was 
necessary in order to give his corporation that fair standing before the 
legislature which it ought to have and that if he could have presented his 
arguments to either the Senate or House he should not have felt obliged to 
employ the lobby. (Bridgman 1897: 156) 
 
This quotation illustrates an issue that is central to this study:  That is, does the 
very function of lobbying inhibit participation in the political process?  This concern  
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was more implicit than explicit in our ‘Mary and Steve’ story.  Mary and Steve are 
insiders in a community of lobbyists and politicians characterized by durable and 
long-lasting ties.  This community is set off from others by the social norms by which 
they abide, and the strength of the community – its solidarity – reflects the level of 
commitment to the norms particular to the group of insiders.
9   
In contrast, the outsiders are those actors who are not a part of the community and 
who do not have the relationships that underpin interactions within that community.  
‘Outsider’ can mean the broad public, the media, and/or other political actors.  For 
example, the term ‘outsider’ could include social activists who are concerned about 
the same issues as the insider lobbyists but lack the relationships that exist among 
insider-lobbyists and politicians.   
If close-knit relationships are likely to influence the actions of insiders in the 
political process, what are the implications for political outsiders who are trying to 
change policy?  For example, Bacharach and Baratz (1962) raised the issue of the 
‘second face’ of power, which is the ability to set the agenda and specifically to keep 
items off a policy agenda.  Informal lobbying with its emphasis on trust-based 
interactions, and the inability of outsiders to reach this inner circle of interaction, 
would suggest that the public is effectively blocked from getting issues of broad 
importance on the political agenda except in rare cases.  In the ‘Mary and Steve’ story, 
such outsiders are not mentioned, but the confidentiality of their exchange reflects the 
shadow of the outsider. 
In addition, Olson (1982) argued that collusion among special interest groups leads 
to less efficiency in the economy, more divisive politics, and greater complexity in 
government.  The concern here is that beyond achieving simple efficiency in the 
                                                 
9 This issue is related to, but still distinct from, the issue of the role of business unity in influencing 
policy, which is often explored in research involving interlocking directorates (see Mizruchi 1992).  
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policy process and enhancing information transfer that can improve legislation, groups 
of like-minded lobbyists and politicians will actively work together to promote their 
own shared, narrow interest at the expense of the public interest.  Unlike the prior 
paragraph that noted the appearance of barriers for outsiders, lobbyists are actively and 
jointly working to harm outsiders.  Thus, close-knit relations among lobbyists and 
politicians may lead to real collusion that benefits only a small segment of the 
population. 
How do social norms interact and change?  I have so far highlighted the 
importance of relations that are supported by social norms, but norms can be dynamic 
within the close-knit community.  In our story, Mary’s position as trade association 
lobbyist places her at the intersection of several different lines of relationships – 
relationships that connect politicians, other lobbyists, clients, the press, and the public.  
Figure 1.1 provides a simplified view of these different relationships.   
 
 
Figure 1.1: The Structure of Relationships for Lobbyists 
 
 
Lobbyist 
Client 
Politicians 
The Public 
And Media 
Other 
Lobbyists  
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Because of her position within this network of groups, Mary may be subjected to 
different or conflicting norms that attach themselves to the different positions.  For 
example, as a representative of her trade association members, Mary might owe a duty 
of zealous loyalty to her members, but as a member of a coalition of lobbyists, Mary 
might feel that he has to compromise or soften some aspect of her members’ position 
in order to project a united front.  In such positions, norms may be more or less 
‘costly’ to use relative to other norms. 
In addition, the tension stemming from lobbying in democracy leads to the issue of 
norm ambiguity and conflict.  If trust and trust-based expectations matter within, and 
indeed demarcate the boundaries of, the insider community, they may conflict with 
norms that are not insider-specific when insider relationships (i.e., among lobbyists 
and politicians) collide with outside pressures.   
Many have noted that public policy is marked by long periods of gradual and 
incremental change that are occasionally punctuated by bursts of large-scale change 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  The sources of what is known as ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ are not well known and are likely varied.  However, I suggest that one 
source of change occurs when durable relationships come under exogenous pressure 
that invalidate those trust-based social norms that support the lobbyist relationships.  
When scandal or crisis erupts, politicians forego established ‘folkways’ and react 
quickly; when the pressure lessens, old patterns re-emerge.   
These questions point to a related idea of the instrumentality of norms.  That is, 
how are norms used, if at all, by contending parties in the political sphere?  Social 
activists in seeking to change policy may draw upon more generalized norms such as 
transparency in democracy in order to frame insider relationships, which control 
policy, as corrupt or collusive.    
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A focus on the instrumental use of norms may shed additional light on the 
structure and strength of within-group social norms and relations.  More generally, to 
what extent do norms of a group mark or make group solidarity?  If the norms of the 
group define solidarity, what is the implication of conflicts with extra-group norms?  
Are conflicting norms a zero-sum game in which one must alternate between two 
conflicting norms such that counter-norms have little effect when group solidarity is 
strongest?
10  Do conflicting norms affect the cost of sanctions?   
Is lobbying different from activism?  Finally, the insider-outsider dichotomy leads 
to a fourth issue of sociological interest in political actors.  Unlike political science, 
there is a dearth of research on lobbying in sociology, but there is an impressive body 
of research on social movements.  While this might be a good division of labor with 
political science, it does not help get to the question of how and when insider and 
outsider politics intersect, thus presenting an incomplete picture of the political 
system.   
Some scholars are debating whether social movement actors are really any 
different from other types of interest groups, including Washington lobbyists (Burstein 
1998, 1999; Goldstone 2004).
11  Burstein asserts that scholars should not distinguish 
between social movements and other interest groups (1998: 7-9).  Each characteristic 
that distinguishes social movements from other political groups exists on a continuum 
– for example, between routine and unconventional tactics.  But those continua are 
never defined precisely, and it is not clear how groups should be placed on the 
continua.  Rather, treating social movements like other interest groups can be 
beneficial since we can apply the same theory of collective action to both social 
movements and other political organizations (Burstein, 1999: 8-9). 
                                                 
10 I am grateful to Nicolas Eilbaum for a personal exchange that helped clarify my thinking on the 
interplay between norms and group solidarity. 
11 See Baumgartner and Leech (1998) regarding difficulties in defining interest groups (pp. 25-30).  
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Moreover, social movements are closely intertwined with normal political 
processes (Goldstone 2003).  For example, protest is not the touchstone that it once 
was in social movement research.  “Protest actions have certain advantages over and 
complementarities with political action that make protest both an alternative and a 
valuable supplement to the latter” (Goldstone, 2003: 9).  Even the use of violence is 
not a reliable indicator of outsider status as research has shown a curvilinear process in 
which social movements without any resources or with full acceptance within the 
polity do not engage in violence; only those groups in states with intermediate levels 
of repression and political access engage in violent protest (Goldstone, 2003). 
Goldstone does not argue that social movements are indistinguishable from 
institutionalized groups but that the relationship is more complex than is usually 
acknowledged.  The implication seems to be that social movements can generate 
institutional groups (such as interest groups and parties) and institutions (such as 
democracy) (Goldstone, 2003: 2-3, 9).   
Thus, by approaching issues of identity and norms, I hope through this research to 
contribute to the debate of whether lobbyists and social movement groups are really 
equivalent interest groups or whether significant differences between such groups 
actually exist.  Having explored these motivating themes in some detail, in the next 
section, I provide the theoretical framework for this research and associated 
propositions.   
Social Networks and Norms of Lobbying 
The format of this section incorporates theory and narrative in order to produce 
propositions.  There are five propositions that are summarized as follows:   
·  Consistently working on the same set of issues leads to close-knit or cohesive ties 
among actors.   
·  Actors in close-knit relationships are likely to engage in joint activity.    
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·  Organizations in close-knit communities are likely to have more influence.   
·  A policy domain characterized by close-knit relations is likely to uphold social 
norms that maximize group welfare.   
·  The salience of the group-specific norms makes them targets of socially distant 
outsiders. 
The diverse nature of this argument is reflected in the diverse sources, data, and 
methods of this research.  I plan to use a mixed methodology in addressing these 
propositions.  Focusing on one policy domain (retirement policy), the data will consist 
of longitudinal social network and attribution datasets that are supplemented by in-
depth interviews and other qualitative information.  Sources for the data include, 
among others, lobbyist disclosure reports, archived websites, and secondary sources.  
The methodology will use social network analysis, quantitative statistical analysis, and 
interpretation of qualitative evidence.  Chapter 3 and a technical appendix will lay out 
in more detail how the arguments, set forth below, will be operationalized. 
In addition, my arguments regarding group norms in policy and politics are not 
meant to supplant the role of ideology and policy interests or lift such norms to an 
overarching position in the political process.  In the pages that follow, I lay out reasons 
why I think group norms assist cooperation but also heighten conflict.  An interesting 
question then becomes how group norms work within ideologies and policy 
preferences.  While I do not propose to provide a full answer here, I would suggest 
that group norms work or interact with preferences.  For example, I contend that 
lobbyists are subject to both cooperative and competitive pressures (lobbyists such as 
Mary, Pat, and Rob who work for similar trade associations that compete for 
members).  Despite shared interests, competitive pressures may compel them to work 
apart from each other.  Group norms may tip the scales back toward cooperative 
activity such as coalitions.  As another example that is discussed later in the chapter,  
16 
 
social movement groups make claims in opposition to corporate lobbyists, but the 
claims may be framed in terms of the opposing lobbyists rather than solely on the 
issues.   
The Relational Nature of Policy Domains – The first argument, stated as a 
proposition at the end of this section, is that durable relationships arise from lobbyists 
that work on the same or similar set of issues over time: Mary and Steve’s personal 
relationship of exchange is emblematic of the larger domain of retirement policy.  To 
get to this argument, I start from an exchange perspective.  Social behavior is an 
exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly, 
between at least two persons (Homans 1961).  In general, the more often a particular 
action is rewarded, the more likely the person is to perform that rewarded action.  For 
example, our congressional aide Steve is more likely to ask others for advice if he has 
been rewarded in the past with useful advice.  On the other side, lobbyist Mary is more 
likely to give advice and give it more frequently if she has been rewarded with 
approval in the past.  Moreover, the action is more likely to be repeated when the time 
between behavior and reward is short; long intervals between reward and action would 
result in a lower likelihood of repetition.  Moreover, when a particular stimulus leads 
to a reward, a person is likely to perform the same or similar action when stimuli are 
applied that are similar to those in the past.  Thus, a process of generalization occurs in 
which actors tend to extend behavior to similar circumstances.  There is also an 
affectual component to exchange that exists apart from other benefits and that make 
the exchange relationship an expressive object that is valuable in its own right.  
Repeated interaction works through emotional processes to foster a sense that the 
exchange partners are part of something larger, an entity that the actors will take 
account of and nurture in future interactions (Lawler and Yoon 1996).   
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As we progress from dyadic exchange to multiple exchange relationships, social 
network analysis becomes relevant.
12  A relational perspective stressing social network 
analysis may be useful in getting at social reality in “dynamic, continuous, and 
processual terms” (Emirbayer 1997: 281).
13   
The embeddedness perspective in network analysis “stresses the role of concrete 
personal relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of such relations in generating trust 
and discouraging malfeasance” (Granovetter 1985: 490).  “’Embeddedness’ refers to 
the fact that economic action and outcomes, like all social action and outcomes, are 
affected by actors’ dyadic (pair-wise) relations and by the structure of the overall 
network of relations.”  (Granovetter 1992: 34).
14  In terms of dyadic or relational 
embeddedness, reciprocating ties are generally asymmetric, differing in content and 
intensity, but ties are usually reciprocated in a generalized way (Wellman 1988).  Ties 
link network members indirectly as well as directly such that any tie between two 
actors must be defined within the context of the overall network.
15   
Relational embeddedness typically has direct effects on individual action and leads 
to trust.  Information from a trusted source is cheaper, richer, more detailed, and 
known to be accurate precisely because continuing relations often become overlaid 
with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from 
opportunism (Granovetter 1985).  Embedded exchanges make expectations more 
predictable and reduce monitoring costs; ‘thick’ information exchange of tacit and 
                                                 
12 Social network theory and analysis has a long tradition in political research.  For example, the 
resource mobilization approach uses the patterned links among interest groups to show the structure 
coalitions, cleavages, and competitive relations among such groups and how political actors are linked 
to resources (Wellman 1988; Knoke 1990).  Political process theory also draws upon network models in 
order to understand mobilization and claim-making (Tilly 1978). 
13 “Instead of society, I thus use the term relational setting….As such, it is a relational matrix, similar to 
a social network” (Somers 1994: 72). 
14 Moody and White (2003) commented that the nature of embeddedness, particularly its duality of 
relational and structural, lends a certain imprecision in its usage in the research literature. 
15 “In practice, many ties are with network members whom one does not like and with whom one would 
not voluntarily form a twosome.  Such ties are involuntary in that they come as part of the network 
membership package” (Wellman 1988: 41).  
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proprietary know-how; and joint problem-solving arrangements that stress flexibility 
and feedback (Uzzi 1997).   
The cooperative relationship between Mary and Steve involves such thick 
information such as technical revisions to legislative text, and it includes tacit know-
how in the form of how the information is conveyed:  They did not have to reach an 
agreement, for example, on whether Steve could use the name of Mary’s trade 
association as an endorsement because Steve knew that Mary would not provide the 
feedback if her group were perceived as endorsing the bill.   
In contrast, structural embeddedness typically has more subtle and less direct 
effects on action.  Multiple independent paths that link pairs of structurally cohesive 
actors help information flow among organizations in a way that facilitates politically 
similar activity (Moody and White 2003).
16  Structural embeddedness, which arises 
from sharing one or more foci of activity with others, is less under the control of 
individuals and is more stable than the dyad (Feld 1997). 
In this study, I use the term “close-knit” in place of the more familiar “embedded” 
when describing relationships among lobbyists.  Either terms is meant to distinguish 
long-term and durable relations from those that can be characterized as arms’ length in 
nature.  I prefer the term “close-knit” because it resonates better with the idea of 
group-wide relations that are thick with tacit knowledge and information transfer.  
However, the reader who is more comfortable with the embeddedness literature should 
view the terms as interchangeable. 
In this study, the involuntary nature of ties in lobbying is a function of government 
institutions that create jurisdictional divisions by policy area.  Issues in one policy 
                                                 
16 “In saying this I draw on the principle that to the extent that a dyad’s mutual contacts are connected to 
one another, there is more efficient information spread about what members of the pair are doing, and 
thus better ability to shape that behavior.  Such cohesive groups are better not only at spreading 
information, but also at generating normative, symbolic, and cultural structures that affect our behavior” 
(Granovetter 1992: 35).    
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domain (e.g., tax policy) generally are considered and debated in relative isolation 
from other areas of policy (e.g., defense).
17  So, lobbyists and policymakers are likely 
to specialize in a policy area or areas and have repeated contact with each other.   
Beyond relational and structural effects, embeddedness establishes markers of 
collectivities.  Bourdieu stated that the relationships that provide social capital “are 
more or less really enacted and so maintained and reinforced, in exchanges” (1985: 
249).  Exchange that is endlessly reproduced encourages and produces mutual 
knowledge and recognition:  “Exchange transforms the things exchanged into signs of 
recognition and, through the mutual recognition and the recognition of group 
membership which it implies, reproduces the group” (1985: 250).  Thus, those 
lobbyists and politicians – like Mary, Pat, Rob, Sarah, and Steve – who are part of the 
trust-based exchange network know each other, repeat their interactions, and reinforce 
the identity of their policy domain. 
Building on these different theoretical threads, I argue that a policy domain is 
characterized by durable and informal relationships of the participating lobbying 
organizations, but the strength of the relationship is a property of the group rather than 
the constituent organizations (Moody and White 2003).  Lobbying organizations will 
vary in terms of their specific strength of ties to each other, but the group has a unique 
level of cohesion (i.e., structural embeddedness) that should persist over time.   
Moreover, relationships arise out of shared interests such that an increasing 
number of shared interests contributing to an increasing level of group-wide 
relationships.  Thus, if Mary’s coalition partners have a number of issues on their 
monthly agenda for discussion rather than just a couple, their ongoing relationships are 
                                                 
17 This is not to say that jurisdictions do not overlap; they do.  Moreover, different policy making actors 
and entities often compete for jurisdiction over issues.  And as will be discussed in Chapter 4, some of 
the jurisdictional overlap is institutionally designed.  As a general matter, however, policy work is often 
done through division of labor.  
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likely to be stronger.  Markovsky and Lawler (1994) identify ‘reachability’ as an 
essential idea to group embeddedness, that is, we should be able to trace a path from 
any group member to any other member.  As new relations develop out of shared 
interests, multiple and independent paths between two lobbyists can be traced through 
the group (Moody and White 2003: 106).   
Multiplicity of ties might be expressed in terms of the number of issues or they 
might consist of different kinds of relations.  These relations can be shared issues, 
common membership in a trade association, jointly participating in a coalition, and a 
host of other social actions.  The point is that as a group becomes more close-knit in 
nature, ties or relations expand along different dimensions. 
But multiplicity of relations might only exist at only one point in time:  For 
example, lobbyists might come together once, and only once, to discuss five 
legislative areas of interest, and then depart.  Therefore, time also becomes part of the 
equation.  Steve goes back to Mary again and again for feedback.  When we see the 
same lobbyists working on a number of shared issues over time, we could say that 
they are occupy a set of positions within a web of close-knit relationships.  Therefore, 
I would expect that those lobbyists who operate in one policy area over time would 
increasingly develop a stable set of shared interests with other, similarly situated 
lobbyists relative to lobbyists who do not work consistently in a policy area over time.  
These points lead to the following proposition: 
The Policy Domain Proposition: Lobbying organizations that consistently work 
on a similar set of public policy issues are more likely to have relationships among 
each other that are close-knit in nature.  
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Relationships and Coalitions
18 – The policy domain proposition just discussed 
argues that close-knit relationships develop over, and are characterized by, shared 
interests over time.  However, shared interests over issues should then translate into 
joint activity.  But while lobbyists tend to work together on policy issues of shared 
interest, the question is whether shared interest alone generates this joint activity or do 
close-knit relationships play a role here as well?
19   
As a prefatory note, I want to acknowledge a possible source of confusion in terms 
of the relationships discussed here.  A coalition is itself a set of relationship that can be 
close-knit in nature.  So I want to distinguish for clarity of discussion relationships 
that are part of the Policy Domain Proposition and those that are part of coalition 
participation.  When I state that increasing work on a set of issues within a policy 
domain leads to close-knit ties, I am talking about ties that do not include coalition 
ties.  These ties can include simple awareness of others and informal interactions as 
well as more formalized ties such as membership in a trade association.  The reason I 
distinguish these ties from ties that constitute coalitions is that joining a coalition is 
both voluntary and is an important hallmark of political life in Washington (as well as 
other venues for politics).  In addition, coalitional ties are posterior to the other kinds 
of ties that make up a policy domain.  However, the Coalition Proposition discussed 
here could be viewed as a special case of the Policy Domain Proposition. 
Organizations entering into alliances face considerable moral hazard concerns 
because of the unpredictability of the behavior of partners and the costs from potential 
opportunistic behavior.  Faced with uncertainty about a partner, actors adopt a more 
                                                 
18 For this study, coalitions are broadly inclusive of many types of joint activity, for example, from 
signing one’s name to a group letter all the way to a formally structured coalition with a budget and 
steering committee. 
19 I want to distinguish between coalitions and embedded relationships as the two might be but are not 
necessarily identical.  Mary may have long-term and durable relations with certain other lobbyists in the 
policy domain, but even if they share common interests, they might not form a coalition.    
22 
 
social orientation and resort to existing networks to discover information that lowers 
search costs and alleviates the risk of opportunistic behavior (Gulati 1998).  As 
competition for limited resources is inherent in social systems, particularly in 
hierarchical networks with asymmetric ties, members must use collaborative or 
complementary ties to gain those resources (Wellman 1988).   
It is well established that the network position of an initial contributor combined 
with the overall network density can strongly influence the participation of others in 
the network (Gould 1993).  Those organizations that are consistently embedded in a 
policy domain have superior network positions:  They are more central, they broker 
ideas, and they have more contacts.  Lengthy social and communication networks that 
relay data identify the location and availability of political resources, including 
potential coalition partners (Knoke 1990).  “Mobilization for collective action depends 
on the timely and trustworthy transmission of information within a domain of interest” 
(Laumann and Knoke 1987: 206).  As a result of these processes, these embedded and 
central organizations are the ‘focal points’ (Schelling 1960) around which joint 
activities are formed.   
I assume that lobbyists are rational and interested in attaining some gain, G, from 
their lobbying activities.  The gain might be legislation that incorporates their 
interests, income from member dues or client fees, and/or the social capital from 
enhanced reputation or new relationships that provide information and other resources.  
I also assume that as lobbyists generally work in specialized areas for years at a time, 
the model is based on repeated interactions. 
In pursuing gain, lobbyists with similar interests have a choice: They can work in a 
coalition or they can work alone.  In this case, there is little difference between making 
an offer to work together and receiving the offer.  Gains from cooperation are labeled, 
Gc, while gains from working alone are labeled, Ga.  The probability of lobbyist i  
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achieving Gic is denoted by gic, and the probability of achieving Gia is denoted by gia.  
The probability of gains is a function of different factors; for cooperation, it is gic(Ri + 
∑Rj), where i  ≠ j, and for working alone it is gia(Ri).  In the case of the cooperation, Ri 
is the resources of organization i where resources may be financial and/or non-
financial in nature; and Rj are the equivalent set of resources for i’s partner j.  This is 
an additive relationship between Ri and Rj.   
The decision to work together or work alone, of course, incurs costs, c.  The costs 
of cooperation include:  
·  standard lobbying costs (cl) such as expenses in going to Capital Hill, 
meeting with clients, preparing written materials and that occur regardless 
of coalition arrangements;  
·  coalition costs (cc) such as, for example, scheduling meetings, 
compromising on individual positions in order to achieve a consensus 
position, preparing coalitional materials, arranging group meetings with 
congressional offices; and, 
·  network costs (cn), which are the costs of maintaining relationships in the 
policy domain out of which coalition partners are found.   
The costs of working alone involve the standard lobbying costs (cl) as well as 
‘relationship’ costs (cp), the costs of maintaining relationships between the lobbyist 
and the politician. 
At this point, an illustration of these terms might be helpful to the argument.  The 
lobbyist who would choose to work alone either has some sort of pre-existing 
relationship with a key member of Congress or she is in such a position that they do 
not need the help of others.  As to the former, it is not unusual these days to see former 
members of Congress, such as a Dick Armey or Tom Daschle, work as lobbyists 
because they are trading on the personal relationships that they developed during their  
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public service.  I call these people ‘relationship lobbyists’ because they are using 
relationships to politicians rather than other resources in order to influence policy.  For 
example, Dick Armey, former Majority Leader in the House of Representatives, might 
be able to convince a former colleague to insert a small provision into a bill – the 
proverbial ‘earmark.’  However, such relationships are not cost-free:  They must be 
maintained, such as through ongoing contacts and/or campaign contributions.  A 
lobbyist working alone may also be in a position that she does not need or want help.  
For example, the AARP is so large that it does not want to compromise on its 
positions with potential allies.   
But this scenario does not represent the reality for the many thousands of lobbyists 
crowded into the District of Columbia.  For them, influence stems from their ability to 
put together coalitions that, for example, signal broad support (or opposition) to a 
policy choice or enable more Hill visits than one lobbyist working alone can 
undertake.   
Returning to the model, the choice to engage in cooperative lobbying or to lobby 
along might be expressed as the decision tree in Figure 1.2 below.  For a lobbyist i to 
cooperate (C) with other lobbyists, then the benefit from cooperation (multiplied by 
the probability of successful coalitional work less the coalition costs) must be greater 
than the benefit from lobbying alone (A) (multiplied by the probability of success less 
the costs of lobbying alone): 
Gc*gic(Ri + ∑Rj) – (cl + cc) > Ga*gia(Ri) – (cl + cp) 
Rearranging terms slightly, I get: 
Gc*gic(Ri + ∑Rj) – Ga*gia(Ri) – cc + cp > 0 
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Figure 1.2: Model of the Choice between Coalitional Lobbying (C) versus 
Lobbying Alone (A) 
 
Just focusing on costs, if the costs of coalition work (cc) are very high, then a 
coalition strategy will be unattractive.  If the costs of ‘relationship lobbying’ (cp) are 
high (such the difficulty in establishing a ‘personal’ relationship with a Senator via 
campaign contributions), then a coalition will be more appealing.  The key assumption 
here is that increasing dense ties within the policy domain decreases, all else being 
equal, the costs of coalitional work.  If an organization is more deeply embedded in a 
policy domain, joint activity seems more likely.  If a lobbyist is deeply embedded 
within a network of similarly-minded lobbyists, however, sharing information and 
finding coalition partners would seem easier than if the lobbyist does not have 
embedded ties.   
A question that might be asked at this point is whether embedded relationships are 
more or less important than shared interests in coalition formation.  I would not deny 
the importance of shared interests; indeed, they are the starting point for any joint 
Lobbyisti 
Gc*gic(Ri + ∑Rj) – (cl + cc) 
Ga*gia(Ri) – (cl + cp) 
C 
A  
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activity.  But close-knit relationships are likely to make repeated coalition formation 
easier, particularly when there are a range of issues and interests levels will vary even 
among groups that broadly share the same interests or ideologies.  Moreover, the 
repeated formation of coalitions with the same embedded organizations will thrust 
those organizations into leadership positions, much as what happened to Mary in our 
opening story.  These ideas lead to the second proposition:  
Coalition Proposition: Organizations tied to other organizations by close-knit, as 
opposed to arm’s length, ties are more likely both to participate and be leaders in 
coalitions. 
Influence – Embeddedness should have an effect on organizational outcomes; in 
the business context it might be survival or profitability (Uzzi 1997).  “Influence 
occurs when one actor intentionally transmits information to another that alters the 
latter’s actions from what would have occurred without that information” (Knoke 
1990).  If embeddedness exists and produces joint activity, embeddedness should then 
be a source of influence with others.  This need not be so, however, as influence is 
often a function of resources, which can include financial campaign contributions, 
expertise, or the ability to generate a grassroots campaign in favor of a particular issue.   
However, much like the way I suggested above that highly centralized positions 
created through affiliations of common legislative interests creates focal points for 
joint activity, superior network positions created through embedded ties create focal 
points of influence.  Those lobbying organizations that are more central in the network 
have greater access to better information, and as noted above, these positions are 
reinforced by participation in coalitions of lobbyists.  In turn, such central lobbying 
organizations are able to transmit that superior information to policymakers.  This 
makes the lobbyists more valuable and more influential.  Thus, those who have the 
superior network positions via their embedded ties are more likely to be called for  
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their opinion and feedback.  In short, embeddedness should translate into more 
influence.   
Influence Proposition: Lobbying organizations increase the likelihood of their 
influencing policy when linked to a group network formed around close-knit ties. 
Norms of Cooperation - Establishing trust and developing a sense of community 
are mechanisms for producing new institutions that solve collective action problems 
(Ostrom 1990).  Trust forms the basis for repeated play among bounded actors, and it 
does this through enhancing reliability and credibility.  Norms of confidentiality, 
cooperation, and reciprocity that are based on trust, for example, can stem from the 
thickness of the relational tie:  As trust increases (or decreases), actors in turn modify 
their ties to make them ‘thicker’ (or thinner) by broadening (or restricting) the flow of 
information and stimuli over the ties.  Trust in this sense is conceptualized as 
encapsulated interest, in which the one who is trusted values the continuation of the 
relationship, and the trustee therefore has her own interests in taking the truster’s 
interests into account (Hardin 2002).
20  Mary knows what Steve needs to get the bill 
into shape so Steve’s boss can introduce it.  Mary wants Steve to look good for his 
boss because she wants the relationship to continue.  Steve trusts Mary because of past 
interaction, and he knows that she will want their relationship to continue. 
Trust underwrites the social norms that generate cooperative behavior.  Social 
norms, which are rules of behavior that govern interactions across the set of 
relationships, must be shared by other people and partly sustained by their approval 
                                                 
20 Similarly, trust also enables political participation and interaction.  “Trust, which is so important for 
entry into the public space (either through conventional action or through protest), is a key concept in 
the explanation of why certain types of social ties are more important than others for individual 
participation.  Social ties provide individuals with specific meaning structures which significantly affect 
their perceptions of participation in social movement organizations.  In this respect, close friends 
(especially in the case of organizations without salient public visibility), and participants already 
involved in the organization at the highest levels of participation, are better able to provide prospective 
members with trust than other types of ties”  (Passy 2003: 41).  
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and disapproval (Homans 1961; Blau 1964; Elster 1989b).
21  Time and specificity are 
critical to the development of trust-related social norms.
22  Homans (1961) suggests 
that as norms are particular to a group, the development of such norms is a function of 
the past history of the group.
23  Game theory has developed these ideas; in particular, 
they advance the claim that not only do norms help solve problems of non-cooperation 
but also that non-cooperative dilemmas help generate specific norms (Ullman-
Margolit 1977).  Axelrod’s (1984) computer tournaments, for example, showed that 
tit-for-tat strategies were particularly successful in repeated play.   
The group must have the capacity to enforce norms, either by rewarding adherence 
or punishing deviation (Horne 2001).  Enforcement usually takes the form of informal 
sanctions (Coleman 1990).  The self-interest of parties leads them to monitor 
compliance with norms and report infractions (Ostrom 1990; Ellickson 1991; 
Saxenian 1994), and repeated interaction enables sanctions such as conditional 
cooperation (Diekman and Voss 2003) and reputation loss (Ellickson 1991).   
                                                 
21 Sociology has not always been adept at developing coherent theories of social norms.  Functionalist 
schools of thought (Durkheim [1893] 1984; Parsons 1951; Merton 1968) held that social norms serve to 
promote the survival of the group.  While the functionalist approach has many issues associated with its 
analysis – tautology and the difficulty of translating evolutionary biology to social systems among them 
– the idea persists that social norms develop and exist because they provide a benefit of some kind.  
Another approach has been Marxist and other interest group theories that hold that the most powerful 
groups in society exploit norms in order to further their own interests.  Thus, the idea of false 
consciousness in Marxist thought would hold that social norms encourage proletarians to engage in 
behavior that does not question or challenge the pro-capitalist social order.  The difficulties here are in 
proof: For example, how does a neutral social norm like reciprocity reflect the dominant capitalist 
order? 
22 “In ongoing relations, human beings do not start fresh each day, but carry the baggage of previous 
interactions into each new one….Structures of relations also result from processes over time and can 
rarely be understood except as accretions of such processes” (Granovetter 1992: 34). 
23 “A norm is a statement made by a number of members of a group, not necessarily by all of them, that 
the members ought to behave in a certain way in certain circumstances….Our example is an output 
norm in an industrial group: a statement that no member ought to turn out more than a certain number 
of pieces of work in an hour or a day.  Whereas we call the value put on social approval or on money a 
generalized reward, a norm remains specific to a particular situation: a different industrial group might 
value conformity to a different norm.  Why the group should find conformity valuable is a question 
whose answer, again, depends on the past history of the members in a particular factory or industrial 
community” (Homans 1961: 46).  
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However, sanctioning can be costly (Heckathorn 1990), and this cost could be 
higher if solidarity in the group is high (Hechter and Opp 2001).
24  Costs of 
sanctioning include the risk of retaliation or at least the potential loss of relationship 
(Hirschman 1970), the loss of time or money, or negative affections, etc. (Horne 
2001).  In addition, if a group is interdependent, sanctions can have externalities that 
spill over to members of the actor’s group, and such externalities may affect how other 
members of the group react, i.e., whether they will monitor for violations of norms or 
support sanctions (Heckathorn 1990).     
While we might expect social norms of cooperation and others to develop within a 
community marked by embedded relations, this is not necessarily so.  Embeddedness 
does not necessarily lead to trust although I expect that, in general, the two concepts 
are positively correlated.  Recall that under structural – as opposed to relational – 
embeddedness, ties can be either voluntary as well as involuntary.  In the case of the 
former, trust is a natural outgrowth of embeddedness and reinforces embedded 
relations.  For the latter, trust seems more problematic and more susceptible to 
opportunism because any threats for misbehavior are lessened by the fact that the 
parties have to work in the same space.  Lobbyists might work together on issues more 
out of an intersection of interests rather than out of any set of concrete relations.  
Therefore, the trust we might find in these relationships is likely to be conditional or 
short-lived because the shared interests are short-term in nature.  Of course, initially 
involuntary relationships can turn into voluntary ones that are marked by trust over 
time.
25  
                                                 
24 “However, punishing one’s friends is costly.  Because these costs are likely to be higher the more 
solidary the group is, certain norms might be less likely to emerge in highly solidary groups” (Hechter 
and Opp 2001: 399). 
25 “A player with a network rich in information benefits has: 1) contacts established in the places where 
useful bits of information are likely to air, and 2) a reliable flow of information to and from those 
places.  The second criterion is as ambiguous as it is critical.  It is a matter of trust, of confidence in the 
information passed and in the care with which contacts look out for your interests….We use whatever  
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The problems of cooperation encountered by a group of lobbyists are specific to 
the group; therefore the social norms solving these problems are specific to the group.  
They are meant to support the relationships and transactions that occur among these 
relationships.  If joint activity is critical to influence, then norms should support joint 
activity.  Moreover, there is no third party that is available to impose order on 
lobbyists who do not conform to group norms.  Lobbyists are largely self-organizing 
and self-ruling.
26 
To expect relational norms of cooperation among embedded lobbyists, some 
assumptions have to be made.  We would expect to see group norms that support 
embedded relationships develop more fully within a network of embedded actors; that 
is, where lobbyists are generally interdependent.
27  These group-specific social norms 
incorporate information about the prior interaction(s), about the other’s expectations.  
This last point overlaps with another assumption, namely that lobbyists in a policy 
domain are able to monitor each other.  In this study, I am also concerned with the 
content and operation of social norms in a context of relationships in which repeated 
play is quite strong.
28 
                                                                                                                                             
cues can be found for a continuing evaluation of the trust in a relation, but really don’t know it until the 
trusted person helps when you need it” Burt 2000: 288.   
26 This is not to say that the law has no role in lobbying malfeasance.  The recent Abramoff lobbying 
scandal, like many before it, has shown that the rule of law does apply to acts of fraud and official 
corruption when committed by lobbyists.  However, these are acts that involve lobbyist-and-client 
relations or lobbyist-and-politician relations, which have a higher level of regulation than the workaday 
interactions of lobbyist-and-lobbyist relations, although certain tort actions such as libel, slander, 
defamation, and breach of contract could be applicable in certain situations.  Finally, the shadow of the 
law does make its appearance later in this chapter when the discussion turns to the conflict of norms and 
counter-norms. 
27 While I would expect that social norms would develop in smaller groups rather than larger groups, I 
do not think group size is the important criterion.  As Olson (1965) notes, keeping the group small is 
one path to overcoming the collective action problem so we would expect that community-oriented 
norms are more likely to develop in smaller communities than in larger communities.  This is so 
because we have a limit on the number of relationships that we can maintain.  Therefore, embedded 
relations, and associated social norms, are more likely to be found in smaller networks of embedded 
relations.  The focus here, however, is on a network of embedded relations and not a particular group 
size. 
28 “To generalize the point, if researchers do not analyze the conditionality of a norm, it is unclear just 
what they are explaining” (Hechter and Opp 2001: 406).  
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Specific social norms of embedded lobbyists will be directed towards enhancing 
the welfare of group members as a whole rather than one specific person or actor.  If 
members of the community perceive that the benefits only flow to a select few, those 
members will have little incentive to follow such norms if they do not benefit and even 
less incentive to support such norms if the sanctions are costly.  It may be relevant to 
note here that group welfare is concerned with the group of close-knit lobbyists and 
not the welfare of the general population.  As noted above, Olson noted long ago 
(1982) that lobbyists will have strong incentives to collude in order to benefit their 
shared special interests at the expense of the broad polity and economy. 
Moreover, the maximization of networked relations means that the average gain is 
net of both ‘deadweight losses’ and transactions costs of using informal social 
controls.  Deadweight losses refer to the opportunity cost of non-cooperative behavior 
– The Gc of our prior proposition (Ellickson 1991).  Enforcing such norms – through 
information gathering about transgressors and operating sanctions – also incurs costs, 
and if the costs are sufficiently high, the costs may negate any benefits from 
cooperation.  Thus, we would expect lobbyists to use those social norms that not only 
enhance group welfare but that also minimize sanctioning costs.  As Ellickson (1991) 
notes, the social norms proposed here not only relate to substantive norms (e.g., one 
should cooperate) but also procedural norms (With whom can I expect cooperation?  
When do I complain about non-cooperative behavior?  To whom do I complain?  
What do I get for non-cooperative behavior that damages my interests?).
29  These 
                                                 
29 As to content, Ellickson makes the further requirement that group-oriented norms deal with what he 
calls ‘workaday affairs’ or interactions.  Ellickson makes this restriction in order to solve problems of 
potential indeterminacy stemming from foundational rules that enable voluntary exchange and purely 
distributive norms (1991: 174-176).  While, I, too, restrict my hypothesis to routine interactions, the 
concerns raised by Ellickson have less weight in lobbyist relationships than in the market for beef cattle. 
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procedural costs may act as a brake on the use of certain group-specific norms relative 
to others. 
Cooperative Norms Proposition: Lobbyists whose relations are characterized by 
close-knit ties are more likely to maintain social norms that maximize group welfare. 
Conflict and Collusion – The idea discussed above with regard to norm conflict 
and the cost of enforcement can be expanded to include conflicts between group-
specific norms and norms external to the group.  The issue here is on the legitimacy of 
local norms according to local and global standards of appropriateness or legality.  
Interaction between social movement activists and insider lobbyists shines a light on 
how insider norms operate and are perceived by outsiders.   
The ideas of boundary and distance between groups become important in 
understanding norms as sites of conflict.  With regard to group boundaries, norms can 
be local in nature in that actors on the inside of a community develop norms that are 
specific to their smaller transactional world (Ellickson 1991).  Norms embedded 
within local social relations are not easily discerned by ‘outsiders,’ and even if 
outsiders could learn these normative expectations, they cannot easily develop the sets 
of relationships involved.
30  As a result, the boundary between the outsider and the 
insider can be quite strong (Cook and Hardin 2001).
31   
As to distance between groups, an important characteristic in Granovetter’s 
discussion of the social construction of corruption relates to status differentials or 
social distance, an increase in which facilitates graft.  The idea of distance is not 
unfamiliar in the world of policy: “The more closely political administrators become 
                                                 
30 The connection between group solidarity and the benefits flowing from group membership – social 
capital – are made clear by Bourdieau: “…the profits which accrue from membership in a group are the 
basis of the solidarity which makes them possible” (1985: 249). 
31 Thus, Cook and Hardin critique Fukuyama’s (1995) ‘moral communities’ that “are often models of 
exclusionary tactics that may foster within-group trustworthiness but almost as commonly foster 
distrust of outsiders” (2001: 335).  
33 
 
identified with the various specialized policy networks, the farther they become 
separated from the average citizen” (Heclo 1978: 118).  The idea of distance is also 
implicit in social movement theorizing about identities of actors and hence 
mobilization and claims-making: “Identities define their relations to specific others” 
(McAdam et al. 2001: 137). 
Moreover, competing ideologies, one condemning a norm and the other defending 
the norm, attach themselves to the opposite ends of that social distance.  “This conflict 
of ideologies is not socially random, but reflects real conflicts of interest between 
well-defined social groups in a society” (Granovetter 2005: 12).  Thus, for example, 
Hofstadter (1955) argued that the clean government program of middle class 
Progressives in the early 20
th century United States reflected status anxiety over the 
flood of immigrants who comprised the foundation of urban political machines.  
“What is considered corrupt may result from the balance of power among groups 
struggling to define the dominant view, and this definition may then in turn affect 
those power relations” (Granovetter 2005: 13).   
Unless they evolve into established actors such as political parties, social 
movement activists are perceived as outsiders who will not remain beyond the 
immediacy of the contentious episode because collective action is difficult to maintain 
and/or the underlying claim or issue has an impermanent quality.
32  The social 
movement actor can withdraw from the relationship of routine politics at any time 
with little cost while the established actors are more constrained in changing relational 
and structural ties.
33  Thus, when outside actors get involved in policy areas in which 
                                                 
32 Movements are more interested in the achievement of a specific goal in the present time and are more 
likely to discount the future as a result.  Kleidman and Rochon (1997) suggest this may be due in part to 
turnover in organizational leadership and the lack of learning that occurs between campaigns. 
33 Many have noted that social movements are different from insider political groups.  Movements are, 
in part, collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution (Meyer and Tarrow 
1998; Tarrow 1998; see also Oliver 1989).  McAdam (1982) observes, for example, that social  
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trust-based relationships are strong, they are likely to frame such insider relationships 
as collusive and exclusionary.   
Identities, boundaries, and distance affect the tools or ‘repertoires of action’ for 
social movement actors.  Where boundaries are salient and distance is relatively far 
between lobbyists and social movement groups, group-specific norms of lobbyists are 
likely to be contested by the social movement actors.  The ambiguity of norms may 
give them an instrumental quality; that is, actors will invoke or frame norms in order 
to rationalize self-interest (Fine 2001).
34  Moreover, activists often engage in 
normative change, for example, because they realize that the practices that they wish 
to change do not simply echo norms but make norms real (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 
35).  Granovetter’s discussion of the social construction of corruption builds off the 
idea that practices that are generally known as corrupt can be transformed into 
acceptable practices via ‘principles of neutralization.’  Thus, an employer would 
permit employee theft of office supplies if the employees were paid inadequate wages 
(Granovetter 2005).
35   
In addition, Granovetter notes that the legitimacy of an exchange is a different 
issue than fairness because legitimacy refers to a larger audience than the dyad, which 
is focused on fairness, and is attuned to the appropriateness of the exchange by some 
standard that originates outside the dyad (2005: 3-4).  Social movement groups are not 
only making their own claims but also devaluing the claims of opposing lobbyists.  
Reversing Granovetter’s ‘principle of neutralization,’ activists may use a ‘principle of 
                                                                                                                                              
movements are organized efforts on the part of excluded groups to promote or resist changes in the 
structure of society that involve the use of non-institutional forms of political participation. 
34 For example, in wage negotiations, sheer bargaining power is an important determinant of success, 
but appeal to social norms can be efficacious as in the selective use or adaptation of a norm of fairness 
by both sides.  Yet, norms are more than disguised self-interest in that people believe in norms, and this 
belief gives them credibility.  “The power of norms derives from the emotional tonality that gives a grip 
on the mind.”  (Elster 1989b: 118). 
35 For example, Furman and Stiglitz (1998) note that the same qualities seen positively for pre-1998 
economic success in East Asia (“Business-government coordination improved performance through 
superior handling of information”) was seen as collusion after the 1998 economic crisis.  
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activation’:  An account that identifies an exchange but implies that under the 
particular circumstances a moral violation has occurred.  Because of that moral 
violation, the gains from cooperation through embedded ties, as represented by Gc as 
discussed above, is devalued. 
The parties to the exchange– the particular lobbyists and politicians who engage in 
cooperative interactions repeatedly – are also relevant.  Granovetter suggests that 
successful corruption requires ‘corruption entrepreneurs’ who are masters of social 
network manipulation and who reap the benefits from, for example, structural holes 
and robust action (Burt 1992; Padget and Ansell 1993), but they also have specific 
qualities such as the need for secrecy (2005: 15).  In the case of highly embedded 
lobbyists, social activists would not target the ‘system’ as corrupt or collusive, but 
they would target the most central players or interests within a close-knit group as the 
parties responsible for generating the collusion that blocks participation by activists. 
To illustrate the above discussion, Table 1.1 provides a standard two-by-two 
matrix representation of the alternatives available to a challenging group like a social 
movement organization.  The alternatives result from the interplay between intra-
group embeddedness of the challenged group (such as lobbyists) and inter-group 
distance between challengers and challenged.
36  The horizontal or X-axis represents 
the social distance between lobbyist and challenging groups.  Lobbyists who work on 
different issues are generally pretty close in terms of social distance.  If the 
challenging group is socially near to the challenged group, then the alternatives take 
on an ‘insider’ approach in which accepted norms, procedures, and routines are used.  
If the groups are distant, then an ‘outsider’ approach prevails.   
The vertical or Y-axis is the degree of close-knit ties among members of the 
challenged group.  The level of close relations will likely focus the claim-making of 
                                                 
36 In reality, the axes are not binary but are continuous such that alternatives may not be so clear.    
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the challenging group.  If the challenged group is very close within its own ties, then 
the challenging group’s claim will become focused on the other group or what I call 
‘other-focused’:  Not only will the challenging group proffer its own claims and 
solutions but also downplay those opposing them.  If the opposing group is not close-
knit, then claim is solely ‘claim-focused.’     
Table 1.1 then creates four basic categories of insider/claim-focused, insider/other-
focused, outsider/claim-focused, and outsider/other-focused.  For each of these 
categories, there are different repertoires of actions or tools that the challenging group 
can draw upon (as noted by italics).  In the case of ‘insider/other-focused’ (the upper 
left box), the repertoire might include brokerage and negotiation mechanisms that 
draw upon established routines that both groups support and that are directed at each 
other.  For ‘insider/claim-focused’ (the lower left box), the situation resembles more 
of a formal process: both sides present their respective arguments to the third party 
decision-maker, who makes a decision on the merits.  This could be a court of law as 
lobbyists do not have the close-knit ties with judges, who rely more on formal 
procedures than is the case in the legislature.   
Moving to groups that are more socially distant, the lower right box is 
‘outsider/claim-focused.’  Here the social movement group might hold a protest march 
outside of the Capitol or engage in grassroots letter-writing to members of Congress, 
but the focus is on boosting the salience of their claim, which is the issue generating 
mobilization.  Finally, the ‘outsider/other-focus’ is the upper right box of Table 1.1, 
when the challenging group is facing a highly embedded opposing group.  The 
challenging group not only offers its own claim but also discounts that of the opposing 
group by ‘decertifying’ the opposition.  This is done, among other ways, by contesting 
the norms of the opposing group through the use of ‘principles of activation.’  Thus, 
the social movement group will invoke procedural norms that apply broadly like  
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transparency and/or inclusiveness in the political process in order to characterize the 
meetings and discussions of embedded lobbyists and politicians as ‘collusive’ and 
‘corrupt.’  They may also call for interventions by legal processes that prevent the 
operation of ‘insider’ community relationships.   
 
Table 1.1: Challenging Group’s Repertoires of Action According to Cohesiveness 
of Challenged Group and Inter-Group Social Distance 
 
Social Distance between Groups:   
Cohesiveness of 
Challenged Group: 
 
Near 
 
Far 
 
 
High 
 
 
Insider/Other-Focused: 
Brokerage and negotiation 
 
 
Outsider/Other-Focused: 
Contesting norms 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Insider/Claim-Focused: 
Formal claim-making – 
litigation, congressional 
testimony 
 
 
Outsider/Claim-Focused: 
Protest march, grassroots 
letter-writing 
 
This is a dynamic process.  Initially, a social movement group might use a claims-
focus, but as they discover the presence of highly embedded opposing lobbyists, there 
may be an ‘object shift’ (McAdam et al. 2001) in their claim-making as they include 
characterizations of the opposition.  This may in turn lead to a radicalization of the 
group as they perceive the social distance between them and the ‘collusive’ lobbyists.  
In addition, the social movement group might evolve over time into a group that is less 
socially distant than when it commenced its campaign.  It might find allies on the 
‘inside’ and join in a coalition or it might even decide to set up shop in Washington 
with full-time staff; in effect, becoming ‘insiders’ themselves.    
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Collusion Proposition: When a group characterized by close-knit ties is 
challenged by socially distant actors, the challenging actors are likely to frame group-
specific norms of cooperation as ‘collusive’ or ‘corrupt’. 
The Road Ahead 
This study is unique in that it explores the uses (and abuses) of trust and trust-
based social norms in the political process  This discussion of trust and social norms 
leads to an examination of the social construction of collusion in political life.  
Methodologically, it uses a longitudinal approach to a policy domain by examining 
actors over several years.  In addition, it uses relatively new data sources of lobbyist 
disclosure reports as well as qualitative interviews. 
The dissertation is laid out in the following chapters:  Chapter 2 provides a broad 
background on lobbying in the United States.  Expanding on the short discussion of 
this chapter, I begin with a discussion on what lobbying is.  Chapter 2 then focuses on 
the how lobbying came to be in its present form with a particular emphasis on 
institutional factors that both facilitated and shaped lobbying as well as institutional 
responses to lobbying.  Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion on how lobbying has 
been viewed in terms of its effects on democracy. 
Chapter 3 describes the research site and methodology.  This research focuses on a 
particular area, retirement policy, over a period of seven years.  I give an introduction 
to retirement in the Unites States generally, describe the institutional context of 
retirement and retirement policy, and summarize some of the exogenous trends that 
have been affecting political activity.  In addition, the major players in retirement 
lobbying and their motivations will be described, and I will also introduce the rise of 
retiree activism in recent years.  Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the data 
collection in the research site and the methodology for the qualitative and quantitative 
analysis.  I will discuss the issue again in Chapter 3, but I here want to highlight the  
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unit of analysis.  For the quantitative analysis, I use organizations as the unit of 
analysis while the discussion of norms relies on qualitative analysis of individual data.  
This mixed-method approach, then, results in two levels of analysis.  In part, having 
two units of analysis is a function of available data:  I have neither social network data 
at the individual level (a small exception is discussed in the chapter on influence) nor 
organizational data on norms.  But beyond just the convenience of available data, 
organizational position interacts with personal level relationships and norms – One 
cannot easily separate the two levels when discussing norms and network positions as 
individual position does not easily distinguish itself from the organizational position.  
In addition, the use of two levels of analysis helps tell a complete story about 
lobbying. 
A quantitative and structural perspective on lobbying and activism is provided in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  The purpose of this exercise is to establish the presence and 
influence of ‘socially embedded’ lobbyists, that is, those lobbyists who have the 
deepest relationships within the community and who, according to the previously 
discussed qualitative data, would be expected to value trust-based social norms.  I first 
use social network analysis and other descriptive statistics, and then formal statistical 
methods are provided to test the policy domain, coalition, and influence propositions.  
These chapters will particularly emphasize the longitudinal nature of the lobbyist 
network data, showing how relationships change – and don’t change – over a seven-
year timer period. 
Chapter 6 provides ‘thicker’ descriptions of the relationships among lobbyists, 
policy makers, and those actors that are usually outside of the political process.  That 
is, I flesh out the theoretical argument, particularly with regard to the following 
questions:  How does one become embedded in lobbying relationships?  How do trust, 
norms, and exchange work among lobbyists and policy makers?  Are there  
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repercussions for violations of norms?  These questions are addressed by relying on 
qualitative interviews of lobbyists working in a policy domain.  Chapter 5 therefore 
addresses the cooperative norms proposition. 
After looking at a community of lobbyists, the focus broadens to consider the 
interaction among norms and between community insiders and outsiders.  Using 
qualitative data, Chapter 7 considers questions such as:  How do norms associated 
with different roles in lobbying work or conflict with each other?  Are outsiders like 
social movement activists less likely to value the ‘insider’ trust-based norms?  If so, do 
such trust-based relationships and norms become contested sites for activists as a way 
to offset their relative powerlessness?  In this approach, I address the collusion 
proposition. 
In summarizing the results of the preceding chapters, the concluding Chapter 8 
discusses lobbying within the framework of social ambivalence.  Like the legal and 
medical professions, lobbying can be viewed as a position or role that generates 
conflicting norms, expectations, and values at different levels: lobbyist and lobbyist; 
lobbyists and clients; lobbyists and politicians; and lobbyists and the public.  Chapter 
7 discusses how such conflicting norms and values produce cooperation and collusion, 
and the implications of such cooperation and collusion for democracy will be 
discussed.    
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CHAPTER 2: LOBBYING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 
 
1. If you agree with the aims of the group, it is a “crusader in the 
public interest,” a “voice of the people,” or a “force for good.”  2. If 
you’re indifferent to its cause, it is a “special interest group.”  3. If you 
disagree with its position, it’s a “lobby.”  
  
      - Kiplinger and Kiplinger (1975: 203) 
 
But I had a client come up to me.  I was talking about, I gave a 
little speech about lobbying reform and how it’s not getting done.  It’s 
pretty unbelievable it’s not getting done given what happened earlier 
this year.  And the guy came up to me afterwards and said - now I 
represent his association - he said to me, “I guess since you represent 
our association, I assume you are one of the good lobbyists, not one of 
the scum lobbyists.”  I said, “Yeah, that’s me.”  “And why aren’t 
people like you lobbying to get lobbying reformed?”  And I almost had 
to say, “Because no one’s paying me to do lobbying reform.”     
       
- A lobbyist interviewed by the author (2006) 
 
A walk along K Street 
A short walk along K Street in Washington, D.C., is as good a place as any to 
begin a chapter on lobbying.  Standing on the corner of K and 10
th streets in 2006 or 
2007, the first thing one would notice would be the construction activity as new, 
gleaming high-rise office buildings with lots of chrome and glass were being 
constructed in several places.  Many of these buildings will be occupied by lobbying 
organizations – More on that in a bit.  But after acclimating one’s senses to this bustle, 
one would also notice a small retail and office building at 1001 K Street, shown in 
Illustratoin 2.1a below.  The building, which was built in 1926, was the former 
headquarters of Local 132 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners.  Many 
unions established their headquarters or significant offices in Washington for the 
purpose of attaining legal recognition of the right to organize, bargain, and strike over 
working conditions.  In 1935, during the New Deal administration of Franklin  
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Roosevelt, Congress passed the Wagner Act, which was the first major federal law 
permitting union organizing on a large scale.  In the decades that followed, Congress, 
the courts, and the executive agencies generally expanded the rights of organized 
labor.  But unionized industries began their decline in the 1970s and a Reagan 
administration hostile to the unions limited the rights and gains of organized labor.  
Looking at the Painters’ Union building now, it is perhaps symbolic that the current 
resident is a tourist trinket shop that sells many items made overseas.  The only 
evidence of its prior history is the cornerstone (Illustration 2.1b). 
 
 
Illustration 2.1a: Carpenters Union Building at 1001 K Street, Washington, D.C. 
Source: Photograph taken by the author.  
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Illustration 2.1b: Cornerstone of the Carpenters Union Building 
Source: Photograph taken by the author. 
 
 
Illustration 2.2: Asbury United Methodist Church at 11
th and K Streets 
Source: Photograph taken by the author  
44 
 
 
Heading west, we see a large church (see Illustration 2.2 below) on the southwest 
corner of 11
th and K Streets, which is the Asbury United Methodist Church.  Founded 
in 1836 by 75 free and slave African-Americans, Asbury is one of the oldest African-
American churches in the District and has counted many of the city’s community and 
civil rights activists among its members.  Churches like Asbury formed the backbone 
of many movements, from women’s rights to civil rights to peace movements, and 
these church-based activists used their proximity to the hallways of Congress and 
executive branch agencies to press their claims. 
Another stop a few blocks away is at 1625 K Street, the site of the notorious ‘little 
green house.’  The little green house was the Washington apartment and entertainment 
center of Attorney General Harry Daugherty in the Harding administration (1921-
1923).  Daugherty, a political crony from Harding’s home state of Ohio, often 
entertained the president, members of the cabinet, and other Ohio political and 
business associates – known colloquially as the ‘Ohio Gang’ – with all-night poker 
parties and drinking at 1625 K Street.  At these sessions, Daugherty was reputed to 
have colluded with political loyalists in the sale of pardons and immunities from 
prosecution.  The intimacy of this setting also enabled Albert Fall, Secretary of the 
Interior, to convince President Harding to transfer large tracts containing oil reserves 
in the Western states from the Department of the Navy to his own Interior Department.  
Oil company interests then were able to lease these reserves for little cost in exchange 
for bribes to Fall, Attorney General Daugherty, and others in the Harding 
administration in what became known as the Teapot Dome scandal.  The little green 
house, which today has been replaced by a bland office building, probably gave birth 
to the impression of K Street as a den of corruption.  Some of the recent scandals refer 
to this street:  The “K Street Project”, for example, was an arrangement in which  
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Republican congressional leaders would pressure lobbying firms to hire Republicans, 
who in turn would contribute to the campaign funds of GOP members of Congress. 
All along our walk, we have passed existing modern office buildings or new ones 
in the process of construction, which we first noticed when we started from the former 
Carpenters Union building (see Illustration 2.3 below).  Washington, D.C., has seen a 
veritable building boom in office space in the downtown area.  As an industry analyst 
notes, “the cost of office space in downtown D.C. has surpassed properties in 
Manhattan and Los Angeles on a per-square-foot basis” (Fisher 2006).  Of course, not 
all the office space is reserved for lobbying organizations as there are a large number 
of private firms that supply services to the federal government.  However, as I will 
discuss later in the chapter, the boom in construction activity is matched by a boom in 
the number of lobbyists at the federal level. 
 
 
Illustration 2.3: View of K Street Construction in 2006 
Source: Photograph taken by the author.  
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Like any other urban street, K Street is a dense space of buildings, people, and 
infrastructure, but our walk showed a density of diversity and history related to 
lobbying.  Our popular conception is of lobbyists as well-dressed professionals in new 
office buildings.  But lobbyists are also, among other things, activists in pursuit of 
civil rights; advocates for labor rights; and self-interested actors solely seeking private 
gain.   
This chapter discusses the origins of, and context for, lobbying in the United 
States.  The central argument of this chapter is that lobbying is deeply rooted within 
American democracy as it complements the formal processes and institutions of 
government.  However, particular qualities of lobbying, chiefly those of physical 
proximity and social relationships, mark the process of lobbying for political and 
popular attacks.   
Following up on Chapter 1, this chapter begins with a discussion on what 
lobbying is.  The next section focuses on the how lobbying came to be in its present 
form with a particular emphasis on institutional factors that facilitated lobbying as 
well as institutional responses to lobbying.  Lobbying, and indeed other forms of 
political participation, are rooted in ancient political rights.  While lobbying is open to 
all and is constitutionally protected, the distinction between insider and outsider has 
mattered for influence purposes since the earliest days of the U.S. government.  The 
chapter concludes with short overview of popular perspectives on lobbying. 
What is Lobbying? 
As noted elsewhere (e.g., Nownes 2006), lobbying is a process that 
encompasses a number of activities, some of which occur simultaneously.  As noted 
by the American League of Lobbyists, which is an association of lobbyists that would 
professionalize the institution of lobbying, there is a great deal involved in the practice  
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of lobbying.  Principal elements include researching and analyzing legislation or 
regulations; monitoring and reporting on developments; attending congressional or 
regulatory hearings; working with coalitions interested in the same issues; and then 
educating not only public officials but also the media and general public as to the 
implications of various changes (American League of Lobbying 2006).   
If we were to ask Mary, our fictional lobbyist, what she did in a typical day, 
she might say, “Meetings.”  After getting to her office around 9:30 and checking 
emails and voicemails, Mary will probably spend some time getting ready for the next 
meeting on her schedule.  Mary spends a significant portion of her day setting up 
meetings with other lobbyists, her association’s members, and with policymakers.  She 
is then out at meetings or running conference calls from her office or the association’s 
conference room.  In between these meetings, she might stop to chat with other 
lobbyists or make some calls from the cab on the way back to the office.  At the end of 
the day, she might find a block of time to write up some talking points for an 
upcoming visit to Capitol Hill or a summary of a new bill that’s been introduced that 
will be posted on the association’s website.  Or she might head back up to the Hill for 
a committee hearing, at which she will take notes, get a word in with a busy staffer, 
and trade gossip with other lobbyists. 
Both in the American League of Lobbying’s description and in my thumbnail 
sketch of Mary’s day, there is the flow of communication.  It is the job of lobbyists 
like Mary not just to stay on top of the flow but occasionally to direct it as well. 
So, we have a broad range of activities, but how do we define lobbying?  A 
number of definitions exist:  Under section 308 of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 
1995, any person “who shall engage himself for pay or for any consideration for the 
purpose of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation by the  
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Congress” must register under the lobbying disclosure rules.
37  According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (2006), a lobby in a collective sense refers to those “who 
frequent the lobbies of the House [of Commons]” or, in the United States, “the persons 
who frequent the lobby of the house of legislature for the purpose of influencing its 
members in their official action.”
38   
As noted in Chapter 1, no standard definition of lobbying exists in the 
academic literature (see the discussion in Baumgartner and Leech 1998), but they are 
similar enough that we can choose one.  Berry (2001: 9001) defines lobbying as “the 
effort of organized interests to inform policy makers and persuade them to choose 
particular policy choices.”  The term ‘interest’ is not simply any value but rather 
“arises from the conjunction between some private value held by a political actor – 
public officials, or groups thereof as well as private sector operatives – and some 
authoritative action or proposed action by government” (Salisbury 1994: 12).  
Organized interests then engage in communication efforts: “The most general way to 
state the nature of the lobbyist’s job is to note that he must in some way communicate 
with governmental decision-makers” (Milbrath 1963: 115). 
Influence is the other part to Berry’s definition and is part of many other 
definitions, but influence itself is evasive of clear definition.  In modifying 
Baumgartner and Leech’s definition (“an effort to influence the policy process”), 
Nownes suggests that lobbying “is an effort designed to affect what the government 
does” (2006: 5).  So, communication and an intent to influence (but not actual 
influence) are both necessary and sufficient for a definition of lobbying. 
                                                 
37 There are some other technical requirements such as the amount of time spent lobbying.  Thus, the 
focus is on people who make lobbying a more or less full-time pursuit as discussed below. 
38 Thus, during an 1808 debate in Congress about moving the seat of government from Washington 
back to Philadelphia, one member noted, “If we move to Philadelphia we shall have a commanding 
lobby.”  Debates of the Congress (1852: 2 Feb. 1808, 1536).  
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Focusing on definitions casts a wide net on activities but still misses some key 
elements, and highlighting these elements necessarily narrows the focus of this 
research.  One key element in lobbying is physical presence.
39  The term itself refers to 
one who is waiting outside the doors of the decision-makers.  Pasley picks up on this 
idea by defining lobbying as “when some group or individual, typically a private 
economic interest seeking benefits or protection, makes its case personally to 
government decision-makers, often but not necessarily through some sort of specially 
deputed emissary” (2002: 59; emphasis original).  Nownes notes that lobbying is a 
complex phenomenon that takes a variety of forms.  In illustrating these forms with 
four examples, he uses a common phrase – “meets personally” – in each example 
(2006: 2-3).  The importance of personal presence is highlighted by the testimony of 
the lobbyist Sam Ward, speaking in 1875: 
 
To introduce a bill properly, to have it referred to the proper 
committee, to see that some member in that committee understands its 
merits, to attend to it, to watch it, to have counsel to go and advocate it 
before the committee, to see that members of the committee do not 
oversleep on the mornings of important meetings, to watch for the 
coming in of the bill to Congress day after day, week after week, to 
have your men on hand a dozen times, and to have them as often 
disappointed; to have one of those storms which spring up in the 
Adriatic of Congress, until your men are worried, and worn, and tired, 
and until they say to themselves that they will not go up to the Capitol 
today – and then to have the bird suddenly flushed, and all your 
preparations come to naught – these, these are some of the experiences 
of the lobby.  (Byrd 1991: 496-7). 
 
The physical presence of lobbyists often translates into personal relationships 
that channel communication and influence.  Rothman (1966) relates the following 
example from the Gilded Age:  “Herbert Terrill, agent for the sugar refiners, explained 
                                                 
39 By highlighting physical presence, I exclude other forms of lobbying such as grassroots activities, 
which are also characterized as ‘indirect lobbying.’  
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that he discussed rates only with friends; with others ‘I presumed my views would not 
have had much weight.’” (1966: 205).  Corporations disliked high turnover in 
Congress, relates a senator in the 1890s, because their lobbyists could not form stable 
connections to members (Rothman 1966). 
Another element involves representation.  Lobbying can be on behalf of one’s 
self, such as when a person seeks a public pension or a position in government.
40  In 
the early Congresses, it was not unusual, as in the English manner, to receive petitions 
and then pass acts that implemented that particular petition.
41  But by the early to mid-
19
th century, lobbyists more frequently were agents on behalf of other persons or 
interests as the floodwaters of requests to Congress continually rose. 
Representation highlights the relationship of lobbying to the broader processes 
of politics and policy.  Thompson highlights the importance of representativeness in 
her definition of lobbying, which is the process by which the interests of discrete 
clienteles are represented within the policy-making system:  “Lobbyists, then, can be 
defined as representatives who act concurrently with, and supplement the capabilities 
of, those who are selected at the polls” (1985: 140).  This idea will be discussed more 
below, but lobbying is so durable in this democracy because lobbyists are 
representatives of cross-cutting affiliations, groups, and even of specialized 
knowledge.  By the 1890s, for example, 
 
Agents typically answered the inquiries of interested Senators, 
explaining the various proposals on the calendar and clarifying the 
pertinent but dull details of intricate bills.  With regularity, they 
supplied information that only representatives of particular 
organizations could gather.  Helping members of Congress to 
understand the increasingly technical issues that came before the 
                                                 
40 “One of our fellow-travellers seemed to be a disappointed place-hunter, who had been lobbying the 
Houses of Legislature in vain for the whole session” (Lyell 1855: 28). 
41 For example, many Revolutionary War veterans or creditors of the army sent petitions for a pension 
or repayment for services rendered (Bowling et al. 1998).    
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chamber, lobbyists became the experts in an era of specialization.  
(Rothman 1966: 203) 
 
Another aspect of lobbying is that it can be a profession or an occupation, 
which can be seen in the latter part of the nineteenth century by one observer:   
 
The term includes both those who, since they hang about the 
chamber, and make a regular profession of working upon members, 
are called ‘lobbyists,’ and those persons who on any particular 
occasion may come up to advocate, by argument or solicitation, any 
particular measure in which they happen to be interested. (Bryce 1910: 
691) 
 
Lobbying is not an occupation or profession in the classic sense – there is no 
regulating body like a bar or medical association – because the process draws on 
political rights and values that are open to all.  Its status as an occupation or profession 
arises out of the combined effects of time, personal relationships, and proximity.  The 
idea of year-round presence in the form of an occupation also supports the 
development of personal relationships among those active in the policy process. 
Having spent some time discussing what is lobbying, the next section provides 
a background on the development of lobbying over time, which will shed additional 
light on what is the process of lobbying as well as amplify some themes of this study. 
How did lobbying come about? 
Where did lobbyists come from and when did lobbying manifest itself?  How 
has lobbying changed over time, and what accounts for these changes?  The section 
presents a brief social history of lobbying, which gives an important context for the 
rest of the study.  In order to keep the discussion necessarily brief, I organize it around 
what I call ‘inflection points’ that mark changes in the trajectory of the development 
of lobbying.  These inflection points are the changes in the institutions of government 
as well as environmental mechanisms such as war and the economy.  In summary, we  
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can trace the development of lobbying over four inflection points: The first 
Congresses of the late Eighteenth Century to the Civil War; the immediate post-Civil 
War period known as the Gilded Age (circa 1865 – 1890); the rise of Progressive 
reform (circa 1890 – 1917); the two World Wars and the New Deal (1917 – 1960); 
and the Civil Rights era and beyond (1960 – present).  These are approximate 
identifications of historical periods that do not have clean divisions, but they provide a 
framework for viewing the development of lobbying.   
Moreover, much of the following discussion concerns lobbying on behalf of 
business.  This is appropriate in that much of this study involves lobbyists working on 
behalf of corporate employers and financial service firms.  Moreover, the data and 
research on business lobbying is quite good relative to other interest groups, and 
intuition suggests that business groups are more stable.  With this focus in mind, the 
development of business-oriented lobbying is guided by Stigler’s (1971) idea that 
business effectively buys regulation.  Regulation that benefits an industry, or some 
segment of an industry, is more common than regulation that is overly onerous to 
industry.  Business benefits from regulation by restricting new entrants into industry, 
price-fixing, subsidies, and by encouraging complements to its products and 
discouraging substitutes (Stigler 1971).  Thus, there is an effective demand for 
regulation by industry, and this demand will be in evidence as I discuss the growth of 
lobbying. 
First, however, I want to discuss some of the institutional precursors to 
lobbying.  That is, what are (or were) the rules of the game that influenced the rise of 
lobbying?      
Institutional Precursors and Influences: Petition and Association – The 
institutional context for lobbying comes from two complementary sources, the rights 
of petition and association; the former deals with making claims and the latter  
53 
 
concerns social groups in civil society.  These two rights are derived from the English 
common law rights of petition and assembly (Rice 1962).  The right of petition dates 
back to at least the 13
th century Magna Carta,
42 which was reaffirmed by the English 
Bill of Rights in 1689.
43  The right of petition was exercised in the American colonies, 
most notably when colonists petitioned to King George III prior to the outbreak of the 
Revolutionary War (Rice 1962).
44  The Constitution of the United States incorporated 
the right of petition in the First Amendment.
45   
The Supreme Court in 1961 determined that lobbying was an important means 
of petitioning government and thus is protected, to an extent, by the Constitution.
46  
The case involved the right of a group of railroads to wage a lobbying and public 
relations campaign against the trucking industry.  The truckers sued the railroad 
association by charging a conspiracy to foster the adoption of laws and law 
enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business as well as to create an 
atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among the general public.  However, the Court 
stated: 
 
The right of the people to inform their representatives in 
government of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement 
of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing 
so.  It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in 
                                                 
42 Chapter 61 of the 1215 Magna Carta has been translated as follows: “If we, our chief justice, our 
officials, or any of our servants offend in any respect against any man, or transgress any of 
the articles of the peace or of this security, and the offence is made known to four of the 
said twenty-five barons, they shall come to us - or in our absence from the kingdom to the 
chief justice - to declare it and claim immediate redress.” This translation (the original is in 
Latin) is from the website of the British Library and can be found at: 
http://www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/translation.html 
43 The English Bill of Rights of 1689 provides in pertinent part: “That it is the right of the subjects to 
petition the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal…” (Rice 1962). 
44 The first American colonial treatise that codified the right of petition was the Body of Liberties by the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony Assembly in 1641 (Fatka and Levien 1998). 
45 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” 
46 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).    
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the hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a 
disadvantage to their competitors.  365 U.S. at 139. 
The related rights of association and assembly reflect an institutional concern 
with groups in civil society, a concern that can be traced back to ancient Greece.  Plato 
argued that a state needs to be unified in its beliefs, while Aristotle countered that such 
homogeneity was detrimental.  This debate continued into the present era; for 
example, Hume discussed the dangers of factions for government.  These beliefs are 
reflected in the arguments of the framers of the Constitution, who were distressed by 
the narrow-minded politics that were dominating state governments in the new 
Republic.  As discussed in Madison’s Federalist Number 10, the new federal system 
contained a number of checks on the power of ‘factions’.  The lodging of supreme 
authority in a national government meant that interests would be aggregated and 
balanced out by each other.  The use of representatives, who would be somewhat 
removed in a national capitol, would help move debate above local self-interests.  The 
different branches of government, each with its own set of powers and jurisdictions, 
would make capture of the government difficult for any one set of interests.   
Legislative procedure in the early Congress also influenced early lobbying.  An 
early institutional distinction was made between public bills, which affect society 
broadly, and private bills, which affected only one person or organization.  Unlike the 
British practice of utilizing different procedures for the type of bill,
47 since the first 
Congress all bills regardless of scope have been handled in the same way.
48  
Moreover, the Congress had jurisdiction over a wider range of issues and claims than 
                                                 
47 In the United Kingdom, private bills are not assigned to a committee but are dealt with by a small 
judicial-like panel that only involves a few Members of Parliament and that rules on private bills in a 
judicial manner, after permitting the introduction of evidence in support of or against the bill (Bryce 
1910). 
48 “The lobbies of the legislative halls are filled with a class of men called agents, whose business it is, 
to work private bills through Congress, or public bills, in which, like the Morrill tariff, private interests 
are deeply concerned, by means of influence upon members” (Spence 1862: 37).  
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the British Parliament.
49  The American legislative system thus was conducive to 
bringing in a large range of interests in a way that avoided other institutions like the 
courts.   
The institutional structure in the U.S. system afforded many opportunities for 
lobbying as a number of points of access were opened up through the system of checks 
and balances.  This is particularly the case as Congress organized the legislative 
process through semi-autonomous committees of jurisdiction.  Moreover, the lodging 
of authority in a national government that was removed from the local level and the 
insulated nature of legislative interaction meant that lobbying activities could be 
shielded from the public view.  Almost immediately with the opening of the first 
Congress in 1789, lobbyists were present. 
The Early Republic: A Tale of Two Lobbyists – There are many indicators of 
lobbying in the early Congress.  For example, William Hull was hired by the Virginia 
veterans of the Revolutionary War in order to lobby for additional compensation for 
their war service.  In 1792, Hull wrote to other veterans’ groups, recommending that 
they have their “agent or agents” cooperate with him during the next session to pass a 
compensation bill (Byrd 1991).  During a debate in 1802 about moving the national 
capitol back to Philadelphia, Representative Lyons of Kentucky argued against 
moving because if “we move to Philadelphia we shall have a commanding lobby.”  
(Annals of Congress, 10
th Congress, 1
st Session. 1852: 1536).  Following Lyons’ 
comment, according to Pasley (2002), other Representatives began to refer to lobbies 
more frequently and in a negative sense.  It was not long before the actual term 
became common:  H.L Mencken (1931) finds that in 1829 there were “lobby-agents” 
                                                 
49 For example, in England claims against the government must be brought before a law-court in the 
form of a Petition of Right (Bryce 1910).  
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at Albany, and in 1832 “lobbying” had been extended to Washington.
50  The Oxford 
English Dictionary, which provides examples of the earliest written usages of defined 
words, finds usages of the verb, to lobby, dated 1837, 1848, 1850, 1855, 1860, 1862, 
and 1864.   
The idea of boundaries between insider and outsider was an important facet of 
early lobbying.  Pasley (2002) argues that one’s reputation in late 18
th century 
America was based on one’s level of gentility and social refinement.  For those who 
were recognized as genteel and refined, it was relatively easy to enter into the lodgings 
and work areas of members of Congress, and their arguments were given more weight.  
As Pasley notes, “the access to the powerful that modern lobbyists must fight tooth 
and nail for, an eighteenth-century gentleman could walk into noiselessly and almost 
automatically” (2002: 90).  Speaking of the Rev. Manesseh Cutler, a lobbyist who 
successfully persuaded Congress to ignore its own land laws and award ownership of 
several million acres of Ohio territory to his group of investors, Pasley remarks: 
 
Once acknowledged as a fellow gentleman, a lobbyist could not 
only see a congressman but join fully in their social life at the seat of 
government, providing all sorts of nonofficial settings where contacts 
could be built and sensitive business matters could be discussed 
discreetly and effectively.  Gaining access was not always quite as 
simple as walking the walk and talking the talk.  It helped to have 
evidence of gentility beyond one’s personal qualities, such as a noble 
title, a well-known family name, or recommendations from other 
members of the club.  Cutler took the latter route, bringing so many 
letters of introduction with him to New York [then the national 
capitol] that it takes an entire page of the published edition of his 
journal just to list it all.  Admitted to the club, Cutler used his 
membership privileges to the hilt.  Almost all his lobbying took place 
at private homes or social gatherings. (2002: 90-1)  
 
                                                 
50 Mencken (1931) argues that “lobbying” and “lobbyist” are particular examples of the unique brand of 
English spoken by Americans; in fact, in “two other familiar fields very considerable differences 
between English and American are visible…They are politics and that department of social intercourse 
which has to do with drinking” (Mencken 1931: 97).  
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In contrast, consider the case of the Quaker abolitionists, who lobbied 
Congress at roughly the same time as Rev. Cutler.  Petitions for anti-slavery 
legislation were sent by Quaker Meetings in Philadelphia and New York, and nearly a 
dozen Philadelphia Quaker leaders spent several weeks in New York, then the 
temporary home of the Congress, engaging in a variety of activities designed to press 
their case (Pasley 2002).  The Quakers published pamphlets based on their petitions, 
they visited the meeting place of Congress, and they went to the lodgings of members 
of Congress.  It was a highly organized, multidimensional effort that ultimately 
resulted in failure, and such a visible campaign was not imitated by other groups for 
some time.
51  These two lobbying experiences underscore the fact that being a 
‘member of the club’ is important but membership requires adherence to certain 
expectations.  Lobbying is largely an in-person activity that relies on personal 
connections and relationships.
52   
Post-Civil War: The Professional Lobbyists – Lobbying would undergo 
significant change in the years following the end of the Civil War in 1865.  It also was 
in the post-Civil War era that lobbying became part of the national consciousness.  By 
1884, a magazine profiling life in general in the nation’s capitol would write: 
 
There are professional lobbyists who go there in numbers every 
winter; their doings and their methods, with their restaurant dinners, 
their hotel life, their intrigues, and their secret conferences, can be 
traced by the aid of a detective reporter; and the spectacle is by turns 
exciting and repulsive, instructive and indecent (The Century 
Magazine 1884: 654) 
                                                 
51 In fact, the editors of The Documentary History of the First Federal Congress write, “Congress took 
steps to prevent a repeat of that episode”:  Congress devised a gag rule in which all anti-slavery 
petitions were tabled automatically (Bowling, DiGiacomantonio, and Bickford 1998: 314). 
52 The importance of physical proximity for lobbying in the later antebellum era is also illustrated by 
newspaper correspondents who were then (but not now) permitted to sit on the House floor.  For this 
privilege, reporters were required to pledge that they were not employed as agents to pursue any claim 
before Congress (Byrd 1991).  Yet an 1854 Congressional report found that such press reporters “are 
very generally regarded as the most efficient agents…we find that, in utter disregard of this pledge and 
its spirit, they have been employed in many of the railroad, patent, and other schemes which have 
engaged the attention of Congress” (Byrd 1991: 493).  
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Lobbyists became so numerous and overt in this time that the coining of the 
term ‘lobbyist’ is credited – inaccurately – to a story about President Grant.
53  But 
there was a reason for their heightened profile:  “In the 1870s, when party did not 
superintend the course of Senate affairs, lobbying for the first time became a vital 
element in government” (Rothman 1966: 192).  Both economic organizations and the 
government fundamentally changed during the latter half of the nineteenth and early 
part of the twentieth centuries.  Certainly the growth of large firms, particularly the 
railroads and vertically integrated firms, contributed to the use of lobbying (Porter 
1973).
54   
But was there a demand for lobbying by government?  Lobbying in the post-
Civil War era was filling a growing institutional void.  As noted above, the 
Constitution and its framers envisioned a particular version of representation that 
Congress was to fulfill, but this vision was predicated on certain assumptions that no 
longer held up in the post-Civil War era (if it ever did) as the federal government 
expanded its jurisdictional purview and as the country expanded in population, large 
economic organizations, and geographic size (Thompson 1985).  Due to the 
discrepancy between vision and reality, lobbyists grew in numbers in order to serve as 
representatives between an increasingly disaffected citizenry and an overwhelmed 
Congress. 
Three factors in particular made lobbyists practically necessary to the 
functioning of government (Thompson 1985).  First, unlike today, most members of 
                                                 
53 The story is that Mrs. Grant did not like President Grant’s habitual drinking so Grant began going to 
the bar at the nearby Willard Hotel for a mid-afternoon whiskey.  Men seeking an audience with the 
President soon learned that could approach him in the lobby of the hotel.  Exasperated that he was 
running an ever-expanding gauntlet each day, Grant complained bitterly of all the ‘lobbyists’ who were 
getting in the way of his toddy (Smith 1997). 
54 For example, President Lincoln signed the Pacific Railway Act in 1862, in which the federal 
government spurred the construction of a transcontinental railway.  Over the next 15 years, railroads 
would compete for subsidies, construction loans, and lucrative land grants (Congressional Research 
Service 1986).  
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Congress in the post-Civil War era did not think of their service as a career; even those 
professional politicians focused on local and state politics and viewed federal service 
as a necessary but temporary obligation to bring federal benefits to local communities.  
The result was a high rate of turnover in both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate.  Second, members of Congress had no staff resources.  At most, a member 
might have a secretary.  Working at their desks in their respective chambers,
55 a 
Representative or a Senator did their own correspondence and legislative drafting.   
Third, the period saw a vast increase in the workload of the federal government 
and, hence, that of members of the legislature.  The Civil War erased the obstacles to a 
large, centralized, and powerful national government. 
 
By the Age of Grant the Capitol had, in other words, clearly 
overextended itself.  As welfare agency, employment bureau, 
ombudsman with the bureaucracy for constituents, policy initiator, 
program implementer, political barometer and partisan testing 
ground, oversight watchdog, and self-styled (if only sometime) 
guardian of the public virtue, the House and Senate had assumed or 
been asked to handle a range of responsibilities that collectively 
and, in most cases, individually exceeded dramatically their normal 
pre-Civil War, peacetime workload.  (Thompson 1985: 50) 
These factors exposed a flaw within the constitutional system of 
representation.  That is, as the framers, dealing with a new system and justifying a 
framework that covered a large and diverse polity, envisioned a system of 
representation that would encourage reflection of the commonweal rather than 
parochial will.  However, Washington in the 1870s was not only the seat of 
government, but it was “the centre from which radiate the varied influences which 
affect every citizen of the Republic, from the millionaire to the man dependent on his 
daily earnings” (McCabe 1873: 5).  As opposed to constituencies, Thompson argues 
that clienteles arose, detached from geographically distinct districts, and that within 
                                                 
55 Members of Congress did not have separate offices then; today, there are six large buildings 
dedicated solely to office space and meeting rooms in addition to leadership offices in the Capitol itself.  
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each congressional district there were multiple and overlapping clienteles:  “Seeing 
representation not as an unvarying and constant relationship between legislators and 
constituents but rather as a multidimensional interaction among numerous discrete and 
overlapping clienteles and their agents – who may or may not be members of 
Congress – illuminates both the context and complexity of the process” (1985: 137). 
In the face of such difficulties, lobbying was a representational device that 
provided fluidity and precision in meeting discrete yet overlapping clienteles; that 
could be highly organized but informal in design; and that was compatible with 
governmental decision-making processes.  “It must, therefore, operate in ways that 
foster cooperation from those within the process: by providing services that are 
beneficial to them, for instance, or by facilitating the execution of their 
representational responsibilities to heterogeneous constituencies” (Thompson 1985: 
139).  Lobbyists could specialize and could afford to work in a bipartisan fashion.  
Since their work did not begin or end with the electoral cycle, they could be a source 
of continuity amidst turnover among lawmakers. 
But this growth in government also strained lobbying.  Lobbying was a 
particularistic practice in Gilded Age Washington.  For example, Rothman (1966) 
suggests that lobbyists were largely operating alone and in an uncoordinated fashion.  
While information and statistics were certainly needed and requested from lobbyists, 
personal qualities of civility and gentility were what counted most.  Consider the case 
of Sam Ward, the self-proclaimed ‘King of the Lobby.’  Ward was acknowledged to 
be the most important lobbyist in 1870s Washington because of his superb social 
connections and lavish entertaining (Byrd 1991).
56  Ward, an adventurer and diplomat, 
                                                 
56 This is apparently no small claim.  In later years, his biographer notes, Ward was recognized as 
America’s authority on haute cuisine:  “Largely because of the impetus he provided, the American 
understanding of what is proper to put into a human stomach was revolutionized: from the horrified 
Frenchman’s ‘country of fifty-two religions and one soup’, the United States became a land where a 
civilized man could dine” (Thomas 1965: 409).  This helped in lobbying as Ward heeded the axiom that  
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was the brother of the abolitionist and poet Julia Ward Howe and a close friend of the 
authors Oscar Wilde and William Makepeace Thackeray.  Very well connected, he 
was able to enter government offices at will, even using the stationary of the Treasury 
Department or the Ways and Means Committee – whatever was at hand – to write 
notes or instructions.  His knowledge of the Treasury’s buying and selling of gold was 
invaluable at a time when currency issues were among the top issues for government 
action (Thomas 1965).  His influence was his person rather than that of a large 
organization or PAC. 
The particularistic quality of lobbying in the post-Civil War era was also 
evident in the hiring practices of principals.  Some firms hired dozens or even 
hundreds (in the case of one railroad) of lobbyists (Rothman 1966).  This was because 
most lobbyists, in the absence of large-scale organizations like trade associations, had 
personal relationships with only a few legislators, and their influence was 
consequently limited.  On the lobbyists’ side, lobbyists accepted numerous and 
conflicting retainers because employers, having to hire many lobbyists, paid small fees 
(Rothman 1966).  So as lobbying became more important and more widespread, its 
effectiveness was hampered by custom and habit. 
Given the rise of lobbying, it is perhaps not a coincidence that the Gilded Age 
also saw the first efforts to regulate lobbying activity.  In 1876 the House of 
Representatives passed a resolution calling for registration, but that resolution was 
effective only for that session of Congress and was not passed by the Senate.  Some 
regulation of lobbying began to be seen, albeit in a limited and narrow scope, at the 
end of the nineteenth century.  In 1879, members of the press galleries in Congress 
created rules of admission to the galleries that would bar all lobbyists posing as 
                                                                                                                                             
“the shortest distance between a pending bill and a Congressman’s ‘aye’ lies through his stomach” 
(Byrd 1991: II: 495).  
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journalists, and they created a standing committee of correspondents to enforce the 
rules (Byrd 1991).  Earlier in the Gilded Age, members of Congress inundated the 
railroad lobbyists with requests for free passes, but the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887 prohibited passes for national lines (Rothman 1966).
57   
The Progressive Era: The Lobbyist Is the Group, the Group Is the Lobbyist – 
As a backdrop to the following, consider Figure 2.1, which provides the number of 
business associations both nationally and just those located in Washington, D.C., from 
1865 to 1961.  I focus on business associations because of data availability and the 
higher likelihood that business associations would have more staying power over time 
than other types of associations.
58  One sees both an increasing number of business 
associations over time, but the acceleration in growth occurs at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  Washington-based business associations also show an upwards 
growth but not nearly as steep as for all business associations.  If the Gilded Age was 
notable for reliance on individual lobbyists, the Progressive Era (circa 1890-1920) 
would see a change in the structure of lobbying.  Historians have asserted that the 
Progressive Era constituted an “organizational synthesis” for associations and a 
pivotal time when new interest groups flourished in the United States (Galambos 
1970).   
                                                 
57 The states were bolder in regulating lobbying.  For example, Alabama amended its constitution in 
1873 to make it a felony to lobby its legislature, and Georgia and California shortly followed suit.  In 
1890, Massachusetts enacted a disclosure rule, and in 1910 Wisconsin made solicitation of a legislator 
by a paid lobbyist a felony (Congressional Research Service 1986). 
58 I used the 1961 edition of the Encyclopedia of Associations for founding dates.  Naturally, this is a 
flawed approach in that associations could have become defunct before 1961.  However, I believe that 
the figures that follow will be useful even considering the shortcomings in the data collection.  
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Figure 2.1: Total Business Associations and Washington-based Associations, 1865-1961 
Source: Author’s compilation of data from the Encyclopedia of Associations (1961).
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One reason for this organizational shift was that political institutions changed.  
Wilson (1983) gives a succinct institutional comparison between the Gilded Age and 
the Progressive Era:  From 1861 to 1900, the federal government expanded a great 
deal in terms of staff (over 200,000 new employees) and agencies.  The primary 
function of these early agencies – which included the Commerce Department, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, and the Civil War pensions 
bureau – was to provide services such as providing research, collecting statistics, 
dispensing federal lands, and distributing benefits.  Crucially, as Thompson (1985) 
argues, Congress in the 1870s began to consider legislation that treated businesses, 
notably railroads, as a class in addition to so-called distributive legislation that 
awarded benefits, e.g. a subsidy, to particular firms.  In 1887, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission was created, and its primary function was to regulate.  Over the next 30 
years, a number of new laws and bureaucratic organizations were created to regulate 
business as a class of activity.
59   
A likely consequence of these changes was that business became inclined towards 
joint activity.  Previously, businessmen were inclined against overtly joint and 
coordinated responses to regulatory efforts because they believed that explicitly 
working together would lend legitimacy to Congressional regulation of economic 
activity that was inherently ‘odious’ and ‘unnatural.’  Moreover, business viewed as 
repugnant the thought of working in concert with one’s competitors (Galambos 1966). 
And while common threats did eventually produce intra-industry discussion, 
business leaders also began a search for ways to make their business environments 
more predictable and certain in an expanding but highly variable nineteenth century 
economy.  In his wonderful study of business associations, the economic historian 
                                                 
59 For example, the Sherman Act of 1890, the Pure Food & Drug Act of 1906, the Meat Inspection Act 
of 1906, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the individual and 
corporate income tax acts of 1914, to name a few.  
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Louis Galambos (1966) discusses the transformation of informal business relations in 
the late nineteenth century to structured associations in the early twentieth century.  
Galambos characterizes the post-Civil War period association movement as the 
“dinner club” which involved informal meetings among business leaders within a 
particular industry.  These ‘dinner club’ associations were marked by an ad hoc 
approach to issues and little leadership or administrative capacity.  Around 1900, new 
entities that he calls “service associations” began to emerge with the beginnings of a 
bureaucracy and a comprehensive political program (Galambos 1966). 
The trend toward associations was complemented institutionally.  Progressive 
reformers pushed through many measures designed to curb the influence of the 
business lobby, including the direct election of senators in 1913, the increased use of 
public committee hearings in Congress, and high profile exposés of lobbyists’ 
misdeeds.  This new system called for more complex and vigorous forms of organized 
activity on the part of the manufacturer:   
 
If he was to make his voice heard, he had to have organizations 
which could operate effectively in this different context.  He needed 
technically competent representatives to argue his case before 
commissions.  He needed organizations that would be ever watchful 
for some new administrative ruling that might affect his interests.  He 
needed trade groups that provided more services on a more continuous 
basis than did the older dinner-club associations.  (Galambos 1966: 50) 
 
The total effect of the progressive movement was to break up the “dinner club” 
model of the business lobby that had dominated American politics since the end of the 
Civil War (Galambos 1966).   
 
In its place there developed a new style of pressure-group politics 
which was more open, more responsive to public pressure.  Personal 
influence became somewhat less important; well-organized group 
action and the appearance if not the reality of broad support became 
essential to political success.  (Galambos 1966: 49) 
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The new governmental environment that the reform movement helped to produce, 
with the exception of the anti-trust laws, actually contributed to the spread of the 
associative concepts of stability, cooperation, and control (Galambos 1966). 
Finally, however, I cannot ignore the importance of social movements themselves 
as they agitated, without government assistance or encouragement, for various causes.  
The Progressive Era saw the rise of very large groups that advocated for a variety of 
causes, including women’s suffrage, immigration reform of various types, 
conservation, prohibition, and municipal reform (Skocpol 1992; Clemens 1997; 
Sanders 1999).  Thus, a constellation of factors all led to a shift away from the Gilded 
Age’s particularistic lobbying and towards organizations and associations. 
In contrast to earlier scandals involving individual lobbyists, scandals now 
involved associations.  For example, press reports of lobbying excesses on the part of 
the National Association of Manufacturers launched an investigation by the House of 
Representatives, which produced a report recommending lobbyist registration.  In 
1919, Congress prohibited any lobbying effort with funds appropriated by Congress 
(Byrd 1991).  Congress again in 1928 attempted to enact lobbyist registration, but this 
time only the Senate passed a bill and the House declined.
60 
The rise of interest groups and associations is also reflected at this time in a shift in 
scholarship on politics and government.  The previous nineteenth century scholarship 
focused on formal institutions and processes such as the Constitution and the structure 
of congressional committees, but the early twentieth century saw change in emphasis 
                                                 
60 The failure of lobbying reform may be due to the development of a trend I lobbying at this time:  
Lobbying became a common occupation for retired or defeated senators, who as a courtesy had the right 
to be on the floor of the Senate and mingle with old associates.  It was proposed in 1897 that ex-
senators be barred from the floor of the chamber if they were representing some interest with business 
before the Senate.  The Senate maintained its custom, however, and corporations continued to hire ex-
senators (Rothman 1966).  With regard to lobbying in the Progressive Era, an observer could say that 
the “most dangerous men are ex-members, who know how things are to be managed” (Bryce 1910: 
694).  
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toward interest groups (Tichenor and Harris 2002-03).  Bentley (1905) and Herring 
(1929) are both exemplars of this new scholarship.
61  Noting that there have always 
been various interest groups and minor parties in American political life, Herring 
would continue: 
 
Within very recent years these groups have increased and 
multiplied.  More important still, they have become highly organized 
and are to-day conducted by shrewd and capable leaders.  Now 
because of improved means of communication, these groups, no 
longer hindered by geographic limitations, are organizing on a national 
and even a world-wide scale (Herring 1929: 3). 
 
Herring conservatively estimated the number of organized groups in Washington 
equal to at least 500 with over 1,000 individual representatives (1929: 19).  But these 
numbers would seem puny compared to the growth in associations over the next two 
decades. 
World War I, the New Deal and World War Two – To paraphrase Charles Tilly, it 
might appear that states make war, and wars make lobbyists.  In less than 30 years, the 
United States fought two world wars and dealt with an economic calamity, and during 
these crises the government encouraged association-formation.  In the case of World 
War I, the national government coordinated industrial production through the use of 
trade associations that linked industries and individual businesses that were scattered 
geographically (Tichenor and Harris 2002-03).  Once the crisis of war was over, the 
associations continued through the 1920s as group members realized the benefits of 
maintaining associational relations (Herring 1929).   
After 1932, the government of Franklin Roosevelt began a governmental 
expansion without precedent as it dealt with the Great Depression and, several years 
later, the specter of Second World War.  These efforts meant an overall expansion of 
                                                 
61 “Political evolution does not await the formal action of legislatures, nor is it bound by statutory codes 
and written constitutions” (Herring 1929: 2).  
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regulatory scope and mission, budget, and employment as the government sought first 
to assert greater control over a moribund economy and then mobilize the economy for 
war.  In both the World War I and New Deal/World War II periods, the government 
sought to maximize its planning and control efforts by encouraging the formation of 
industry-wide trade associations.  These “top-down” efforts legitimized industry 
cooperation, strengthened relations and interactions between industry and state, and 
provided business leaders with a positive perspective on joint activity. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 provide a historical perspective on and empirical basis for the 
growth of government during this time period.  Figure 2.2 gives the growth of federal 
government outlays from 1901 through 1946.  With regard to budgetary outlays, 
government spending increases significantly in 1917 when America entered World 
War I.  While the spike is followed by a sharp decline in the early 1920s, this level of 
spending does not drop to its pre-war levels after World War I ends.  However, the 
New Deal and World War II show a sharp rise in the growth of government spending 
such that by 1945, the last year of the war, outlays are ten times the levels that existed 
in the 1930s.   
An alternative view is examining the growth of the regulatory state.  Figure 2.3 
shows the number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) from 1936 
through 1946.  Although data for the number of pages in the CFR are not available 
before 1936, by 1945, the last year of Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, the CFR was 
seven times its size in 1936.    
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Figure 2.2: Federal Government Outlays (in nominal billions of dollars), 1901-1945 
Source: Office of Management and Budget (2006). 
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Figure 2.3: Growth of Pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, 1936-1946. 
Source: Crews (2006).
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The upheavals of the 1930s and 1940s accelerated the institutionalizing of 
associations and lobbying, both in terms of encouraging the establishment of 
organized interests and in the regulation of such interests.  Figures 2.4 and 2.5 
illustrate the growth of business associations both nationally and in Washington.  
Figure 2.4 provides the year-by-year founding’s of business associations for both non-
Washington-based associations and for those headquartered in Washington.  The chart 
illustrates the slow growth of new associations through the Gilded Age until the 
Progressive Era (roughly around 1890), when there is a noticeable jump upwards.  In 
1917, when America entered World War I, there is a sharp increase, and a higher level 
of new associations continues through the 1920s.  But the New Deal drove the rate of 
new associations sharply higher as the Roosevelt administration encouraged 
association formation as a depression-fighting strategy, and this heightened growth 
continues through the 1930s and into the war years of the early 1940s.  Interestingly, 
growth also continues into the 1950s, but the shift is moving towards locating 
association headquarters in Washington by this time.
62   
Figure 2.5 confirms this D.C.-bias as it provides the ratio of D.C.-based business 
groups to non-D.C. business groups from 1909 to 1960.  Resembling a U-shape, 
clearly many new associations were being founded outside of Washington during the 
1920s, but the expanded role of government in the 1930s and beyond causes the trend 
to move in the direction of Washington associations. 
                                                 
62 The last year of the chart is for 1961, which shows a decrease in new business associations.  
However, this may be a result of data collection as the editors of the Encyclopedia of Associations often 
learned of new organizations a few years after their establishment.  
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Figure 2.4: New Business Associations per Year, in Washington, D.C. and outside of Washington, D.C., 1870-1960. 
Source: Author’s compilation of data from the Encyclopedia of Associations (1961)
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Figure 2.5: Ratio of Washington-headquartered Business Associations to Non-Washington Business Associations, 1909-1960 
Source: Author’s compilation of data from the Encyclopedia of Associations (1961) 
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As the nation moved out of the immediate post-World War Two period, the 
number of associations continued to grow.  As in World War I, the process could be 
contagious:  “Once the habit of associated activity was established under the stimulus 
of governmental encouragement, most such groups tended to persist and to invite 
imitation” (Truman 1951: 55).  
While lobbyists were under criticism from scandals and exposés through the 1920s 
(including the afore-mentioned Teapot Dome scandal), little effort at regulation was 
made even when the inevitable scandals would erupt.  For example, in the spring of 
1935, lobbyists for an association of public utilities attempted to block passage of a 
bill that would have broken up utility holding companies into smaller entities.  After 
Congress was deluged with hundreds of telegrams demanding that senators block the 
bill, congressional investigators determined that lobbyists impersonated constituents 
by dictating hundreds of unique telegrams (Public Citizen 2005).  As a result, the 
Public Utilities Holding Company Act was amended to provide for registration of all 
company agents (Byrd 1991).  Senator Hugo Black, the future Supreme Court Justice 
and the lead investigator in the utilities lobbying scandal, introduced legislation for 
broad lobbyist registration, but the conflicting versions that passed each chamber 
could not be reconciled. 
The first comprehensive reform was the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 
(FARA), which required that all agents of a foreign principal register their names, 
addresses, and the identities of foreign clients with the Secretary of State (Public 
Citizen 2005).  The enactment of FARA was followed in 1946 by the Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 (FRLA), which again required registration and 
financial disclosure for lobbyists representing domestic interests, but the law did not 
regulate conduct.  Anyone whose principal purpose was to influence the passage or 
defeat of legislation in Congress had to register with the Clerk of the House and the  
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Secretary of the Senate and file quarterly financial reports.  However, the law did not 
cover contacts with congressional staff, the executive branch, or a great deal of 
grassroots lobbying.  Moreover, the phrase ‘principal purpose’, which triggered the 
registration requirement, was not clearly defined.  (Public Citizen 2005). 
While the Supreme Court upheld FRLA as not violative of the rights of speech, 
press and petition,
63 the Court also narrowed the applicability of the law by holding 
that it could only cover efforts to influence passage or defeat of a specific bill, and for 
only those paid efforts in which lobbyists directly contacted members of Congress, not 
their staff.  Persons who spend less than half their time contacting members of 
Congress on legislation were exempted from FRLA.
64    
As in the Progressive Era, scholarship continued to think in terms of groups and the 
pluralist approach to politics reached its zenith with works by Truman (1951) and Dahl 
(1961).  But the seeds of its demise were being planted in this period as Mills (1956) 
and Hunter (1953) mounted a critique that focused on the overarching power of elites.  
As this critique went into full swing in the 1960s, a new cohort of interest groups came 
to the political scene. 
The Civil Rights Era and Beyond – Despite the relative stability of the post-war 
era, business lobbying continued to grow.  Recall Thompson’s (1985) functionalist 
assertion that lobbying grew in numbers and importance during the Gilded Age 
because the role of government changed but the resources of government, particularly 
the Congress, had not kept pace from pre-Civil War levels.  What, then, accounts for 
the growth in lobbying organizations from the 1950s forward?  Congressional staffs 
had expanded as had the bureaucracy during the Progressive Era as well as during the 
                                                 
63 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
64 Ibid.  
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New Deal so the argument that lobbyists were filling vital functions would seem 
weakened.
65   
Heclo (1978) notes two developments:  One is that government expenditures 
continued to increase in an almost exponential form, which increase was nearly 
matched by the amount of regulations produced by the executive branch agencies.  
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 below provide a longer term view of federal budget outlays and 
regulatory page growth, respectively, than was previously shown in Figures 2.2 and 
2.3.  With regard to federal spending, one sees a drop following the end of World War 
Two but then a steady rise occurs through the 1950s and early 1960s.  Government 
spending accelerates with the Great Society and the Vietnam War in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, but spending really takes off in the last half of the 1970s.  
 A somewhat different story occurs in Figure 2.7 with the growth of the number of 
pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, which the main publication for federal 
regulations.  Again, there is a drop in the number of pages after the war years of the 
1940s, but a steady rise resumes through the 1950s and into the first few years of the 
1960s.  After 1964, the volume of regulations in terms of page numbers increases 
greatly until 1981, when it reaches a peak of over 73,000 pages.  During the Reagan 
years of the 1980s, when there is a decline from this peak until 1986, when the 
regulatory volume again increases through the year 2000.   
                                                 
65 Thompson acknowledges that the number of lobbyists has grown steadily since the 1870s and that 
such lobbyists in the 1980s would not be considered powerless.  However, she argues that they face 
greater competition for and constraints upon their hegemony, and their activities are different than in 
the Gilded Age (1985: 143, n.64).  I discuss this point later in the chapter.  
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Figure 2.6: Federal Government Outlays (in nominal billions of dollars), 1901-2006 
Source: Office of Management and Budget (2006). 
Note: Amounts are in constant 1982 dollars; the price index is the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U)
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Figure 2.7: Growth of Pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, 1936-2005 
Source: Crews (2006).
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The second development noted by Heclo is that the level of federal employment 
remained virtually flat since the 1950s to the present.  Combining these developments, 
the government is doing more with less.  Part of the solution has been to push 
responsibilities down to the states, but there also remains an opportunity for organized 
interests to advocate and provide information to a Congress and federal bureaucracy, 
as Thompson would have predicted.   
At this point, it might be helpful to refer back to Figures 2.1 and 2.4, which 
illustrate the growth of business associations through 1960.  It is striking to note that 
both DC-based and non-DC business associations continued to be founded after World 
War Two and indeed the rate of growth was steadily upward through the 1950s.  
Clearly, the organization of business interests had taken hold generally and 
particularly with regard to establishing a presence in the nation’s capitol.  Simple 
correlations show that a very positive relationship among outlays, pages of 
regulations, and associations: 
·  Outlays and pages of regulations (for years 1936-2004): 0.936 
·  Outlays and total business associations (1901-1960): 0.777 
·  Outlays and DC-based business associations (1901-1960): 0.790 
·  Pages of regulations and total business associations (1936-1960): 0.450 
·  Pages of regulations and DC-based business associations (1936-1960): 0.451 
Thus, we can see the growth in business trade associations is closely matched by the 
expansion in the federal government.
66  As noted above, business may in effect be 
lobbying for additional regulation, as Stigler (1971) postulated. 
By the 1960s, the country experienced what Berry (1999) calls the rise of post-
materialist advocacy.  After the Progressive Era, lobbying was largely concerned with 
                                                 
66 The current sample of business trade associations only extends to 1960, but it is my intent to extend 
the data through at least two more decades.  
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distributive concerns such as business regulation and labor rights.  Beginning in the 
1960s and continuing through to the present, new groups emerged – some out of the 
civil rights and antiwar movements and others inspired by them – to press for values 
and rights unrelated to materialist concerns such as jobs or industry.  These values and 
rights included environmental concerns, recognition of new categories of peoples such 
as gays and Latinos, feminist issues, consumer protection, and others.  In turn, the 
liberal movements of the 1960s and 1970s were matched by conservative counter-
movements of the late 1970s and 1980s (Walker 1991).   
In addition, the 1970s saw a tremendous expansion in the role of the federal 
government in terms of such post-materialist issues.  Just considering environmental 
issues, the early 1970s saw the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the enactment of the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, among others.  Whether 
as a cause or effect of these expansions of federal authority, the late 1960s and 1970s 
saw an explosion in the number of environmental groups.  Figure 2.8 below shows the 
number of environmental associations that were formed on a year-by-year basis from 
1900 through 2004.  The early 20
th century saw a number of conservation 
organizations formed as part of the broader progressive movement.  But as the figure 
indicates, large numbers of new environmental associations were formed in the late 
1960s and 1970s, and this development continued through the 1980s in response to the 
Reagan administration’s conservative environmental policies.  Following the election 
of Bill Clinton in 1992, we can also see a decline in the number of new environmental 
groups being formed. 
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Figure 2.8: Number of New Environmental Associations by Year of Formation, 1900-2004 
Source: Author’s compilation of environmental associations listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations, 1961-2006 
8
1
  
82 
 
Turning more toward our present time, Figure 2.9 below provides a recent 
illustration of the growth of all lobbying (not just business-oriented) in the past 10 
years.  The top line in the figure indicates the number of individual lobbyists as listed 
on lobbyist registration reports from June 1998 through December 2005.  One can see 
that the number of lobbyists is sharply rising particularly with the advent of the new 
millennium.  The middle line is the number of clients on whose behalf the lobbyists 
are lobbying, which line exhibits modest growth for this category.  Finally, the lowest 
line is the number of registrants – either organizations or individuals who are 
registering as lobbyists in a particular period.  The number of registrants is growing 
but the growth is almost imperceptible.  What is the difference in these lines?  An 
important distinction is that an organization can register but not all its personnel have 
to do so.  So organization A registers with the Congress as a ‘lobbyist’ but its staff do 
not; however, A’s reports indicate the names of persons working for it.  So, we have a 
small growth in the number of registrants, but a vast increase in the number of 
individuals working for lobbying organizations.   
As the number of lobbyists mushroomed, major lobbying reform finally became a 
reality.  From the enactment of FRLA in 1946 until 1995, several agencies 
implemented ad hoc disclosure rules for lobbyists seeking government contracts, 
grants or loans, and federal employees were restricted from lobbying in certain 
circumstances (Public Citizen 2005).  These efforts were not comprehensive but were 
a patchwork of mainly administrative rules.  In general, the ineffectiveness of FRLA 
was made apparent in 1991 when it was disclosed that about 10,000 of the 13,500 
individuals and organizations listed as lobbyists by the Directory of Washington 
Representatives were not registered under FRLA (General Accounting Office 1991).  
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Figure 2.9: Number of Registrants with the Lobbyist Disclosure Act, Clients Represented, and Individual Lobbyists, 1998-
2005. 
Source: Author’s compilation of statistics provided by the Secretary of the Senate
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Passage of a comprehensive lobbying disclosure law came in the form of the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA).
67  The LDA required biannual reporting, 
specific information on the issues on which the organization lobbied, financial 
disclosures, and personal information on the lobbyists working for an organization.  
The LDA has much more clear definitions of lobbyist and lobbying, which includes 
the contacting of congressional staff and not just a member of Congress.  
Unfortunately, there is weak enforcement capability and little regulation of conduct. 
In light of more recent scandals involving Jack Abramoff and Randy “Duke” 
Cunningham, commentators have noted a number of abuses within the system that are 
in need of reform.  The following list (taken from Thurber (2006)) is not meant to be 
comprehensive but does indicate a number of issues: 
·  The use of earmarks, which are narrow provisions of law that are inserted 
secretly into legislation without public debate or attribution, has exploded in 
recent years.   
·  The reliance on massive, unwieldy appropriations measures that become 
magnets for extraneous, special-interest provisions.  Thus, the old “public 
bills” versus “private bills” distinction is eroding. 
·  The use of closed rules, particularly in the House of Representatives, that 
restrict the right of the minority party to offer amendments has increased since 
the mid-1990s.  Without debate or alternative bills being offered, substantive 
legislation is often hurried through.  Other parliamentary procedures are 
increasingly relied on to shepherd legislation without challenge, such as the 
use of extended roll calls, self-executing rules, ‘emergency’ procedures, and 
reporting bills outside of normal hours.
68 
                                                 
67 Public Law 104-65. 
68 Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi has proposed a number of lobbying reform initiatives, including: 
Ban on gifts from lobbyists; a ban on all privately funded travel; ban on lobbyists attending or  
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Perspectives on Lobbying 
 
Winding in and out through the long, devious basement passage, 
crawling through the corridors, trailing its slimy length from gallery to 
committee room, at last it lies stretched at full length on the floor of 
Congress – this dazzling reptile, this huge, scaly serpent of the lobby.  
(Briggs 1906)  
  
Of course, lobbying has always been viewed with suspicion if not outright 
revulsion.  “The name [lobby], therefore, does not necessarily impute any improper 
motive or conduct, though it is commonly used in what Bentham calls a dyslogistic 
sense” (Bryce 1910: 691).  The first large-scale lobbying effort, the anti-slavery 
campaign by the Quakers mentioned above, obviously was not well-received by 
southern congressmen who owned slaves.  But Pasley (2002) notes that members of 
Congress as a whole resented being pressured so intensely by men who were not their 
constituents and questioned the constitutionality of the campaign.   
The negative imagery of lobbying reflected its growth as the Gilded Age saw the 
most widespread and negative imagery of lobbyists.  In fact, the term ‘Gilded Age’ 
comes from the novel of the same name, written by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley 
Warner, and which tells the story of Colonel Seller’s tawdry efforts to lobby for a bill 
that would make him rich.  Popular media in the nineteenth century also took note of 
the fact that females were lobbyists, but their influence was attributed to the wiles of 
feminine persuasion, as the political carton reproduced as Illustration 2.4 below 
suggests.  Centered in the cartoon is the story of Eve tempting Adam with an apple, 
and all around this allusion are the various ways female lobbyists work the hapless 
legislator. 
                                                                                                                                              
participating in congressional trips; disclosure of grassroots lobbying; increased disclosure in 
government contracting and  tightening of government contracting laws; extending the ban on lobbying 
by former members of Congress to two years; extend the post-employment ban to senior congressional 
and executive branch staff; enact disclosure requirements for House members and staff negotiating for 
jobs in the private sector.  See http://democraticleader.house.gov/pdf/houseprinciples.pdf.  
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Illustration 2.4: “When Lovely Women Stoops To Lobby” 
Source: The Library of Congress 
 
The negative public image of associations was used by politicians for their own 
ends.  In seeking lower tariffs, Woodrow Wilson practically ordered journalists to 
investigate lobbyists supporting higher tariffs during a 1913 press conference:  
 
Wilson: I should think you fellows were missing a lot of stories 
about the extraordinary lobbying in this town at this time. 
Reporter: There is a good deal written about it, Mr. President. 
Wilson: Somehow you haven’t gotten hold of it so that the country 
could notice it.  This town is swarming with lobbyists, so you can’t 
throw bricks in any direction without hitting one, much inclined as you 
are to throw bricks.  That is the most concerted and as concentrated 
effort, I dare say, as has ever been made to influence government 
legislation by the pressure of private interests. 
Reporter: Do you refer especially to sugar? 
Wilson: Sugar, wool – those in particular. Those have the biggest 
lobbies.  Of course, there are men, perfectly legitimate businessmen,  
87 
 
who have come to town in some ways to represent their interests.  I 
don’t know that but that there is a great deal besides that going on. 
Reporter: I think the country knows pretty well that lobbyists are 
here. 
Wilson: I know, but you think just the usual scenery is in view.  
There is a good deal more than the usual scenery in view… 
Reporter: Can you give us some names, pictures, in connection 
with that, then we will start using –  
Wilson: Well, if I could collect this lobby around myself, I 
shouldn’t like to be photographed with them.  We can get the names 
out of our daily mail. 
Reporter: You mean, Mr. President, there is a corrupt lobby here? 
Wilson: I don’t know that they could approach Congress in that 
way, but just a systematic misrepresentation of the facts and one of 
these organized processes by which people, just out of weakness, will 
write letters galore about things they know nothing about… (Link 
1966: 472).
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Wilson’s depiction of the lobbying campaign against his priorities produced favorable 
publicity and helped pass his tariff bill.   
Negative portrayals of lobbyists in popular culture continue to the present day.  In 
1989, Dennis Quaid starred in Suspect, playing the lobbyist Eddie Sanger.  Although 
he helps the public defender, played by Cher, in a murder case, he is not above 
seducing the chairwoman of the House Ways and Means Committee so he can get his 
issue approved.  In 2005, Thank You For Smoking was a movie based on the 
Christopher Buckley novel of the same name.  Tobacco industry lobbyist Nick Naylor 
has a seemingly impossible task: promoting cigarette smoking in a time when the 
health hazards of the activity have become too plain to ignore.  Nick, however, revels 
in his job, using argument and twisted logic to place, as often as not, his clients in the 
positions of either altruistic do-gooders or victims.   
                                                 
69 This formal statement was released by the White House after the Wilson’s press conference:  
“Washington has seldom seen so numerous, so industrious, or so insidious a body.  The newspapers are 
being filled with paid advertisements calculated to mislead the judgment of public men not only, but 
also the public opinion of the country itself.  There is every evidence that money without limit is being 
spent to sustain this lobby, and to create an appearance of a pressure of public opinion antagonistic to 
some of the chief aims of the tariff bill…It is thoroughly worth the while of the people of this country to 
take knowledge of this matter.  Only public opinion can check and destroy it.”  (Link 1966: 473)  
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Lobbyists have been painfully aware of their image and the consequences of 
publicity.  The term ‘lobbying’ was not popular with late nineteenth century 
corporations or their Washington representatives, who were referred to as “attorneys” 
and their fees labeled as “retainers” in order to provide a patina of respectability 
(Rothman 1966).  Another example is taken from Bryce (1910), who remarked on the 
contrast of lobbying for appropriate ends: 
 
It must, however, be remembered that although no man of good 
position would like to be called a lobbyist, still such men are often 
obliged to do the work of lobbying – i.e., they must dance attendance 
on a committee, and endavour to influence its members for the sake of 
getting their measure through.  They may have to do this in the 
interests of good government of a city, or the reform of a charity, no 
less than for some private end (1910: 682). 
While it did not take long for a negative view of lobbying to develop, one sees two 
dominant themes in the perspectives on lobbying.  One is the corruption induced by 
lobbying; that is, that lobbyists get their way by bribing lawmakers.  By the outbreak 
of the Civil War, for example, an observer could write that the “lobbies of the 
legislative halls are filled with a class of men called agents, whose business it is, to 
work private bills through Congress, or public bills, in which, like the Morrill tariff, 
private interests are deeply concerned, by means of influence upon members, - or, in 
plain terms, by some form of corruption” (Spence 1862: 37).  And how did this 
situation come about?  The payment of legislators “has created a class who make law-
giving a livelihood, the rate of payment is below the present standard of expenditure.  
There will therefore be those who have to make up this deficiency.  Hence arises the 
well-known institution of ‘lobbying’” (Spence 1862: 37). 
The other theme is lobbying as a barrier between the elected representative and the 
citizenry.  In its holding on the 1946 lobbyist registration legislation, the Supreme 
Court stated, 
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Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual 
members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad 
pressures to which they are regularly subjected.  Yet full realization of 
the American ideal of government by elected representatives depends 
to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures.  
Otherwise the voice of the people may all to easily be drowned out by 
the voice of special interest groups seeking favorable treatment while 
masquerading as proponents of the public weal.  This is the evil which 
the Lobbying Act was designed to help prevent. (United States v. 
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) at 625) 
Despite the persistent negative imagery,
70 lobbying has been, and continues to be, 
seen as necessary or useful.  For example, the Gilded Age did see its defenders of the 
institution: “It is of the utmost importance,” avowed Nelson Aldrich [the powerful 
Senator who represented Rhode Island from 1881 to 1911], “to manufacturers and to 
members of Congress…to have in existence some representative organization whose 
officers or agents can speak with authority on the various complex questions 
constantly arising” (Rothman 1966: 207).  Similarly, a contemporary voice from the 
American League of Lobbyists in 2007 takes the high road: 
 
Lobbying is a legitimate and necessary part of our democratic 
political process.  Government decisions affect both people and 
organizations, and information must be provided in order to produce 
informed decisions.  Public officials cannot make fair and informed 
decisions without considering information from broad range of 
interested parties. 
 
In addition, Rice (1962) makes the functional argument for pressure groups: 
One may legitimately wonder what is the function of these myriad 
groups in the operation of government.  The answer is that they not 
only advance their particular, and perhaps selfish, interests by 
importuning their legislators and administrators, but they provide, in 
                                                 
70 Over a century ago, one commentator speculated on the public fascination with lobbyists and scandal: 
“Scandal and corruption are interesting, and they always have been:  The most that is known about the 
lobby and corrupt bills is derived from the principal newspapers, and one may live in Washington for 
years and never meet a live lobbyist.  It is highly probable that the amount of legislative dishonesty is at 
least not greater in Washington than in London or Paris.  The difference lies in the amount of publicity 
given to it in America, and to the public craving for that sort of news which stimulates the supply of it, 
to an extent far exceeding what is warranted by mere truth” (Century Magazine 1884: 654-5).  
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our system founded upon geographical representation, a substitute for 
the functional representation one finds in some other countries.  When 
the views of the interested occupational and other groups are available 
to the legislators in a coherent and responsible form, the process of 
legislation is simplified and the end product is more likely to elicit the 
support of the majority of those affected…(Rice 1962: 110) 
 
Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, in his magisterial history of the United 
States Senate, remarks that 
 
Congress has always had, and always will have, lobbyists and 
lobbying.  We could not adequately consider our work load without 
them.  We listen to representatives from the broadest number of 
groups: large and small; single-issue and multi-purposed; citizens 
groups; corporate and labor representatives; the public-spirited and the 
privately-inspired.  They all have a service to fulfill.  (Byrd 1991) 
These perspectives on lobbying have their roots in the debate between Plato and 
Aristotle over the role of groups in the state.  The fear of special interest groups can be 
traced to the concerns of Hume and Madison over ‘factions.’  As such, these recurring 
themes are latent reservoirs from which both the powerful (see the quote from 
Woodrow Wilson above) and the ordinary citizens can draw.  The themes and images 
that have been explored in this chapter will be revisited in later chapters.  Lobbying 
brings in a conflicting set of perspectives, and these conflicts have an effect on what 
lobbyists do and how policy is made.   
The next chapter will focus more narrowly on the set of lobbyists that are studied 
in this dissertation.  I will discuss the research site – the area of retirement policy – in 
terms of institutional background, actors and their interests, and key trends.  The next 
chapter will also provide the data used for this study as well as the methods. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE RESEARCH SITE, DATA, AND METHODS 
 
Pension: An allowance made to anyone without an equivalent.  In 
England it is generally understood to mean pay given to a state 
hireling for treason to his country. 
 
- Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary, 1755 
 
The prior two chapters provided the theoretical basis for this research as well as 
background on the institutional development of lobbying in general.  In preparation for 
examining the theoretical propositions in more detail in the following chapters, this 
chapter provides a description of the research site – the domain of retirement policy in 
Washington, D.C. – as well as the data and methods for this study. 
The focus of this study is not just on retirement policy generally but on retirement 
policy as it relates to private pensions.  In addition to private pensions, lobbyists in the 
retirement policy domain work on issues that include Social Security; military 
pensions; retirement programs sponsored by local, state, and federal governmental 
authorities; the pension plans of church and other non-profit organizations; railroad 
pensions; and countless other employment-related benefits issues.  In order to keep the 
scope of the study manageable, the quantitative portions of this study include all 
lobbying organizations, but the qualitative sections are focused on those actors that 
work on private pension programs.  Hence, the background discussion of this chapter 
is on the development of private retirement plan policy. 
In addition and in accordance with Schumpeter’s (1954) dictum that the state’s tax 
structure has an enormous effect on economic, political, and social life, this chapter  
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grounds its review in the structure of pension law.  I first review general concepts 
regarding retirement and retirement plans as well as historical trends in retirement plan 
structures.
71  The legal terrain is then surveyed by tracing the general pattern of 
legislation as it pertains to private pensions.  The discussion then turns to the four 
stakeholders of retirement policy – employers, workers, financial service providers, 
and the government – in great detail, which is followed by a review of the concurrent 
rise of lobbying on retirement and retiree activist groups.  The chapter concludes with 
a discussion with a restatement of the propositions from Chapter 1 and derives 
hypotheses from these propositions.  In order to test these hypotheses, I then provide a 
description of the data sources, the variables that will be used in this study to 
operationalized the hypotheses, and the methods employed to analyze the data. 
Retirement and Private Pension Plans 
The private pension system is distinct from the national social insurance program, 
Social Security, in that it is voluntary on the part of employers (and to an extent, 
employees) and that it is based on a complicated mix of tax law incentives, 
regulations, and penalties.  Private pensions evolved over time in the United States 
since the first written corporate-level private program was established in 1875.
72  Early 
in the twentieth century, pension plans were generally pay-as-you-go affairs with 
benefits paid out of the general assets of the employer as they came due, but beginning 
in the 1920s insurance companies offered insurance contracts as a way for companies 
to provide benefits without the burden of potentially excessive claims on the 
company’s assets (Sass 1997).  In effect, insurance contracts were marketed as a way 
to transfer the risk of unpredictable pension expense to a third-party provider.   
                                                 
71 The focus of this study is on private pension plans as opposed to public programs, such as those 
sponsored by local, state, and federal governments.  The reason has as much to do with space as with 
the fact that private pensions form the bulk of retirement programs in the United States. 
72 The first formal pension plan in the United States was established by the American Express 
Company.  
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The modern era of private pensions began in the post-World War II period of the 
late 1940s and the early 1950s (Sass 1997; Costa 1998).  This period of growth was in 
part due to the Great Depression, in which the government became more active in 
pension affairs.  Labor unions not only received a boost in bargaining status following 
the 1935 Wagner Act but they also began to look at pension benefits as part of a broad 
package of compensation over which they could bargain.
73  This modern era was also 
characterized by large firms managing their pension plans in-house with the aid of a 
network of outside pension consultants, investment advisers, and bank trustees (Sass 
1997).  Inflationary conditions and the booming equities market of the 1940s and 
1950s emboldened large corporations to self-insure their own pensions.  Moreover, 
firms began to realize that pension assets and liabilities could serve useful tax and 
corporate finance purposes. 
These pre-funded pension programs were usually structured as defined benefit 
(DB) plans, in which a future annuity is promised to the employee at retirement and 
which is funded almost exclusively by the employer.  Traditional defined benefit plan 
designs were cost-effective for firms that on a pool of younger, cheaper workers and 
relatively short life spans following the exit from the workforce.  Tax deductions for 
advance funding of pension obligations were permitted if contributions were placed 
into trusts and out of the general assets of employers.  In order to fund their pension 
promises, employers (using the help of experts such as actuaries and accountants) 
projected their likely pension obligations several decades into the future on the basis 
of, among other things, estimated trends in labor force growth, inflation rates, and 
asset returns.  While workers had the security of a fixed, future benefit payment 
(typically calculated as a percentage of the worker’s average salary), traditional 
                                                 
73 This view was strengthened by the federal court of appeals decision in Inland Steel Co. v. N.R.L.B., 
170 F.2d 247 (7
th Cir. 1949), that ruled that pensions could be subject to collective bargaining.  
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pensions nonetheless represented a risk to employers even in stable economic times, 
and funding projections could be costly as well as imprecise.  For this latter reason, 
traditional DB plans often could be under- or over-funded at any particular point in 
time. 
However, since the 1970s another type of retirement plan known as defined 
contribution (DC) plans has become increasingly important to retirement security.  
Early forms of these plans were usually profit-sharing arrangements that were 
discretionary and supplementary to the traditional DB pension (at least for large 
firms), but more recently the trend has been towards more reliance on other types of 
DC plans, such as the 401(k) and 403(b) plans.  In DC plans, workers and/or 
employers contribute funds each year to an account in the employee’s name, and the 
assets in the account grow each year according to investment returns and future 
contributions (hence the term, ‘defined contribution’).  A crucial difference relative to 
DB pensions is that DC plans do not promise a specific benefit at retirement so there is 
uncertainty from the employee’s perspective as to what the benefit will be at 
retirement and whether there will be sufficient retirement income.  Benefits are often 
paid as a lump sum rather than an annuity (although an annuity can often be 
purchased).  Moreover, the employee bears much of the risk as both contributions and 
selection of investment vehicles are often left up to the judgment of the worker rather 
than the employer.  Relative to DB plans, then, DC plans represent less cost and less 
risk for employers. 
These differences in plan type help explain trends in the structure of retirement 
benefits.  In 1980, there were more than 148,000 defined benefit plans that covered 30 
million active workers (38 percent of the workforce), but by 1999 these numbers had 
shrunk —just under 50,000 defined benefit plans covered fewer than 23 million 
American workers (21 percent of the workforce).  Over the same period, the number  
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of defined contribution plans increased from 340,850 to 683,100 with an increase in 
workers covered from 14 million (14 percent of the workforce) in 1980 to more than 
46 million (43 percent of the workforce) in 1999 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2004: 
Table E4).
74 
Initially over this period, many of the firms that dropped the traditional defined 
benefit pension plan were small firms; very large firms continued to sponsor defined 
benefit pensions but even this group is changing.  Table 3.1 below provides some 
snapshots of the plan sponsorship by Fortune 100 companies, which are the largest 
employers of working Americans.  In 1985, 89 percent of the Fortune 100 companies 
offered a traditional pension with only 10 percent only offering a defined contribution 
or 401(k) plan.  One company offered a new type of plan – a hybrid plan – that 
combined elements of both traditional pensions and defined contribution plans.  By 
2005, only 37 percent of the Fortune 100 was offering a traditional defined benefit 
plan.  Thirty-six percent of the Fortune 100 was only offering a defined contribution or 
401(k) plan, while 27 percent now offered the new hybrid plans.  As noted by Watson 
Wyatt (2006), a global consulting firm, the Fortune list changes each year, but the 
overall trends hold true even if only the companies that have remained on the list are 
analyzed. 
                                                 
74 These figures refer to active employed and unemployed private sector workers.  The same trends are 
seen using a different set of individuals.  In terms of active workers, retirees, and beneficiaries, in 1980 
defined benefit plans covered nearly 38 million, and by 1999 they covered 41 million Americans.  The 
number of workers and beneficiaries covered by defined contribution plans increased from nearly 20 
million in 1980 to more than 60 million in 1999 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2004: Tables E1, E5).  
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Retirement Plans Among Fortune 100 Companies 
 
Type of Plan  1985  1998  2002  2004  2005 
 
Traditional Defined Benefit Pension  89%  68%  50%  42%  37% 
Hybrid Pension Plan  1%  22%  33%  33%  27% 
Defined Contribution/401(k) Only  10%  10%  17%  25%  36% 
 
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide (2006a). 
Note: Most of the firms that offer a traditional defined benefit pension plan or a hybrid 
pension plan also offer a 401(k) plan. 
 
 
Trends in Retirement Legislation 
Statutory Framework – This section establishes the structure of tax policy and the 
history of retirement legislation, which are the targets of lobbying.  The statutory 
framework for pensions begins with the ratification of the 16
th Amendment to the 
Constitution in 1913, which permitted the imposition of taxation on personal and 
corporate incomes.  The Treasury Department ruled in 1914 – 21 years before the 
creation of Social Security – that amounts paid for pensions to retired workers and 
their dependents could be deducted by employers as ordinary and necessary business 
expense.
75  The tax treatment of pensions was formally recognized through the 
Revenue Acts of 1921, 1926, and 1928, which established the basic tax structure that 
has governed and facilitated private pensions to the present day: Non-recognition of 
income to workers from both contributions to plans and investment gains within plans 
as well as deductions to employers who make contributions.   
The modern era of pension legislation began in 1974 with the passage of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which followed some well-
                                                 
75 Treasury Decision 2090, December 14, 1914.  
97 
 
publicized corporate bankruptcies that erased the pension benefits of affected 
workers.
76  The enactment of ERISA provided a coherent codification of laws relating 
to pensions and placed a greater emphasis on increased funding of traditional defined 
benefit pension plans.  All legislation passed since 1974 has built on the foundations 
laid by ERISA. 
The enactment of ERISA also highlights the importance of institutional 
arrangement of politics for retirement policy (March and Olsen 1989).  ERISA’s 
creation of a coherent pension regime at the federal level incorporated not only tax law 
but also fiduciary and labor rules.  In so doing, it created a framework that provided 
for joint regulatory jurisdiction over pensions for the Treasury Department and the 
Department of Labor as well as a legislative structure that gave primary jurisdiction to 
four congressional committees: the Senate Finance Committee; the Senate Committee 
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions; the House Ways and Means Committee; 
and the House Education and the Workforce Committee.  Thus, multiple points of 
access were created for lobbyists and activists.  Combined with the fact that the U.S. 
has a two-party system, where party differences are slight and different parties can 
control different branches of government, partisan effects on retirement policy are 
likely to have less effect than the pressure of interest groups.  As a result, changes in 
tax policy are incremental in nature as policymakers prefer to avoid, and likely are 
restricted from, enacting radical reform (Campbell 1993). 
The (Unexpected) Rise of the 401(k) – If the 1974 law laid the foundations for 
modern pensions in the United States, a small provision in a law enacted only four 
years later in 1978 provided for the greatest and most unanticipated change in U.S. 
pension policy and possibly in U.S. capital markets.  Beginning in the 1950s, a 
                                                 
76 Notably, the collapse of the Studebaker automobile manufacturer in 1964, which left nearly 7,000 
workers, more than half of whom were at least 40 years old with 10 or more years of service, with little 
or no pension benefits (Sass 1997).  
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number of firms added a feature to their profit sharing plans by which employees who 
received a year-end bonus could defer the money into the profit sharing plan without 
paying tax on it.  The Internal Revenue Service usually allowed this practice, but the 
issue became uncertain in the 1970s.  The Revenue Act of 1978 sought to resolve this 
uncertainty by permitting cash-or-deferred-contribution arrangements (CODAs), as 
long as certain conditions were met, under section 401(k) of the tax code (Holden, 
Brady and Hadley 2006).  Under these 401(k) plans, employees are not taxed on the 
portion of income they elect to receive as deferred compensation until the deferred 
amount is actually paid out from the plan.  This change in the law was a very minor 
clarification, and nobody thought much of it except for one man, Ted Benna, a small 
town consultant who grasped its possibilities:  Instead of just applying to year-end 
Christmas bonuses, why not apply it to paychecks throughout the whole year?  This 
insight completely changed how Americans would work and retire (Lowenstein 2004). 
After the IRS blessed Benna’s insight and issued implementing regulations in 
1981, 401(k) plans grew in terms of assets, participants and number of plans such that 
it is the dominant form of retirement plan in the United States.  In the twenty-five 
years since such plans became a reality, there are now over 417,000 401(k) plans (out 
of 752,000 total plans) holding over $2.4 trillion in assets (compared to $4.9 trillion 
total retirement assets in the U.S.) and with 47 million participants (out of 76 million 
Americans who participate in retirement plans) (Investment Company Institute 2006). 
The Four Stakeholders 
After providing some background on pensions generally as well as on retirement 
policy, this section discussed the actors that have the most effect on retirement policy.  
Moreover, a discussion of the types of actors provides a useful backdrop for the later 
discussion of the research methodology, in which I discuss the use of organizational 
variables that reflect different interests.  Below I discuss four main types of actors that  
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have a strong interest in retirement policy, what I refer to here as “stakeholders.”  
These stakeholders are employers, workers (and their representatives), financial 
services firms, and the government.
77   
Employers: From an employer’s perspective, two somewhat unrelated concerns 
with respect to pension and retirement benefits are the cost of attracting and retaining 
labor and the firm’s capital structure.  Pensions are traditionally part of the 
compensation structure of the enterprise, which in addition to pensions can include 
salary and wages, health care costs, mandatory expenses such as workmen’s 
compensation, vacation, and assorted fringe benefits.  For private employers in 2006, 
pension programs represent 4.3 percent of total labor costs and 14.3 percent of all 
benefits (Department of Labor 2006a: Table 1).  In 2003, employer-sponsored defined 
benefit plans paid out an estimated $132 billion in benefits to retirees and beneficiaries 
(Buessing and Soto 2006).  Moreover, global competition and recent market 
conditions have placed pressure on American firms to reduce labor costs given the 
relative advantage of certain overseas markets in terms of wage and benefit expenses.  
In a recent poll of chief executives of fast-growing private companies, 34 percent 
listed increasing pension and healthcare costs among their most pressing challenges 
(Schneyer 2006).
78 
From a corporate finance perspective, traditional DB pension plan liability is a 
direct part of the capital structure of the sponsoring employer while defined 
contribution (DC) plans are not.  As of 2004, pension liabilities accounted for roughly 
                                                 
77 Of course, one could conceive of other stakeholders, such as the children of employees or the 
industry that provides services to retirees like nursing home care.  However, in order to provide a 
clearer analysis, I sought to classify those actors that have the most proximate interest and effects on 
public policy, and I believe that the four types here meet that definition.  I want to thank a member of 
my dissertation committee for pointing out that there are other stakeholders than the ones I present here. 
78 Among CEOs polled, over 80 percent listed keeping key employees, 52 percent mentioned 
developing new products, 36 percent listed market expansion, 30 percent chose increased competition, 
22 percent indicated increased regulation, and 20 mentioned managing succession.  
100 
 
21 percent of U.S. firms’ market capitalization, and pension liabilities and deficits 
negatively affect the way markets value companies (Orszag and Sand 2005).  Declines 
in fertility and increases in longevity have sharply increased actuarial costs to 
employers that now fund annuities that pay benefits 20 or more years into the future 
and that do not have the pool of younger workers who can produce at lower wage 
costs.       
Because defined benefit pensions are part of a firm’s capital structure, they were 
often seen as opportunities to improve the overall financial position of the firm.  Part 
of the reason for this was institutional: 
 
Until recently, the financial management of most corporate pension 
plans has been the responsibility of the firm’s chief investment officer, 
often operating pretty much independently of the corporate treasury and 
finance functions…this practice of managing the pension fund as a 
business unit unto itself has been reinforced by accounting rules that kept 
pension assets and liabilities off corporate [accounting statements]. (Chew 
2006:2)
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Moreover, higher returns in the stock market in most years allow companies to limit 
their contributions to their defined benefit plans and therefore report lower pension 
                                                 
79 The Financial Accounting Standards Board is proposing new accounting standards for pensions.  In 
the past, corporate sponsors of traditional defined benefit pension plans used accounting techniques that, 
in effect, allowed them to spread the recognition of pension obligations and assets over a number of 
years.  For example, corporate financial statements also did not have to fully disclose the extent of the 
pension assets and liabilities.  According to financial experts, these ‘smoothing’ approaches in pension 
accounting distorted the measurement of earnings and net worth and misled investors about a company’s 
financial position and, hence, their worth (Fortune 2005).  In contrast, the new standard would remove 
smoothing techniques and require the recognition of changes in plan assets and liabilities on an 
immediate basis (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2006b).  The result of this globalization of 
accounting standards is the injection of greater volatility in corporate financial statements and will 
negatively affect corporate financial statements and stock prices (Stickel and Tucker 2007).  While the 
actual proposals are still in the process of implementation, their main points have been known and 
debated for several years now such that financial managers have had ample opportunity to adapt 
strategies.  Companies that sponsor traditional DB plans can eliminate the risk of market fluctuation on 
their balance sheets by freezing or terminating their pension promises, and many companies have 
already done so. 
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expense and, hence, higher net income.  Added to this is the fact that prior accounting 
rules allowed companies, using inflated equity return estimates, were able to generate 
a risk-less stream of profit on the basis of their pension operations.  By one estimate, 
in the absence of the extended bull market of 1982 to 2001 and legislative changes that 
lowered funding requirements, the average firm’s contribution to its pension plan 
would have been 50 percent higher; instead, corporate profits were roughly 5 percent 
higher than they would have been otherwise (Munnell and Soto 2003).   
This changed with the recession in 2001 when equity returns plummeted and 
interest rates dropped.  The equity returns reduced the value of plan assets available to 
pay benefits, and drop in interest rates inflated the value of the liabilities.  Many 
companies began to realize that the true cost of their pension promises were 
effectively concealed and that the risk of assets held in pension plans were transmitted 
to corporate balance sheets, which affects firms’ ability to borrow (Chew 2006).  The 
changed market conditions required sharp increases in contributions by employers.  
From 1980 to 2001, employer contributions to defined benefit pension plans fluctuated 
in a stable range of $25 to $50 billion.  However, defined benefit plan contributions 
went from $44 billion in 2001 to $98 billion in 2002 and $101 billion in 2003, the last 
year for which we have government data (Buessing and Soto 2006).  This new 
financial reality combined with new accounting standards that will make pension 
obligations more transparent on corporate balance sheets make traditional pensions 
less valuable in the eyes of corporate employers. 
Moreover, business organizations in the United States have changed since the 
advent of widespread corporate pension plans in the mid-twentieth century.  In large 
organizations of the earlier era, highly ordered, hierarchical, and closely coordinated 
organizations were dominant in the mass production of standardized goods.  Pensions 
had a specific role in this system of welfare capitalism.  As Sass (1997) notes, the old  
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age pensions were part of a gift exchange that were given “in the hope of soliciting 
employee concern for the good of the corporation” (1997:240).  Pensions were also 
given as compensation for service when organizations valued long service and 
provided firm-specific skills.  Pensions also were (and still are) a tool for inducing exit 
of excessively compensated older workers.  For the underfunded plan, the pension also 
helped bind workers (and their union representatives – e.g., see Ford, GM, and 
Chrysler) to the idea of making the firm successful or at least viable. 
This earlier industrial model has transitioned to a different model that is 
characterized less by internal hiring ladders, more ‘flat’ in terms of management 
supervision, and hiring workers with generic skills rather than developing firm-
specific skills.  Since firms are less interested in keeping workers, traditional DB 
pensions are less useful (Sass 1997).  In contrast, savings plan, like the 401(k), are 
based on competitive market wages.  Moreover, DB pensions are less likely to be 
valued by workers when long-term employment is less stable. 
As a result of these (and other factors), the trend, as noted above, has been one of 
less traditional DB plans and increasing DC plans, and this trend has resulted in more 
risk being shifted towards employees.  In a survey of more than 100 large, U.S. and 
European multinational organizations, only 4 percent said that enabling employees to 
retiree is a top priority (Iyer 2005).  In another survey of 3,000 accountants serving as 
corporate CEOs, CFOs, controllers, and other executive positions, almost 75 percent 
of those polled did not believe that companies will be able to provide adequate 
pensions for their employees in the future (Management Issues 2006).
80 
Those firms that still maintain defined benefit plans are generally reducing benefits 
within these plans and/or closing such plans to new hires (a practice known as 
                                                 
80 But more than half acknowledged that reductions to pensions will threaten a company’s ability to 
attract and retain the talent they need to compete (Management Issues 2006).  
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‘freezing’ the plan).  Moreover, companies in declining and highly competitive 
markets such as the airline and steel industries are shifting their pension liabilities to 
the other stakeholders through bankruptcy, accounting changes, or bond offerings.
81 
Workers and their representatives: Private pensions make up an increasing portion 
of financial support for middle- and upper-income workers, often more than is 
provided by the Social Security program.  At the top quartile of income, pensions 
provide over 25 percent of the recipient’s income while Social Security payments 
provide 20 percent (Whitman and Purcell 2005).  At the second quartile, pensions 
provide 21.4 percent of income while Social Security provides 57.5 percent.  For the 
third and fourth quartiles, however, pensions provide less than 7 percent of income 
while Social Security generates more than 80 percent of income.  Thus, private 
pensions are of direct concern to middle and upper class American. 
However, retirement plan coverage varies along such factors as firm size, industry, 
unionization, and occupational group, among other things.  According to the 2005 
National Compensation Survey, 60 percent of all workers had access to a retirement 
plan, but only 50 percent participated in a plan (Costo 2006).  In terms of type of plan, 
42 percent of workers participated in a defined contribution plan but only 21 percent 
were in a defined benefit plan.  White collar workers tended to have greater access and 
higher participation in all types of retirement plans than non-unionized blue collar and 
service workers.  Unionized workers had greater access and participation as did 
workers in goods-producing industries relative to the service sector.  Workers in larger 
                                                 
81 Another perspective on employers should be noted.  Some employers can be characterized as less 
than benign, at best, when it comes to their pension obligations.  An anecdotal case in point is the 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Company, which announced in early 2004 that it was canceling its 
medical and pension benefits for all employees.  A charge against the principal owner of Kaiser is that 
he is shedding pension and medial benefits in order to pay for the junk bonds that were used to purchase 
the company.  Using bankruptcy law, Kaiser is able to terminate pension and medical benefits, thereby 
shifting the burden of the pension promises onto the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (The 
Seattle Times 2004).  
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establishments (100 or more workers) also had greater access and higher participation 
than workers in small firms.   
As noted elsewhere, unionized workforces have better access to pension (and 
medical) benefits than non-unionized workers: Eighty-eight percent of unionized 
workers have access to retirement plans in general, and 73 percent of unionized 
workers participate in defined benefit plans as opposed to 56 percent and 16 percent, 
respectively, for non-union workers (Costo 2006).   
And while unions have been quite vocal about protecting pension benefits on 
behalf of workers, they have their own interests and conflicts which limit their 
usefulness to workers.  First, unions represent a small portion of the American 
workers, currently 15.4 percent of the workforce age 25 and older (U.S. Department of 
Labor 2007: Table 40).  Second, related to their declining membership is an interest in 
self-preservation, and here unions must make difficult choices between, for example, 
protecting jobs and protecting benefits.  For example, in recent years the United 
Automobile Workers has reached agreement with the auto industry in several 
instances where auto workers’ jobs were protected in exchange for changes in pension 
and other benefit programs (Garsten and Hudson 2003).   
Third, unions are often sponsors or joint sponsors with employers of pension 
plans, and they have responded to the trends discussed above in a way similar to 
employers.  For example, the Central States division of the Teamsters union, joint 
sponsor with participating employers of one of the largest pension funds in the world, 
sharply reduced pension benefits for full-time Teamster members (Wolfe 2003).  This 
action is contributing to a more progressive splinter movement within the Teamsters 
(Teamsters for a Democratic Union 2006).   
Service Providers: The $4.9 trillion in pension assets (as of 2004) supports a vast 
industry of investment firms, consultants, and service providers.  Given the magnitude  
105 
 
of this sector, it would seem obvious that public policy has a large effect on capital 
markets, and change in the capital markets can also be a driver of policy as well.  As 
Figure 3.1 shows below, pension assets in private pension plans have seen tremendous 
growth since 1985 when total assets equaled $2.2 trillion (in 2004 dollars).  Figure 3.1 
also illustrates the trends in both the type of plans that are driving this growth.  Plan 
assets in defined contribution plans have gone from $732 billion in 1985, 
approximately half the amount for traditional defined benefit pensions, to $2.5 trillion 
in 2004, which is 35 percent more than held in defined benefit plans (U.S. Department 
of Labor 2006b).   
The growth in assets, primarily in defined contribution plans, has been in equities, 
and this has helped fuel the growth of the mutual fund industry.  For example, mutual 
funds accounted for 5 percent of all retirement assets in 1990, but by 2005 the mutual 
funds’ share of the retirement market reached 24 percent (Investment Company 
Institute 2006).  In turn, the retirement market became more important for the mutual 
fund industry over time.  In 1990, the retirement plan market made up 19 percent of all 
mutual funds, but by 2005 this proportion rose to 39 percent of all funds (Investment 
Company Institute 2006).  The growth of plan assets is crucial for financial service 
providers like mutual fund managers because their fees come out of the investment 
returns on the plan.  A fund manager might receive a fee equal to 1 percent from the 
investment returns regardless of the size of the plan so a larger asset pool will generate 
higher income.
82 
 
                                                 
82 Service provider fees are usually, but not always, taken from investment returns.  Thus, if the plan 
investments in the aggregate return 7 percent in a year, the 1 percent fee mentioned in the text is taken 
from the 7 percent such that workers will see a 6 percent return on the statements.    
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Figure 3.1: Pension Plan Assets, 1980-2003 
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of U.S. Department of Labor 2006. 
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The issues that have been at the top of the agenda for the financial services 
industry reflect the changing nature of retirement and demographics.  Now that much 
of the risk of retirement has fallen on workers, financial industry representatives are 
pushing a number of initiatives that would legalize new or extend existing products 
directed at this greater risk.  For example, the recently enacted Pension Protection Act 
of 2006 allows financial firms to offer some investment advice even though there are 
potential conflicts of interest when the same firms provide the investment vehicles.  
Automatic enrollment, also blessed in the new law, allows employers to automatically 
enroll new employees in savings plans unless the employees affirmatively opt out of 
the plan.   
Moreover, pensions are a driver of growth in other areas of the financial services 
industry.  According to a recent study, for example, hedge funds are estimated to grow 
from around $360 billion in 2006 to over $1 trillion by 2010, and retirement plans will 
represent 65 percent of total institutional inflows over this period.  In addition, some 
commentators have noted that in the aftermath of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, 
many employer sponsors of pension plans are actively trying to manage interest rate 
risk within their plan investments, and that effort specifically is translating into a 
predicted surge in demand for long-term bonds such as 30-year government 
obligations (Mangiero 2006; Huh and McClellan 2007). 
The pension-related growth in certain areas of financial sector, e.g., mutual funds, 
has not been matched in other areas, most notably the insurance industry, which was 
the dominant provider of all pension services until the 1950s.  Thus, the insurance 
companies are competing with other service providers, like the mutual fund industry, 
and this competition have a political component.  For example, a large initiative for 
insurance lobbyists has been achieving tax-favored status for annuities in general and 
for those paid out of pensions in particular.  This lobbying campaign has generated  
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stiff resistance from the mutual fund industry, among others (Interview 13 2006).  This 
latter issue of annuitization reflects some of the various and cross-cutting divisions in 
the business community over retirement issues, which highlights the idea that the 
policy domain has become another site for competition among firms.  
The Government: From the government’s perspective, there are two views on 
retirement policy.  On the one hand, retirement policy is a part of a larger social policy 
of income security that provides safety net for older Americans who can no longer 
support themselves via the labor market.  This mission perhaps began with disability 
and pension programs for Civil War veterans beginning in the late 1860s (Costa 
1998), but large-scale government involvement received two boosts, one from 
Depression-era programs in the 1930s and the Great Society enactments of the 1960s.  
In 2005, direct outlays for income security (retirement, disability, housing, 
unemployment, and others) totaled $350 billion (Office of Management and Budget 
2006b).   
On the other hand, the tax breaks given for pension contributions, earnings, and 
distributions are a large source of lost tax revenue.  Given the fact that pensions are a 
function of tax policy, it should follow that broad fiscal policy has a significant impact 
on retirement legislation, and that retirement legislation affects the fiscal position of 
the United States government.  The critical concept in assessing the fiscal aspect of 
retirement is that of the tax expenditure.  Popularly known as tax breaks or loopholes, 
tax expenditures are “departures from the normal tax structure…designed to favor a 
particular industry, activity, or class of persons” (Surrey and McDaniel 1985: 3).  As 
the government generally subsidizes private retirement plans through tax breaks rather 
than direct outlays, these indirect subsidies become known as tax expenditures, which  
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can be thought of as a functional expenditure since the government would have 
collected the revenue in the absence of the tax break.
83   
Looking at a cross-section of tax expenditures for the most recent fiscal year 
indicates the importance of pension tax expenditures for fiscal policy.  In fiscal year 
2005, tax expenditures for private pensions
84 amounted to over $88 billion dollars 
(Office of Management and Budget 2006a).  To put this number in context, the top 
three largest tax expenditures for fiscal year 2005 were $118 billion for employer 
contributions for healthcare insurance premiums, the $88 billion for employer 
pensions, and the home mortgage interest deduction at $62 billion.   
Over time, pension tax expenditures have fluctuated as shown by Figure 3.2 
below.  Following passage of the 1974 ERISA pension legislation, Congress placed 
more emphasis on funding, and the adverse economic conditions of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s forced many corporate sponsors of DB pension plans to make additional 
contributions and thereby claim additional deductions (Bell, Carasso and Steuerle 
2004).  After 1982, falling tax rates from the 1986 tax reform act and a booming stock 
market made pension plans less advantageous as a tax shelter strategy.  Moreover, tax 
expenditures declined because several laws in the 1980s restricted the tax advantages 
of pension plans.  Finally, tax expenditures for pension plans have been rising since 
the late 1990s in part due to an expansion of opportunities to save for retirement in DC 
plans and in part due to financial conditions that have necessitated increased 
contributions by corporate employers to traditional DB pensions. 
                                                 
83 Beginning in 1982, budget documents provided data on tax expenditures both in terms of revenue lost 
and in terms of the equivalent outlay, which is generally larger than the tax loss.  For this discussion, all 
tax expenditure numbers refer to revenue loss only. 
84 This amount includes tax expenditures for employer plans and 401(k) plans; the addition of 
individual retirement accounts and Keogh plans would raise the tax expenditure total for pensions to 
$101 billion.  It does not includes expenditures for the low and moderate income savers credit, railroad 
retirement pensions (which have their own special pension rules), military and civil service retirement, 
the small business retirement plan credit, and special rules for employee stock ownership plans.  
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Figure 3.2: Tax Expenditures for Employer Pension Plans, 1974-2006 (in billions of 2000 dollars). 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, various years.
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This longitudinal view of the fiscal effects of retirement needs to be placed against 
the larger context of fiscal trends and legislation.  Since the mid-1970s (with a small 
respite of surpluses in the late 1990s and early 2000s) the general deficit condition in 
the federal budget has run concurrently with the rise of the pension-related tax 
expenditures.  As a result, the broader fiscal picture has had an inhibitory effect on 
pension expansion. 
Table 3.2
85 below provides a comparison of the major laws affecting pensions and 
the level of tax expenditure and fiscal situation in the year each law is passed.
86  If we 
can cautiously make a general statement about the relationships among the three 
entities, it might be that federal legislation is very mindful of both the immediate 
impacts of proposed legislation as well as the overall fiscal climate albeit with perhaps 
a lag such that accumulating tax expenditures and budget deficits provoke legislative 
tightening.  Thus, we can see that from 1974 through 1981, when pension funding 
rules were expansionary, that the overall budget position was deteriorating into very 
large deficits, but the level of tax expenditures in real terms was low.  Beginning in 
1982 through 1994, however, the Congress enacted a series of laws that in various 
ways tightened contribution and benefit limits and required more restrictive funding 
rules for traditional defined benefit plans.
87  These restrictions can be seen to occur 
                                                 
85 ‘Funding’ in Table 3.2 refers to both employer and worker contributions.  Price deflators for specific 
years prior to 1929 were not available.  The 1929 deflator, which was used for 1921, 1926 and 1928 
figures, was taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, at 
http://bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=64&FirstYear=2004&LastYear=2006&F
req=Qtr 
86 While I do not provide data, one can make a similar inference regarding ‘permissive prudence’ when 
looking pension legislation from the 1920s through the 1940s.  The first expansion of tax deductions 
and non-recognition of income from pension trusts occurs in the midst of the booming 1920s while the 
first major cutback in funding deductions occurs in 1942 when the government is under severe fiscal 
stress due to World War Two. 
87 The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, P.Law 97-248, which imposed new 
nondiscrimination rules, imposed more stringent funding and benefit limitations; The Deficit Reduction 
Act of 1984, P.Law 98-369, which froze maximum annual pension benefit and contribution limits 
through 1987 and made substantial changes to nondiscrimination rules; The Retirement Equity Act of 
1984, P.Law 98-394, which instituted spousal protections on pension benefits and changed age 
requirements for enrollment and vesting; The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  
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over a long trend of very large federal budget deficits.  Tax expenditures related to 
pensions reach a high of $76 billion in 1982, but these steadily decline as a result of 
the restrictive legislative enactments.  After 1994, Congress enacted laws of smaller 
scope in 1996 and 1997
88 that lead to the massive 2001 Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
89 (EGTRRA).  These laws generally expanded the 
ability of employers and employees to contribute to pension plans, and as a result, tax 
expenditures related to pensions reach historic highs (in real 2000 dollars) of $84 
billion.  Finally, the last major pension bill was the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
(PPA), which generally tightens funding rules for defined benefit plans but also allows 
for increased deductions for funding the plans.
90   
This perspective is also supported by qualitative data.  Some of the interviews 
were with lobbyists who were active on retirement policy issues in the 1980s, and they 
provided their own perception of the larger environment in which retirement policy 
played out.  In the following quote, a lobbyist comments on the mindset prevalent in 
the 1980s: 
 
                                                                                                                                              
1985, P.Law 99-272, which raised PBGC premiums for employers and restricted the availability of 
insured plans terminations; The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, P.Law 100-203, which 
tightened minimum funding standards, set a maximum funding limit, and increased PBGC premiums; 
The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, P.Law 100-647, which increased excise taxes 
on excess pension assets upon termination of pension plans; The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1989, P.Law 101-239, which increased the tax penalty for overstatement of pension liabilities for 
deduction purposes; The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, P.Law 101-508, which raised 
taxes on transfers from a pension plan to corporate assets and raised PBGC premiums; Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, P.Law 103-66, which reduced the compensation limit on which benefits 
could be based; The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (GATT) of 1994, P.Law 103-465, which 
provided for greater contributions to underfunded plans, slowed cost-of-living adjustments, and phased 
out caps on PBGC premiums (Employee Benefits Research Institute 2005). 
88 The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, P.Law 104-188, which a new savings incentive for 
small business (the SIMPLE plan); The Tax Relief Act of 1997, P.Law 105-206, which created a new, 
nondeductible IRA, the Roth IRA, that permits after-tax contributions, can be used for retirement or 
other expenses such as home purchase, and is more widely available than deductible IRAs. 
89 P.Law 107-16. 
90 P.Law 109-280.  Descriptions of the PPA were taken from a number of commentators, including 
Frueh (2006).    
 
 
Table 3.2: Effect of Selected Major Pension Laws on Pension Funding, Tax Expenditures for Pensions, and Fiscal 
Surplus/Deficit in Year Passed (in billions of 2000 dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilations of budget data from the Office of Management and Budget, various years; Office of Management 
and Budget (2006b); Employee Benefits Research Institute (2005); Holden, Brady, and Hadley (2006); and qualitative interviews. 
 
Year  Law 
Effect on 
Pension Funding 
Tax Loss for 
Pensions 
Budget Surplus 
or Deficit 
1921  Revenue Act of 1921  Expand  n/a  4.4 
1926  Revenue Act of 1926  Expand  n/a  7.4 
1928  Revenue Act of 1928  Expand  n/a  8.0 
1942  Revenue Act of 1942  Restrict  n/a  -199.4 
1974  Employee Retirement Income Security Act  Mixed  15.6  -20.0 
1978   Revenue Act of 1978  Expand  23.6  -141.1 
1981  Economic Recovery Tax Act  Expand  41.9  -142.0 
1982  Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act  Restrict  76.0  -214.8 
1984  Retirement Equity Act/ Deficit Reduction Act  Restrict  67.3  -282.8 
1985  Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act  Restrict  71.5  -313.1 
1986  Tax Reform Act of 1986  Restrict  70.5  -318.4 
1987  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act/  
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1987 
 
Restrict 
 
63.4 
 
-209.6 
1988  Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act  Restrict  60.1  -210.9 
1989  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act  Restrict  56.1  -200.0 
1990  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act  Restrict  57.6  -280.4 
1993  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act  Restrict  56.6  -292.3 
1994  Uruguay Round Agreements Act  Restrict  54.8  -228.2 
1996  Small Business Jobs Protection Act  Expand  59.4  -115.2 
1997  Taxpayer Relief Act   Expand  74.8  -23.0 
2001  Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act  Expand  84.2  236.2 
2006  Pension Protection Act  Restrict  84.7  -361.3 
1
1
3
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If you think about pension funding, there has been a long standing 
conversation, to use a neutral term, between the government and 
sponsors of pension plans about funding their pension plans…They 
did tons of stuff, all of which translated into less money going into 
retirement plans.  In fact, [name of lobbyist] was interesting because 
[he] was on the Hill during part of this.  We were talking to him.  He 
was on the [Senate] Finance Committee and he looked at us and said, 
‘We can't afford for everybody to go and put enough money away for 
them to retire.’ (Interview 12 2006) 
 
Another lobbyist who previously served as a congressional aide and in the 
executive branch made the same observation: 
 
We are partly, we are largely budget driven…But then you were in 
a constant cutback mode because the federal budget deficits were out 
of control.  And everyone was told they had to give at the office, every 
area, every potential tax cut and you were also doing that in an 
environment where we had a Republican president who was firm on 
not increasing tax rates.  And so you were doing a lot of little things 
through the backdoor to raise the money, and it was simple as that.  
(Interview 11 2006) 
 
In summary, the four stakeholders hold interests conflict with each other and/or 
conflict within their own communities of actors.  The institutional environment is one 
in which stakeholders are in competition with each other rather than a situation in 
which there is collaboration or consultation.  The next section looks at the lobbyists 
and activists who represent these stakeholders. 
Trends in Retirement Lobbying and Activism, 1998-2005 
Rather than a single retirement program sponsored by a government in negotiation 
with peak associations of labor and industry, the diffuse nature of retirement and 
retirement policy has opened the policy domain as a different dimension (apart from, 
e.g., retail and wholesale sites) for market competition.  From 1998 through 2004, 392 
organizations filed lobbying registration reports, either on their own behalf or on  
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behalf of other organizations, with the Congress at least once, but during any one 
period of time the figure is much lower.  Figure 3.3 below illustrates the frequencies of 
the number of lobbying organizations (‘actors’) in the retirement policy domain over 
time as well as the number of issues in each time period.  The number of actors in any 
time period shows a general increase beginning with just under a hundred in the first 
half of 1998 to nearly 190 by the end of 2004.  In contrast, the frequency of issues 
being lobbied shows more variability but variability that is somewhat patterned.  
Issues seem to rise within each Congress only to fall with a new Congress coming in 
every two years. 
Figure 3.4 builds on Figure 3.3 by showing the growth of both lobbying disclosure 
reports filed and the number of organizations making such filings over the 1998-2004 
time period.  In terms of both overall filings (the top line) and the number of 
organizations filing (the lower line), Figure 3.4 shows a steady rise.  However, the 
number of filings has a higher rate of increase than the number of organizations filing.  
The difference is explained by the increase in the number of for-hire lobbying 
organizations working in the retirement policy domain over this time period.  If an 
organization represents more than one entity, that organization would have to file a 
separate report for each entity.  That requirement represents the difference in the two 
lines.  
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Figure 3.3: Frequency of Lobbyists and Issues in Retirement Policy, 1998-2004 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist registration reports and other publicly available data 
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Figure 3.4: Frequency of Lobbying Disclosure Reports and Organizations Filing, 1998-2004. 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist registration reports and other publicly available data 
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Why should there be an increase in filings, organizations, and for-hire lobbyists?  
Figure 3.4 provides some important political events as possible explanations.  In 1999, 
protests by workers and retirees against corporate pension cutbacks gained more 
visibility and hence more legislative and regulatory interest.  In 2001, a significant 
recession took hold in such a way as to expose significant pension liabilities on 
corporate accounting books.  Finally, in 2001 and 2003, Congress passed and 
President Bush signed important and broad tax legislation that included pension 
provisions.  In summary, then, lobbying activity was likely pushed by exogenous 
political and economic forces as well as pulled by opportunities for new pension 
legislation. 
Pension activism has shown similar growth from the mid-1990s through to the 
present.  Workers are assuming an increasing burden for their retirement security or 
seeing reductions in pension benefits, but they have not developed a widespread and 
coordinated response by workers to these changes despite a flurry of localized 
litigation and protest.  After 1999, when IBM publicly announced a major shift in its 
pension programs, generating large media coverage, the number of activist groups and 
their connections to each other grew substantially.  Figures 3.5 and 3.6 below compare 
pension activism in 1999 relative to 2005 by using Internet web sites and information 
from these sites as proxies for studying the growth of activism.
91  The dots represent 
retiree activist groups, and the arrows indicate when a group links to another group on 
its website.  In 1999, there were not many groups in existence, and the linkages were 
few.  By 2005, however, the number of groups and linkages greatly increased. 
                                                 
91 These figures were developed from data obtained by ‘crawling’ the Internet Archives.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Pension Activist Groups in 1999 
Source: Author’s compilations of ‘web crawl snapshot’ of Internet Archives and other sources. 
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Figure 3.6: Pension Activists in 2005 
Source: Author’s compilations of ‘web crawl snapshot’ of Internet Archives. 
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The structure of the private retirement system influences the structure of worker-
retiree collective action.  The private retirement system is voluntary for employers, 
varies from employer to employer, and largely benefits middle- to upper-income 
Americans.  Retiree groups must first mobilize fellow workers and retirees within each 
company before they can forge links and a common identity with groups based on 
other firms.  Thus, we see few links among groups at first, but links gradually increase 
over time. 
Now that I have discussed the context for this research, I next provide the 
conceptual approach and related hypotheses for the analyses that follow, the variables 
that proxy for the concepts contained in the hypotheses, and the methods of analysis. 
Data and Methodology 
The prior section gave some background on the institutional context and major 
stakeholders for the research site – the retirement policy domain.  This section will 
give detail on the specific sources and methods used for the study.  A technical 
appendix provides detailed specifications of data sources and collection, variable 
coding, and model specification.  In this section, I first briefly review the conceptual 
approach to the research and then I pass on to the development of hypotheses from the 
propositions outlined in Chapter 1.  The concepts expressed in the hypotheses are then 
translated into measures and variables.  Finally, in the section on methods, the key 
variables are used to specify the statistical models used to test the hypotheses. 
Conceptual Approach – The conceptual approach of this project is a longitudinal 
study of the structure of the retirement policy domain.  The conceptual approach is 
largely deductive in that I have defined certain propositions on the basis of extant 
sociological theories.  However, my research framework is subject to an iterative 
process in which the qualitative interviews and other information inform the 
framework on an ongoing basis.  Moreover, the interaction between outsider groups  
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with the lobbyists is assessed by focusing on a specific case study of a social 
movement in the retirement policy domain.  Beginning in 1999 and continuing to the 
present, workers at several U.S. corporations began protesting against changes to the 
company pension plans, and these protestors applied pressure on policy makers in 
order to effect a reversal of these pension changes.     
Propositions and Hypotheses – While it is not always necessary to derive 
hypotheses from propositions, it is often a useful exercise when there are different 
conceptualizations of mechanisms in the propositions.  In this section, I restate each 
proposition from Chapter 1 and then derive hypotheses that can be tested with the data 
collected. 
The Policy Domain Proposition: Lobbying organizations that consistently work 
on a similar set of public policy issues are more likely to have relationships among 
each other that are close-knit in nature.  Perhaps another way to say this is that a 
policy domain consists of a core set of actors who know each other and who interact 
with each other based on their knowledge.  If we can take a set of policy issues that are 
conceptually related to each other (retirement, pensions, Social Security, etc.), we 
should see two forms of stability: (a) a stable set of policy actors with (b) a stable set 
of relations.  This is not to say that some actors come and go; they do.  I am saying 
that in the ebb and flow of activity, we are likely to see a core of actors who are more 
or less consistently present, who recognize each other, and who establish durable 
relations amongst themselves.  For part (a), therefore, stability in the set of actors 
implies time or history: Over time, we see the same set of policy actors.  Why?  Some 
lobbyists do focus on different policy issues at different points in time.  For-hire 
lobbyists are particularly prone to issue turnover as a client’s issues in one time period 
may be different in another time period (not to forget different clients as well).  But if 
the interests of actors are relatively stable over time, then the issues that they focus on  
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will be relatively stable.  Moreover, it is less costly to focus on a smaller and similar 
set of issues; one does not have to repeatedly climb the learning curve.   
Finally, the policy process itself takes time:  Many bills in Congress, for example, 
languish and die at the end of a Congress, only to be reintroduced, with some 
modifications, when a new Congress reconvenes following an election.  As I noted in 
Chapter 2, lobbying reform has been repeatedly proposed since 1876, but only 
meaningful reform has been passed in 1946 and 1995.  Usually, focusing on any issue 
is a long-term commitment.  Thus, the first hypothesis is, 
Hypothesis 1.1: A policy domain will consist of a set of lobbying organizations 
that consistently lobby on the same set of issues over time and that recognize each 
other as members. 
For the other form of stability mentioned above, stability in relations means simply 
that relations among actors are less likely to change over time.  That is, ties tend to 
replicate and reproduce themselves.  How does this replication/reproduction process 
work?  There are at least two key mechanisms at play.  First, there is an institutional 
funneling, as noted in Chapter 1, in which issues and hence interested actors are 
funneled via jurisdictional rules to congressional committees, agencies, and key 
decision makers.  This sorting process throws actors together.  Second, politics is 
largely an in-person process.  Despite grassroots advocacy and advances in 
technology, most institutional actors work in a face-to-face environment that is 
facilitated by geographical proximity and concentration.  So the funneling process is 
as much physical as it is interest-based.  From these two mechanisms, key actors bring 
people together.  Congressional staffers or bureaucrats, by virtue of their central 
positions, connect interested parties who learn to recognize and interact with each 
other.  This is a first stage reproductive process, but a second, more common stage 
process occurs when lobbyists go to each other based on past interaction.  This is  
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business as usual.  The same lobbyists get together periodically to swap information 
and strategies.  Similarities in interests and tactics increase, and relations become more 
stable. 
Further, as these ties or relations among the stable actors reproduce themselves 
over time, they are also reproducing themselves across levels of relations.  For 
example, those organizations that share a similar set of issues might also belong to the 
same associations.   
Moreover, stability of relations suggest that the group or community is close-knit 
in terms of broadly distributed power and a flow of information within this set of 
stable relations (Ellickson 1991):  Each has the opportunity to interact with each other, 
sanction each other, and learn about others’ behaviors.  These conditions suggest that 
we should see a particular quality to the ties among the stable actors relative to actors 
that come and go, which qualities are expressed in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.2: Inter-organizational relations among long-term organizations in 
the policy domain will be more stable over time as compared to short-term 
organizations. 
Much like a market of firms (White 1981), lobbying organizations are sending 
signals to each other about which issues are important, which issues are moving and 
which are not.  Signals from established organizations are more credible and more 
likely to be acted upon than those from organizations that only occupy space in the 
policy domain for a relatively short period of time.  Longevity and stable relations 
thereby translates into better information, which in turn translates into more 
centralized network positions with more freedom of action.  The stable set of actors 
within a policy domain forms a core around which more temporary actors positions 
themselves.  If you are new to a set of policy issues, you go to the experts or those  
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who have tacit and explicit knowledge about what is happening.  That core is itself 
stable and replicates itself, as argued in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.3: Long-term organizations in the policy domain will occupy 
superior positions within the policy domain than short-term organizations. 
Finally, through the iterative process of information exchange described in the 
prior paragraph, organizational representatives reach consensus as to what is on the 
agenda and what tactics should be used.  Thus, long-term organizations, even if they 
are different in terms of interests and organizational structure, will be more alike in 
terms of the issues on which they work.   
Hypothesis 1.4: Long-term organizations in the policy domain will exhibit more 
similarity with each other than with more short-term organizations. 
Coalition Proposition: Organizations tied to other organizations by close-knit, as 
opposed to arm’s length, ties are more likely both to participate and be leaders in 
coalitions.  First, what is a coalition?  Gamson (1961) states that coalitions are 
temporary, means-oriented alliances among actors that differ in goals, but this 
definition does not consider the inter-actor dynamics and conflicts that occur within 
coalitions and that are resolved by resort to norms and rules.  For this project, I borrow 
and paraphrase from Levi and Murphy (2006):  Coalitions of lobbying organizations 
are collaborative, means-oriented arrangements that permit distinct organizational 
entities to pool resources in order to effect change and that have rules for resolving 
conflict and defining membership.  Coalitions are distinct from other types of joint 
activity, like exchanges of information or holding fundraisers together.  “Joint 
activities may not always involve pooling resources, and not all cooperative activity 
requires rules for managing dissent or defining membership” (Levi and Murphy 
2006:654).  Rules in this case are procedures, generally in the form of norms, that 
manage conflict over the distribution and use of resources.  These procedures highlight  
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the importance of networked relations among lobbying organizations in building trust 
and brokerage. 
Second, in Chapter 1, I said that increasing embeddedness, or durable relations, 
among actors in a policy domain should lower the costs of coalitional activity.  How?  
Costs of coalitional activity are real and high – It takes a great deal of time to form and 
run a coalition as well as (often) money and social capital.  In other words, there are 
search costs and operational costs.  The Policy Domain Proposition states that a policy 
domain should be characterized by a stable set of actors.  A stable set of actors lowers 
both types of costs of coalitional activity:  Searching for and evaluating the 
trustworthiness of potential partners (i.e., whether they will contribute and ‘behave’ in 
a group setting) is easier when there is a history to the relationship and if the actors 
share the same set of values.  In a somewhat more formal manner, if costs to coalitions 
(Cc) are a function of network position (p) for each lobbying organization (Cc = f(p)), 
then costs should decline as network position improves (∂Cc/∂p < 0).   
Moreover, a prior history also implies that the learning curve for coalition 
formation and operation is low: If a group ran a successful coalition effort once, doing 
the same thing will be easier the next time the need for joint effort comes up.  This last 
point leads to an additional implication:  Coalition participation should replicate itself 
such that embedded actors should be in coalitions again and again.  These ideas lead to 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2.1:  An organization with a superior position in the policy domain 
network will participate in more coalitions. 
Hypothesis 2.2:  An organization that participates in prior coalitions in the policy 
domain network is more likely to participate in future coalitions. 
Influence Proposition: Lobbying organizations increase the likelihood of their 
influencing policy when linked to a group network formed around close-knit ties.  In  
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specifying what leads to access or influence researchers tend to focus on 
organizational resources or policy preferences.  “Groups that seek influence must have 
the kind of costly resources that enable them to know, to attain, to frame, and to 
deliver the sort of political and policy information (and interpretations) that are 
relevant to the goals of those legislators who have the power to make decisions that 
affect policy (Leyden 1994; Austin-Smith and Wright 1992).  Organizational attributes 
and resources are no doubt important.  However, just as in the Coalition Proposition, I 
argue here that an organization’s ‘resources’ includes social relations within the policy 
domain, which relations lower the costs of search and operation of influence. 
For example, if a congressional committee is holding a hearing on an important 
issue, how do lobbyists get invited to testify (or have their requests to testify 
accepted)?  Lobbying organizations spend considerable time establishing ties with 
committee staffers or members in order to convince them that the information they 
wish to convey is relevant or important to the hearing proceedings – The importance 
of prior and repeated contact, in terms of months or years in advance, is stressed by 
researchers in political science (Leyden 1994).  When a congressional staffer has to 
find witnesses for a hearing, she wants assurances that a witness has credibility and 
will behave in the way the staffer (and her boss) desires.  While organizational 
attributes certainly are important, an organization’s network position (or social capital) 
provides important signals that lower the search costs (Who can I call?) and 
operational costs (Will they say and do what I want them to?  Are they representative 
of a broad perspective?).  Specifically, I would expect that organizations that are more 
centrally located in their issue network to have better access to information, perceived 
as more representative, and hence more attractive as a potential witness.   
An alternative way to think about network position is that position may be less 
about access to information or resources and more about freedom of action.  In the  
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lobbying and congressional testimony context, a lobbying organization that is highly 
constrained by its to ties to other organization may have little latitude in presenting 
information that elevates it above the other lobbying organizations.  Moreover, a 
committee looking for witnesses may want only those organizations that stand out 
from the group and that can reliably deliver testimony that suits the purposes of the 
committee chair and members.  If A, B, C, and D are tied to each other in dense 
networks, why pick A when you can pick B, C, or D? 
Representativeness in terms of networked relations may also affect influence.  An 
organization that has a high degree of similar interests with organizations is likely 
thought to be representative of all the issue preferences of active lobbying 
organizations.  In addition, a high agenda overlap measure may indicate an 
organization’s expertise in the policy domain. 
In summary, superior network position would be an important factor to 
congressional staffers who are looking for witnesses.
92  A parallel line of reasoning 
runs for other types of influence activities, such as appearing in the news media.  
Thus, 
Hypothesis 3.1: The more superior the network position of an organization within 
its policy network, the more influence that organization will possess. 
Finally, an important hypothesis concerns the effect of joint activity.  The prior 
proposition argued for the importance of networked relations in participating in 
lobbying coalitions, and I would expect in turn that coalition participation would be 
influential as well.  The very purpose of participating in coalitions is to elevate the 
issues of common interest as well as to raise the profile of participating organizations.  
Prominence within a coalition or across coalitions may signify an organization’s 
                                                 
92 This can clearly be an iterative process or feedback loop in that some success at influence however 
conceptualized may improve social network position.  To save space, however, I do not go into any 
iterative mechanisms here.  
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expertise on an issue as well as the gravity of the issue itself.  If an organization 
participates in more coalitions, it seems reasonable that its prominence would be 
higher both among other lobbying organizations and to policymakers. 
Hypothesis 3.2: The more coalitions in which an organization participates, the 
more influence that organization will possess. 
Cooperative Norms Proposition: Lobbyists whose relations are characterized by 
close-knit ties are more likely to maintain social norms that maximize group welfare.  
Creating and maintaining relations is a choice, a choice that entails real costs for 
lobbyists.  When two lobbyists have a relationship or tie, the cost of that relation is 
reduced through the selection of trust-based social norms.  As discussed in the first 
chapter, people cooperate because norms of cooperation and reciprocity ensure that 
violators of the norms will be sanctioned through a variety of means such as future 
non-cooperation or reputation loss.  This idea is especially critical in a complex and 
crowded environment where organizations have to search for information and 
resources:  Those that conduct searches through a cooperative strategy will choose 
partners who share similar norms of cooperation and reciprocity and value trust.   
What about the enforcement of norms and rules?  Again, Ellickson suggests that 
not only do actors want to minimize the amount of ‘deadweight losses’, what he calls 
losses from failures to cooperate, but also the transaction costs related to enforcement 
of substantive norms like cooperation.  Therefore, we would expect to see members of 
a close-knit community not only cooperate but also in the unusual situations in which 
they had to punish deviants that they tend to apply the least costly forms of 
punishment (Ellickson 1991:174).   
How would this proposition work out in practice?  The proposition is borrowed 
from Ellickson (1991), and he argues that an observer of a society would notice that 
detected defections from norms were regularly punished, that most players did  
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cooperate when placed in a game theoretic situation, and that society was rife with 
aspirational statements about the virtues of cooperation.  Aspirational statements are 
likely to provide the best evidence only when patterns of primary and secondary 
behavior are unknown.  Hence, the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4.1: Organizational representatives that value or exhibit durable ties 
to other organizations in the policy domain will also value trust, uphold trust-based 
norms of cooperation and reciprocity, and choose the least costly forms of sanctions. 
Collusion Proposition: When a group characterized by close-knit ties is 
challenged by socially distant actors, the challenging actors are likely to frame group-
specific norms of cooperation as ‘collusive’ or ‘corrupt’.  To summarize from Chapter 
1, groups seeking to change policy (e.g., social activists) are faced with a choice of 
tactics and actions in which to make their claim(s).  This choice is a function, in part, 
of the level of embeddedness of the opposing group (e.g., lobbyists) and the amount of 
social distance between the challenging group and the opposing group.  If the level of 
embeddedness is high enough and the social distance great enough, the choice of the 
challenging group would likely shift from a tactic that is solely focused on the claim to 
a tactic or frame that is focused on the other group.  Thus, the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5.1: The greater the social distance between challenging and 
challenged groups and the greater the level of embedded relations within the 
challenged group, the higher the likelihood that the challenging group will focus its 
action on the opposing group itself. 
Data and Population of Interest – The population of interest in this project is the 
set of all organizations that are present in Washington, D.C. and that lobby in the 
retirement policy domain.  The population of lobbyists is derived largely from publicly 
available disclosure reports that were filed by lobbying organizations on a biannual 
basis with the U.S. Congress over a seven-year period (1998-2004) for a total of 14  
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time periods.
93  I collected reports only for registered lobbyists such that the study 
excludes organizations that are represented by registered lobbyists (and do not have 
lobbyists themselves) or that are not required to register.
94  These reports indicate 
issues or bills on which organizations lobbied, policy domains in which the 
organization is active, and basic organizational information amount of expenses 
related to lobbying (or income from lobbying in the case of for-hire lobbying 
organizations), the number of staff, and the total number of policy domains in which 
the organization lobbies.     
In order to make the data manageable and accessible, I only include lobbying 
organizations with a headquarters or office in the greater Washington, D.C., area.  A 
further limitation is that the organization must have indicated on their disclosure form 
that they lobbied on retirement policy.  Therefore, from 1998 through 2004, as noted 
above, 392 organizations filed lobbying disclosure reports for the retirement policy 
domain, either on their own behalf or on behalf of other organizations.  However, 
during any one period of time the figure is much lower.  The number of actors in any 
time period is smaller beginning with just under a hundred in the first half of 1998 to 
nearly 190 by the end of 2004.   
Variables – Because of the number of propositions and hypotheses, there are a few 
variables that will serve as both dependent and explanatory measures.  So, this section 
will discuss each concept and its operationalization in turn.  In addition, I should note 
that this section discusses the creation of quantitative variables.  However, for the 
Cooperative Norms and Collusion Propositions, I will be using a qualitative approach 
                                                 
93 Lobbying for registration purposes is relatively narrow as it only includes informal contacts between 
lobbyists and policy makers (Furlong 1998).  Also, because of expenditure minimums, groups relying 
on volunteers, those active only for a short time, or those active on a single issue may not be required to 
register (Baumgartner and Leech 2000).  Preliminary interviews in each issue area will help identify 
potentially missing organizations and coalitions. 
94 The website for the federal lobbyist registration reports is http://sopr.senate.gov/.  
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in evaluating the hypotheses – The data simply do not lend themselves to easy 
quantitative analyses.   
Social network positions – An organization’s position in the policy network is the 
critical concept that is woven throughout the argument of this research.  Social 
networks show two things that are relevant to analyzing the hypotheses discussed 
above.  First, by analyzing an organization’s position relative to its peers, we can 
understand that organization’s access to resources and its visibility and credibility 
among its peers as complementary to its own organizational attributes.  Second, an 
understanding of the broad patter of inter-organizational ties or relations enables an 
understanding of the policy domain; the overall nature of embedded relations and their 
sources and consequences.  
It may be helpful to discuss first how the data was constructed and used to create 
the social network variables.
95  The data from the lobbyist registration reports for each 
of the 14 six-month time periods (from January-June 1998 through July-December 
2004) was entered into matrices in which the rows represent lobbying organizations 
and the columns represent different legislative bills or issues.  These organization-by-
issue matrices were transformed into organization-by-organization affiliation matrices 
based on common issues that serve as ties between organizations.  This transformation 
occurs when the original organization-by-issue matrix, A, is multiplied by its 
transpose, A’.  Fourteen affiliation matrices were thus created, and within each matrix 
a set of social network measures and non-network measures were created, which are 
more fully discussed below.   
Another set of variables come from a directed network of association membership 
that is not longitudinal in nature and a longitudinal network of for-hire relations.  The 
                                                 
95 For social network measures, I use the social networks software program UCINET (Borgatti et al. 
2002).    
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association network was created by looking up membership lists of the associations 
that had lobbying organizations as members.  While most organizations had 
longitudinal data on their membership, some did not so I only used the most recent 
membership data.  Most data was collected for the year 2004, the last year of this 
study but in a few instances data came from 2005 or 2006 sources.  For relationships 
based on hiring lobbying firms (referred to here as ‘for-hire firms’), information was 
obtained from the lobbyist disclosure reports for 1998 through 2004.  The for-hire 
relationships are very sparse, particularly in the early years of the study.  I merged the 
association-level and for-hire level networks in order to get a comprehensive map of 
which organizations are paying others for membership or representation services – I 
refer to this as the “resource network”.  In total, there are two network levels, one at 
the level of issue-based relations and another at the level of flows of resources. 
I identify an organization’s network position over both issue and resource 
networks using two measures, centrality and constraint.  In general, centrality is a 
measure of network prominence that indicates actors with many ties.  This study will 
use a particular measure of centrality known as betweeness centrality.
96  Betweeness 
centrality is a measure of the proportion of paths linking all actors in a network that 
pass through a particular actor.
97  In general, betweeness centrality measures 
information control (Borgatti et al. 2002), which is particularly apt for a study of 
lobbyists. 
                                                 
96 A number of network measures are also available, but they are not appropriate or duplicate the 
measures actually used.  For example, betweeness and closeness centrality are appropriate for directed 
networks rather than the affiliation networks that I focus on here.  Moreover, using measures like the k-
core did not add to the statistical models of Chapter 4. 
97 More specifically, let bjk be the proportion of all paths linking nodes j and k which pass through node 
i.  The betweenness of node i is the sum of all bjk where i, j and k are distinct.  Betweenness is therefore 
a measure of the number of times a vertex occurs on a geodesic.  The normalized betweenness 
centrality is the betweenness divided by the maximum possible betweenness expressed as a percentage.  
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The constraint measure is based on Burt’s (1992) notion of structural holes, and 
constraint measures the extent to which an actor is invested in other actors who in turn 
are invested in each other.  If I have ties to a group of people, and those people only 
have ties to each other, I will be highly constrained in my network.  Conversely, if I 
have ties to different groups who are not tied to each other, I will not be constrained in 
my actions and indeed have the flexibility to engage in a number of roles such as a 
broker or representative. 
Agenda Overlap – A measure related to network position but somewhat distinct is 
agenda overlap.  Taken directly from lobbyist disclosure reports, agenda overlap is an 
expression of common or similar issues between any two lobbying organizations.  
Agenda overlap is a measure of the number of issues two organizations have in 
common divided by their total set of issues.  More specifically, the agenda overlap 
index is equal to the total number of common issues between organizations i and j 
divided by the square root of the product of the total number of issues each for i and j.  
Constructed in this way, the measure provides an index ranging from 0 to 1.  An 
organization that has a high agenda overlap number averaged over all organizations 
therefore is representative of all the issue preferences of active lobbying organizations.  
In addition, a high agenda overlap measure may indicate an organization’s expertise in 
the policy domain.   
Coalitions – Coalitions are an important variable in this study.  As noted above 
when I defined coalitions, not all joint activities are coalitions.  There has to be an 
element of resource pooling and rules for managing behavior within the coalition.  
However it is difficult to find coalitions that existed over the time period of this study.  
In order to provide a proxy for these conditions, I have collected data on coalitions 
that were visible and had an identifiable membership.  Such coalitions are likely to be 
more formal in terms of rules and norms among participating organizations than  
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informal exchange relationships.  This measure was created by researching various 
websites related to retirement policy and finding information produced by coalitions 
devoted to retirement policy.
98  I used qualitative information from interviews as well 
as from internet archives (www.archive.org) for this search and was able to identify 31 
coalitions from 1998 through 2004 for which membership information was available.   
The coalition variable focuses on an organization’s participation in group activity.  
The variable for coalitions is a continuous variable counting the number of coalitions 
in which an organization is a member over a particular period of time.  I focus on the 
number of coalitions rather than a dummy variable for any participation in order to 
capture the level of coalition activity.   
Influence - Influence is a notoriously difficult term to define and put into practice 
(Victor 2002), and it may not be the perfect word.  Influence has been used in a 
number of ways by researchers, but in this study I am focused on an organization’s 
visibility in at least two settings.
99  We cannot at present directly measure the informal 
access and influence that an organization likely has, but we can get at it through an 
organization’s visibility at congressional hearings and mentions in the news media.  
Such visibility can serve as a proxy for more hidden forms of influence.  More to the 
point, visibility is itself a form of influence:  Testifying at a congressional hearing or 
getting quoted in the press help shape the opinions of members of Congress, other 
policy actors, and the public at large. 
I focus on two variables that represent influence in different but related ways.  The 
first influence variable measures the number of times that an organization testifies 
before a congressional committee of jurisdiction.  In the Congress, there are four 
                                                 
98 For example, a press release by a coalition would describe the coalition and its issue.   
99 In Chapter 5, which will present the analysis for influence, I will add a third setting for influence, that 
of reputation.  But this is not a central part of the analysis and is complementary so I leave off the 
discussion of that type of influence for Chapter 5.  
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committees that have broad jurisdiction over retirement policy issues.  In the House of 
Representatives, the committees are the Ways and Means Committee and the 
Education and the Labor Force Committee, and in the Senate there are the Finance and 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committees.  I looked at every full committee 
or a subcommittee hearing on a retirement-related issue over 1998 through 2004, the 
time period of this study, and collected data for each instance that one of the 
organizations included in this study testified before a committee.  These counts were 
aggregated into six month time periods in order to correspond with the six month 
reporting periods for lobbyist disclosure filings. 
For news media mentions, I used the Lexis-Nexis database to search mentions of 
lobbying organizations in the major U.S. newspaper and wire service sub-database in 
connection with some aspect of pensions or retirement.  I checked the news stories to 
filter out irrelevant news stories (e.g., obituaries in which the deceased’s affiliation 
with an organization was mentioned).  I made, however, an important distinction in 
collecting news data relative to congressional committee.  For the news media 
variable, I only used those organizations that were associations with a membership 
base, such as trade associations, professional associations, broad-based public interest 
groups, and labor unions.  The reason for this narrowing is that a corporation will 
make the news for a variety of reasons completely unrelated to its activities on policy.  
In contrast, membership organizations are inherently representative of some group and 
are likely to be quoted or mentioned for that reason.  By narrowing the category of 
organizations in this way, the sample was reduced from 392 to 120, but as we are 
looking at the same organizations over time, there are in fact 835 total observations. 
Control Variables – Apart from the key measures for social network positions, 
coalitional activity, and influence, I also include a number of control measures.  An 
important concept that underlies network position is history or time.  I constructed a  
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variable for time, which equals the number is of times that an organization reports 
lobbying, on a biannual basis, in the retirement policy area from 1998 through 2004.   
Network position could be a function of expertise such that an expert organization 
only works in a couple of policy domains.  Network position may also be a function of 
broad stature and reputation that comes from being visible across many policy 
domains.  To control for these possible effects, I use a control variable for the total 
number of policy domains in which an organization operates.  The lobbyist 
registration reports require lobbying organizations to record the policy domains in 
which they lobby using three-letter codes for 84 policy domains, including retirement 
policy.  This variable is the sum of the number of policy domains (including the 
retirement policy domain) in which an organization lobbies.  For example, if an 
organization lobbies on defense policy, environmental issues, and retirement policy, 
the number of policy domains would equal three.
100   
I also control for a number of organizational attributes.  Because financial 
resources often are thought to be important, I control for an organization’s lobbying 
expenses (or income in the case of for-hire firms) as a proxy for resources.  An 
organizations’ average expense in terms of amounts spent on lobbying averaged over 
each (non-missing) time period and divided by the number of policy domains in which 
that organization is active.
101   
In addition, the type of organization and/or its fundamental interest may have an 
effect on outcomes.  Internal dynamics may differ, for example, between membership-
based organizations and for-hire firms.  Two dummy variables were used to indicate 
                                                 
100 These figures were collected for each Congress rather than each time period and are therefore 
averaged over the four Congresses figures were collected for each Congress rather than each time 
period and are therefore averaged over the four Congresses.  The four Congresses are: 1998 – 105
th 
Congress, second session; 1999-2000 – 106
th Congress; 2001-2002 – 107
th Congress; 2003-2004 – 108
th 
Congress. 
101 The disclosure reports ask for the specific amount if over $10,000.  If the organization checked the 
box that indicated ‘under $10,000’, then expense was coded as $5,000 for this study.  
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type of lobbying organization.  One variable is Association, which is comprised of 
trade associations, public interest groups, unions, and professional associations.  The 
second organizational dummy is self-representing organizations (like corporations) 
that are not membership-based organizations.  The organizations in the reference 
group are law/political consulting/public relations firms that represents other 
organizations on retirement issues on a contractual or ‘for hire’ basis.  To capture 
interests, I also include a dummy variable for organizations that represent financial 
services interests.  Private retirement plans in the United States hold roughly $5 
trillion in assets, and the retirement plan industry is large.   
With these categories and variables, we can see some key differences.  In terms of 
spending on lobbying, private employers spend, on average, $638,293 while labor 
organizations spend $218,213. 
Table 3.3 below provides descriptive statistics for the sample, and Table 3.4 
provides a correlation matrix for the variables of interest.    
Methods – Above, I discussed a variety of hypotheses.  To test these hypotheses, I 
need to use different methods, and this section provides a brief summary.  A more 
detailed discussion of the different methods as well as technical issues surrounding 
data collection and variable construction can be found in the Technical Appendix.  
However, Table 3.5 provides a summary of the hypotheses and the related measures 
and models. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics (n=392) 
 
  Mean or Pct.  Std. Dev. 
Frequency of Organization Type (pct.):     
Association  31.64   
Self-Represented Organization  35.71   
For-Hire Lobbying Firm  32.65   
     
Frequency of Interest Types (pct):     
Private Employer  42.60   
Financial Services  24.49   
Public Interest  9.95   
Labor/Employee  9.44   
Professional  6.89   
Public Employer/Civil Service  5.61   
Military  1.02   
 
Average Lobbying Expense over 1998-2004  $487,128  $923,459 
Average Lobbying Expense Per Policy Domain  $60,720  $93,367 
Average Policy Domains per Organization  7.15  5.45 
Average Number of Staff  3.21  12.35 
Average Time Periods in Retirement Policy  5.29  4.19 
 
Average Issue Centrality  10.55  7.96 
Average Resource Centrality  0.39  1.24 
Average Level of Issue Constraint  0.32  0.35 
Average Level of Resource Constraint  1.91  1.00 
     
Average Number of Coalition Memberships  0.74  1.39 
Average Appearances Before Cong. Committees  0.33  1.39 
Average Total Mentions in the News Media  35.80  91.37 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist registration reports and other publicly 
available data. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Variable Correlations (n=392) 
 
  SelfRep  Assn  Staff  Domain  Expense  Coalition  IssueCtr  Clique  Fin Svc  AssnCtr 
Self Represent  1.000                   
Association  -0.511  1.000                 
Staff  -0.083  -0.053  1.000               
Domains  0.230  0.177  -0.062  1.000             
Expense  0.229  -0.015  -0.038  0.103  1.000           
Coalitions  0.191  0.105  -0.044  0.236  0.154  1.000         
Issue Centrality  0.247  -0.069  0.053  0.124  0.211  0.215  1.000       
Issue Cliques  0.063  0.024  0.062  0.207  0.257  0.227  0.639  1.000     
Financial Services  0.074  -0.170  0.040  -0.155  0.128  -0.046  0.109  0.242  1.000   
Assn. Centrality  0.035  0.174  -0.025  0.125  0.325  0.275  0.139  0.275  0.151  1.000 
Time  -0.085  0.227  -0.023  0.242  0.207  0.225  0.100  0.364  0.082  0.252 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist registration reports and other publicly available data 
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In the following Chapter 4, this study first explores the quality of embeddedness as 
applied to lobbyists as a test of the Policy Domain Proposition and related hypotheses 
1.1 through 1.4.  The analysis for the Policy Domain Proposition is mostly descriptive 
as I review the composition of the retirement policy domain in terms of certain 
characteristics and using visual representations.  Hypothesis 1.2 concerns the 
durability of network relations among lobbyists by examining changes in network 
structure over time.
102  For this argument, the level of analysis thus shifts from the 
individual organization to the whole network.  To do this analysis, I calculate 
correlations between any two networks through the use of Quadratic Assignment 
Procedures (QAP).  The QAP analysis provides Pearson correlations of network 
structures such that we can identify in a statistically significant way whether one 
network structure is similar to another.  Correlations are provided for the lobbyist 
network structure for each time period (e.g., first half of 1998) and every subsequent 
year (e.g., second half of 1998 – second half of 2004).  The QAP correlations are 
performed for two levels of network relations, agenda overlap and coalition 
participation.  As hypotheses 1.3 and 1.4 are focused on differences between long-
term organizations and all others in the policy domain along different variables, I also 
employ t-tests of group means.  
                                                 
102 I use the social networks software program UCINET for generating network measures and network 
analysis.    
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Table 3.5: Overview of Hypotheses, Methods, and Key Dependent Variables 
 
 
Hypothesis  Method/Model  Dependent Variable(s) 
Embeddedness Proposition 
Hypothesis 1.1: Over time, a policy 
domain will consist of a set of lobbying 
organizations that consistently lobby on 
the same set of issues over time. 
Descriptive statistics; social network 
analysis; qualitative description 
Time in the retirement policy domain 
Hypothesis 1.2: Inter-organizational 
relations among long-term organizations 
in the policy domain will be more stable 
over time as compared to short-term 
organizations. 
Quadratic Assignment Procedure 
correlation analysis  
Issue-level network; coalition-level 
network  
Hypothesis 1.3: Long-term organizations 
in the policy domain will occupy superior 
positions within the policy domain than 
short-term organizations. 
T-tests of group means  Agenda overlap; network centrality; 
network constraint 
Hypothesis 1.4: Long-term organizations 
in the policy domain will exhibit more 
similarity with each other than with more 
short-term organizations. 
T-tests of group means  Organizational attributes 
Coalitions Proposition 
Hypothesis 2.1:  An organization with a 
superior position in the policy domain 
network will participate in more 
coalitions. 
Zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression 
Number of coalitions in which an 
organization participates 
Hypothesis 2.2:  An organization that 
participates in prior coalitions in the 
policy domain network is more likely to 
participate in future coalitions. 
Zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression 
Number of coalitions in which an 
organization participates 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
Hypothesis  Method/Model  Dependent Variable(s) 
Influence Proposition 
Hypothesis 3.1: The more superior the 
network position of an organization 
within its policy network, the more 
influence that organization will possess. 
Over-time negative binomial regression  Number of congressional hearings at 
which an organization testifies; number 
of mentions in the newsmedia 
Hypothesis 3.2: The more coalitions in 
which an organization participates, the 
more influence that organization will 
possess. 
Over-time negative binomial regression  Number of congressional hearings at 
which an organization testifies; number 
of mentions in the newsmedia 
Cooperative Norms Proposition 
Hypothesis 4.1: Organizational 
representatives that value or exhibit 
durable ties to other organizations in the 
policy domain will also value trust and 
uphold trust-based norms of cooperation 
and reciprocity. 
Qualitative analysis  n/a 
Collusion Proposition 
Hypothesis 5.1: The greater the social 
distance between challenging and 
opposing groups and the greater the level 
of embedded relations within the 
opposing group, the higher the likelihood 
that the challenging group will focus its 
action on the other group. 
Qualitative analysis  n/a 
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In order to examine the Coalition Proposition, I test the effects of key network 
variables on coalition membership.  The dependent variable in this case is the number 
of coalitions in which an organization participates over a two-year time period.  As 
this is a count variable, it resembles a Poisson distribution, but a classic Poisson 
distribution is characterized by a mean that is equal to its variance (Kennedy 1998).  
However, the variable for coalition participation exhibits a large variance.  More 
specifically, in the case of coalitions for the 2001-2002 time period (the 107
th 
Congress), the mean number of coalitions equals 0.543 and the variance is 1.159, and 
for 2003-2004 the mean is 0.773 and the variance is 1.513.  Figures 3.7a and 3.7b 
below provide the histograms of the two coalition dependent variables.   
Because of the large variance, a negative binomial model is more appropriate than 
a Poisson model because of the over-dispersion but one that incorporates the fact that 
many organizations have zero occurrences for both variables.  When considering 
which model to apply to the data, an important consideration is that different processes 
may be producing the excess number of zeroes.  An organization may not be 
participating in a coalition because there are no organizations that share the same 
issues.  It may also be that the organization is not currently lobbying on retirement 
policy issues and therefore has no need for a retirement policy coalition.  In the latter 
case, we have an organization that is referred to as a ‘certain zero’.  Thus, the number 
of zeroes may be inflated and the number of organizations with zero participation in 
coalitions cannot be explained in the same manner as the number of organizations that 
participated in one or more coalitions.  A standard negative binomial model does not 
distinguish between these two processes, but a zero-inflated negative binomial model 
allows for the different processes outlined above and permits testing between the 
standard negative binomial model and the zero-inflated negative binomial.  
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Figures 3.7a and 3.7b: Frequency Distribution of Coalition Participation for 2001-02 and 2003-04 (n=392) 
Source: Author’s compilation of data
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Thus, the Coalition Proposition and hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 will be tested by zero-
inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression.  ZINB regression generates two 
separate models and then combines them.  First, a logit model is used to determine 
whether selected independent variables predict whether or not an organization would 
be a “certain zero”.  Then, a negative binomial model is generated predicting the 
counts for those organizations that are not certain zeroes.
103  The results for the Policy 
Domain and Coalition Propositions are presented in Chapter 4. 
For the Influence Proposition and hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, a negative binomial 
regression methodology will be used, similar to the ZINB model for the Coalition 
Proposition but with some differences.  The two dependent variables that proxy for 
influence, one for testifying at a congressional hearing and the other for mentions in 
the news media, are count variables whose means are much less than their variances.  
However, these measures differ somewhat from the coalition participation measures in 
that I have exact dates for both hearing appearances and mentions in the news media 
(the coalition data did not indicate when a coalition began or ended).  Therefore, I can 
more fully exploit the over time nature of the data using a multilevel method, which 
controls for multiple observations for an organization over time.  For both dependent 
variables, estimates are obtained using the xtnbreg command in Stata version 10.  
There is a trade-off for using this over-time analysis as the xtnbreg command does not 
incorporate the effect of zero-inflated results.  These results will be presented in 
Chapter 5. 
Qualitative methods address the Cooperative Norms and Collusion Propositions.  
The interviews provide information on the nature of the interactions, relationships, and 
mechanisms of social norms within each policy domain.  In addition, the interviews 
with both social movement actors and insiders give a sense of how outside actors view 
                                                 
103 The regression results were produced by the zinb routine in STATA version 10.  
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the social organization of lobbyists as a test of the collusion proposition.  Using 
qualitative data software, interview transcripts will be coded and analyzed in order to 
assess the role and mechanisms of social norms and embeddedness in lobbyist 
interactions across individual interviews and policy domains.  Interviews were 
conducted with 26 individuals from January through September 2006.  In addition, 
archival data and secondary sources provide additional qualitative information that 
will be combined with the interview data.  Chapter 6 will discuss the Cooperative 
Norms Proposition, and Chapter 7 will discuss the Collusion Proposition. 
As mentioned at the end of Chapter 1, in general I use organizations as the unit of 
analysis while the discussion of norms relies on qualitative analysis of individual data 
– Chapter 7’s discussion considers both organizational data and individual qualitative 
interviews.  This mixed-method approach, then, results in two levels of analysis.  In 
part, having two units of analysis is a function of available data:  I have neither social 
network data at the individual level (a small exception is discussed in the chapter on 
influence) nor organizational data on norms.  Therefore, I cannot test the hypotheses 
consistently across one level of analysis. But beyond just the convenience of available 
data, organizational position interacts with personal level relationships and norms – 
One cannot easily separate the two levels when discussing norms and network 
positions as individual position does not easily distinguish itself from the 
organizational position.  A lobbyist accounts for her organizational role when 
considering her social interactions with other lobbyists and associated norms.  Of 
course, there are times when the organizational and individual levels separate, as when 
affectual considerations are present, but for the most part such considerations are not 
present and were not present in the qualitative interview data. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
THE POLICY DOMAIN AND COALITIONS  
 
If you want to get along, go along. 
- Sam Rayburn
104 
 
The prior three chapters laid out the theoretical basis for this study, background on 
lobbying at the level of the federal government, and a discussion of the substantive 
policy area in which the lobbyists studied work.  Chapter 1 laid out the following 
propositions:  
·  Policy domains can be characterized by embedded or cohesive ties among 
actors.   
·  Actors in embedded relationships are likely to engage in joint activity.   
 This chapter and the next two provide empirical support for the arguments made 
in Chapter 1.  The first part of this chapter addresses the nature of the policy domain, 
which can contain a variety of policy organizations and relationships among those 
organizations.  In arguing that durable relations among long-term policy actors 
constitute a policy domain, I draw upon more than one method, but these methods are 
largely descriptive in nature.  This is not too surprising in that the policy domain 
proposition is largely a depiction of a community of relations and as such provides a 
foundation for the other propositions.  Empirical support for this proposition takes the 
form of descriptive statistical and social network analysis by showing correlations of 
network structures over time as well as correlations between time and the network 
positions of lobbying organizations. 
                                                 
104 Sam Rayburn (1882–1961), U.S. legislator, Democratic politician, former Speaker of the House of 
Representatives  
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The second half of this chapter concerns the nature of joint activity within the 
policy domain.  Here I combine an organization’s social network positions and 
standard regression methods to analyze both the decision to join in joint activity as 
well as model the overall level of joint activity.  In general, certain network positions 
are associated with increased joint activity. 
The Policy Domain Proposition: The policy domain proposition states that 
networks of relations among organizations that replicate themselves over time 
constitute policy domains.  In Chapter 3, we derived the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.1: A policy domain will consist of a set of lobbying organizations 
that consistently lobby on the same set of issues over time and that recognize each 
other as members. 
Hypothesis 1.2: Inter-organizational relations among long-term organizations in 
the policy domain will be more stable over time as compared to short-term 
organizations. 
Hypothesis 1.3: Long-term organizations in the policy domain will occupy 
superior positions within the policy domain than short-term organizations. 
Hypothesis 1.4: Long-term organizations in the policy domain will exhibit more 
similarity with each other than with more short-term organizations. 
If embeddedness in terms of durable and long-lasting relations characterizes a 
policy domain, then we should see a set of actors who have participated in the policy 
domain for a long period of time as the most central or prominent in the policy domain 
network.  In other words, we should see a correlation between longevity within a 
policy domain and overall centrality and importance in the policy network.  As noted 
in Chapter 3, I am focused on three types of network position, which are betweeness 
centrality, agenda overlap, and structural constraint.  Therefore, the more an 
organization lobbies within the retirement policy domain, the more central its position  
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and the less subject to constraint.  Moreover, the more an organization lobbies within 
the retirement policy domain, the greater its agenda overlap with other, long-term 
organizations.  In addition, I would expect that organizations that have long-term 
relationships within a policy domain would be less likely to be constrained by ties to 
other actors. 
These network positions can exist at different levels of relationships.  
Organizations can have relationships in the form of common issues, membership in a 
an organization such as a labor union or trade association, contractual relations as 
when one an organization hires another to represent it, and/or when two organizations 
engage in joint activity such as a coalition.  This chapter will explore some of these 
dimensions in more detail. 
The Policy Domain Map – Figures 4.1 through 4.5 visually represent the different 
social networks in the retirement policy domain.  Figure 4.1 provides an index to the 
figures that follow.  Different colors indicate different interests (employer, labor, 
financial services, public interest, public/civil service, professional, and military).  
Different shapes indicate the types of organizations (triangles for membership 
organizations like trade associations and unions; circles for self-represented (or non-
membership) entities like corporations and public interest groups; squares for for-hire 
organizations like law firms and consulting firms).  In all figures, the size of the node 
(representing an organization) is proportional to the total amount of time (in terms of 
six months increments) that the actor has spent in the policy domain from 1998 to 
2004.  In addition to node size, the number of shared interests is indicated by the 
thickness of the line that connects any two nodes.   
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Figure 4.1: Organization and Interest Types 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the network of actors who are affiliated by shared retirement 
policy issues in the time period of July to December 2004.  I selected this time period 
because it ought to show the full effect of over time participation in the policy domain.  
Most of the actors
105 in Figure 4.2 are connected to each other in terms of shared 
issues, but a single grey triangle labeled AICPA (the American Institute of Certified 
                                                 
105 Isolated organizations are not shown in Figure 4.2 or the following figures.  For Figure 4.2, an 
organization is isolated if it does not have an issue in common with any other organization.  There are 
seven such isolates in the last half of 2004 out of a total of 190 organizations that lobbied during that 
time frame. 
Membership 
Self-Represent 
For-Hire 
Private Employer 
Financial Services 
Public Interest 
Public Employer 
Labor 
Military 
Professional  
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Public Accountants, a professional association) is the sole connector between two 
large clusters of organizations.  In the lower right area of the figure, three labor unions 
(red triangles) – the American Federation of Musicians (AFM), the Teamsters, and the 
painters union (IUPAT) – are connected to each other as well as to a for-hire 
organization (red square labeled Hood).  Also in the lower right area, three public 
interest groups (pink triangles labeled Seniors, TREA, and RetireSafe) are connected 
to each other as well as to a for-hire firm (pink square labeled Acors).  For these two 
clusters of unions and public interest groups, they are tied to each other, and a for-hire 
firm, in terms of shared issues in which no other organization has an interest.  While 
there are a number of short-term organizations, in general, long-time members of the 
policy domain tend to cluster among a thick set of relations.   
Figure 4.3 is a map of relations by membership in associations and unions, and 
here the ties have arrowheads on them to reflect the direction of membership:  If there 
is an arrow pointing from A to B, A belongs to, or is a member of B.  In Figure 4.3, 
there are also two large components that are not connected to each other.  In the upper 
left part of the graph, there is a cluster of red triangles, and these are labor unions that 
are chiefly the constituent unions of the AFL-CIO.  The other, larger cluster is a 
collection of management and financial services trade associations and their members.  
In this case the relations are not nearly as dense as in Figure 4.2, and it is apparent that 
a handful of long-serving trade associations and unions are the recipients of the vast 
majority of incoming ties and links; the more short-term organizations are on the 
periphery, for the most part.  In the case of the management and financial services 
component, long-term, self-representing organizations (the circles) act as bridges 
among the major trade associations (see the area denoted by a yellow dotted-line 
oval).  This central position among a dozen or so organizations may serve as a 
coordinating function among the different trade associations.  
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Figure 4.4 provides a map of for-hire relationships in 2004.  As an organization 
can hire another lobbying organization to represent it, this social network map is 
directional in nature.  That is, an arrow going from organization A to organization B 
indicates that A has hired B.  The map shows a sparse network of 16 components and 
in which relatively few firms are hiring, and the hired firms only represent one or two 
organizations.  However, because some organizations will hire more than one 
lobbying firm, one can see a chain of 30 organizations that create a large ‘C’ shape in 
the figure with a node Abernathy at one end and Hohlt at the other end.  A significant 
number of organizations are linked, at least in this time frame, through hiring 
practices.  Here, long-term organizations (that is, those nodes with larger sizes) are 
often key links in the chain (e.g., nodes ABC, Groom, Davis, MassMutual, wcey, SIA, 
and OB-C). 
Finally, Figure 4.5 illustrates the social network of coalition membership 
aggregated over the 31 coalitions used in this study and over all time periods.  Because 
of the aggregation, this is probably the most dense graph of all in that both labor and 
management are connected to each other, albeit indirectly.  This is a situation unlike 
that of Figure 4.3 where labor and management/financial services organizations were 
not connected to each other at all, as we would expect.  As noted in Chapter 3, some 
labor unions sponsor their own pension plans and thus have some interest similar to 
private employers, and some other unions are joint trustees with private employers of 
plans and therefore find common cause on some policy issues.  
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Figure 4.2: Network of Retirement Lobbyists, July-Dec. 2004, by Interest Type (color), Time in Policy Domain (node size), 
and Number of Shared Issues (tie thickness) 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist disclosure reports for year-end 2004 
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Figure 4.3: Social Network of Association Membership in the Retirement Policy Domain, circa 2004, by Interest Type (color), 
Organization Type (node shape), and Time in Policy Domain (node size). 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist associational membership data from various public sources. 
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Figure 4.4: Social Network of Client Relationships in the Retirement Policy Domain, June 2004, by Interest Type (color), 
Organization Type (node shape), and Time in Policy Domain (node size). 
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Figure 4.5: Social Network of Coalition Membership in the Retirement Policy Domain, 2000-2005, by Interest Type (color), 
Time in Policy Domain (node size), Organization Type (node shape) and Number of Shared Memberships (tie thickness). 
Source: Author’s compilation of coalition materials data from various public sources. 
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In these last four figures, organizations that participate in retirement policy over a 
long period of time appear to have dense ties to other actors.  But are long-term 
organizations unique?  Are organizations that spend long periods of time in retirement 
policy different from organizations with more short-term focus on retirement issues?  
Tables 4.1 through 4.3 shed some light on this question by providing the results of t-
tests of group means on selected organizational and network measures.  Table 4.1 
examines differences in means between long-term organizations (at least six years in 
retirement policy out of a total of seven) and short-term organizations (six months 
only).  On average, long-term organizations will have more staff working on 
retirement policy (4.1 persons versus 2.2 for short-term organizations).  Long-term 
organizations are more likely to be membership organizations (57 percent were 
membership organizations versus 28 percent for short-term organizations), and they 
spend more with an average expense or income of $99,754 on a per policy domain 
basis as against $29,543 for short-term organizations.  Long-term organizations also 
participate in more coalitions (nearly 3 coalitions per long-term organizations versus 
0.23 coalitions for short-term organizations) and are called more frequently to testify 
before congressional committees (1.3 hearing appearances versus 0.014).  Only 20.8 
percent of long-term organizations are for-hire lobbying firms as compared with 45 
percent of short-term organizations.  There is no significant difference between long-
term and short-term organizations in terms of whether they are self-represented (that 
is, whether they have their own in-house lobbyist).   
Table 4.2 extends this analysis using the same variables but focusing on the 
difference between long-term organizations and all other organizations that lobbied on 
retirement policy issues from 1998 through 2004.  The results are much the same as in 
the prior table:  Long-term organizations have larger staffs, are membership 
organizations, spend more money, work in more policy domains, join more coalitions,  
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and testify more often.  They are less likely to be self-representing and be a for-hire 
lobbying firm.   
From tables 4.1 and 4.2, we see that for-hire lobbying firms, the so-called ‘hired 
guns’ of K Street, are present but only episodically.  They go where the clients pay 
them to go.  Long-term organizations are more stable because either they are 
representing themselves or have a membership base.  Stability translates into size or 
larger resources to throw at an issue.  They also have a broader focus in terms of the 
number of total policy domains, not just in retirement policy, in which they lobby.  
Short-term organizations, as perhaps befits the presence of for-hire firms, are more 
narrowly focused.   
 
Table 4.1: T-tests of Difference in Means of Selected Variables by Short-Term 
versus Long-Term Participation in Retirement Policy (n=143) 
  Long-Term Orgs  Short-Term Orgs 
  Mean  Std. Error  Mean  Std. Error 
t-test 
Staff  4.111  0.455  2.169  0.225  -3.808*** 
Self-Represented  0.222  0.049  0.267  0.052  0.627 
Association  0.569  0.058  0.281  0.053  -3.610*** 
Hired Gun  0.208  0.048  0.450  0.059  3.170*** 
Expense  99,754  16,323  29,543  4,479  -4.123*** 
Policy Domains  9.459  0.853  4.915  0.446  -4.700*** 
Coalitions  2.972  0.501  0.225  0.067  -5.396*** 
Hearings  1.347  0.347  0.014  0.014  -3.809*** 
***Pr(|T| > |t|) <0.01 
Notes: The t-test is evaluating the null hypothesis that the difference in group means is 
not different from 0.  The degrees of freedom equal 141.  The groups are short-term 
organizations that lobby in retirement policy for only six months and long-term 
organizations that lobby in retirement policy for more than five years (out of a 
possible seven). 
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Table 4.2: T-tests of Difference in Means of Selected Variables by Long-Term 
Participation in Retirement Policy (n=392) 
  Long-Term Orgs  All Other Orgs 
  Mean  Std. Error  Mean  Std. 
Error 
t-test 
Staff  4.111  0.455  2.437  0.117  -5.098*** 
Self-Represented  0.222  0.049  0.387  0.027  2.661*** 
Association  0.569  0.058  0.259  0.025  -5.277*** 
Hired Gun  0.208  0.048  0.353  0.026  2.378** 
Expense  99,754  16,323  51,937  4,327  -4.001*** 
Policy Domains  9.459  0.853  6.638  0.269  -4.046*** 
Coalitions  2.972  0.501  0.662  0.075  -8.105*** 
Hearings  1.347  0.347  0.103  0.022  -7.277*** 
 
*Pr(|T| > |t|) <0.10  **Pr(|T| > |t|) <0.05  ***Pr(|T| > |t|) <0.01 
Notes: The t-test is evaluating the null hypothesis that the difference in group means is 
not different from 0.  The degrees of freedom equal 390.  The groups are long-term 
organizations that lobby in retirement policy for more than five years (out of a 
possible seven) and all other organizations. 
 
 
Table 4.3 below focuses on the social network positions of the long-term 
organizations relative to all other organizations.  Because network position may 
change from year to year, I present two separate t-test of group means analyses for the 
2001-2002 and 2003-2004 congressional periods.
 106  The results are generally 
consistent across time as long-term organizations are more central for both issue and 
membership networks.  They are less subject to constraint at the membership level, 
which means that long-term organizations have more diverse networks that are rich in 
structural holes.  In terms of agenda overlap, there is no significant difference between 
                                                 
106 For Table 4.3, I only use organizations that actually lobby during the time periods in question.  For 
that reason the observations in Table 4.3 is less than the overall sample size of 392 organizations.  
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long-term organizations and all other organizations in 2001-2002, but in 2003-2004 
long-term organizations have greater agenda overlap on average than more short-term 
organizations. 
We can also map social network positions against time spent in the retirement 
policy domain, which is shown in Figure 4.6 below.  The four network measures – 
issue centrality, membership centrality, agenda overlap, and membership constraint – 
have been rescaled for a common starting point of zero.  In terms of specific network 
measures, Time shows a positive correlation with both of the centrality measures, 
which rise sharply after year 5.  Membership constraint, which should be lower for 
more long-term organizations, does drop after year 4.  This is what we would expect:  
In other words, organizations are less constrained by their network relations and 
become more central in the network as they spend more time in the retirement policy 
domain.  In contrast, agenda overlap rises after the first year but does not show an 
appreciable change with successive years.   
The discussion thus far suggests that time matters (for the most part) in terms of 
position and prominence within the retirement policy network.  Certain, but not all, 
lobbying organizations possess dense ties with other lobbyists partly as a function of 
time spent in the field.  Presumably, these dense ties translate into improved network 
positions and, hence, greater freedom of action and/or opportunities for information 
brokerage.  The next section examines the degree to which the structure of relations 
changes over time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: T-tests of Difference in Means of Selected Variables by Long-Term Participation in Retirement Policy 
  2001-2002 (n=238)  2003-2004 (n=247) 
  Long-Term Orgs  All Other Orgs  Long-Term Orgs  All Other Orgs 
  Mean  SE  Mean  SE 
t-test 
Mean  SE  Mean  SE 
t-test 
Agenda Overlap  0.119  0.007  0.111  0.005  -0.846  0.129  0.010  0.107  0.007  -1.668* 
Issue Centrality  0.241  0.040  0.048  0.007  -6.699*** 9.183  2.234  2.971  0.671  -3.521*** 
Member Centrality  0.312  0.113  0.033  0.007  -3.716*** 0.362  0.139  0.071  0.014  -3.159*** 
Member Constraint  0.545  0.054  0.728  0.031  3.112*** 0.328  0.045  0.527  0.033  3.353*** 
Coalitions   1.555  0.231  0.391  0.064  -6.422*** 1.972  0.296  0.702  0.083  -5.513*** 
Hearings   0.444  0.116  0.078  0.024  -4.304*** 0.263  0.086  0.034  0.015  -3.793*** 
*Pr(|T| > |t|) <0.10  **Pr(|T| > |t|) <0.05  ***Pr(|T| > |t|) <0.01 
Notes: The t-test is evaluating the null hypothesis that the difference in group means is not different from 0.  The degrees of 
freedom equal 236 for 2001-2002 and 245 for 2003-2004.  The groups are long-term organizations that lobby in retirement policy 
for more than five years (out of a possible seven) and all other organizations. 
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Figure 4.6: Organizations’ Average Social Network Measures (for 2003-2004) by Time Spent in Retirement Policy Domain 
(n=247). 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist disclosure reports for 1998-2004 
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Stability of Network Structures – How much change occurs in the networks of 
lobbyists over time?  A structure of networks should be reproduced over time such 
that there should be positive and statistically correlations between any two networks.  
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide results of the Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) 
correlations for agenda overlap.  Recalling from Chapter 3 that QAP correlations are 
correlations of entire network structures, Table 4.4 should be read as the correlations 
for each network listed in the column label and each successive network (all 
correlations are statistically significant).  Looking at the first column of results, for 
example, the correlation between the network in the first half of 1998 (denoted as 
‘m98’) with the second half of 1998 (‘e98’) is 0.502.  Moving down the column, the 
next correlation is between m98 and the first half of 1999 (‘m99’), which is 0.285.  
Turning our attention to patterns, one can see that in each column of Table 4.4, the 
correlations generally decline the farther in time one gets from the initial time period.  
This makes sense as we would expect that social networks would become more 
dissimilar with the passage of time.  However, all of the correlations remain positive 
throughout and statistically significant.   
In addition, the correlations are very high when within the same Congress relative 
to networks in different Congresses.  A congressional term lasts two years until an 
election occurs and a new Congress comes into place.  Any bills that are introduced 
during a prior session are dropped as the new Congress starts fresh.  Lobbying 
relationships are likely to be highly correlated within a particular session of Congress, 
and that is what Table 4.4 shows us with the shaded results.  For example, looking at 
the third column labeled ‘m99’, the first three results are shaded indicating that they 
occurred within the 106
th Congress (1999-2000).  The correlations between the first 
half of 1999 (‘m99’) and the next three time periods (e99, m00, e00) are 0.698, 0.378,  
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and 0.405, respectively.  In general, the shaded results are higher than correlations 
between networks across sessions of Congress.   
However, we also can see a strong correlation between the end of a Congress and 
the start of a new Congress.  These correlations are indicated by numbers in bold.  
There are three transitions over this time period: From the 105
th to the 106
th Congress 
(e98 – m99), from the 106
th to the 107
th (e00-m01), and from the 107
th to the 108
th 
(e02-m03)  The correlations for these transitions are 0.472 (e98 and m99), 0.423 (e00 
and m01), and 0.325 (e02 and m03), respectively.  Thus, the network of interest 
affiliations tends to replicate itself over time, and the correlations evidence stability in 
the relationships.  
Table 4.5 compares these correlations against the same correlations for long-
organizations only (full results for long-term organizations as shown in Table 4.4 are 
not shown but are available).  In all categories, long-term organizations had higher 
correlations.  Across all time periods, the correlation of agenda overlap for long-term 
organizations was 0.391 as compared to 0.338 for all others.  Within each two-year 
congressional session, longer-serving organizations’ agenda overlap correlation was 
0.598 versus 0.559.  And from the end of one congressional session through the start 
of a new Congress, the correlation for long-term organizations was 0.525 as against 
0.421 for all other organizations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: QAP Correlations between Issue Network Structures Using QAP Analysis, 1998-2004 
  m98  e98  m99  e99  m00  e00  m01  e01  m02  e02  m03  e03  m04 
m98                           
e98  0.502                         
m99  0.285  0.472                       
e99  0.299  0.525  0.698                     
m00  0.166  0.287  0.378  0.507                   
e00  0.237  0.307  0.405  0.591  0.699                 
m01  0.198  0.189  0.322  0.320  0.402  0.423               
e01  0.212  0.229  0.294  0.316  0.284  0.370  0.469             
m02  0.182  0.259  0.321  0.347  0.384  0.397  0.325  0.376           
e02  0.177  0.199  0.344  0.342  0.255  0.370  0.348  0.383  0.629         
m03  0.110  0.132  0.241  0.250  0.265  0.242  0.243  0.233  0.260  0.325       
e03  0.110  0.152  0.224  0.254  0.257  0.250  0.214  0.203  0.282  0.288  0.633     
m04  0.138  0.162  0.252  0.298  0.294  0.286  0.249  0.261  0.326  0.326  0.473  0.664   
e04  0.136  0.157  0.221  0.267  0.287  0.245  0.237  0.250  0.274  0.290  0.408  0.525  0.712 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist registration reports. 
Note: Each time period represents a six-month period corresponding to lobbyist reporting periods.  An ‘m’ indicates a mid-year 
filing period while an ‘e’ represents an end-of-year filing period.  For example, ‘m98’ is the period January through June of 1998 
while ‘e98’ is the period July through December of 1998.  Shaded areas indicate correlations of networks that occur in the same 
session of Congress.  Bolded numbers indicate correlations of networks that occur between the end of one Congress and the start of 
a new Congress. 
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Table 4.5: Average QAP Correlations for Agenda Overlap Networks by Long-
term Organizations and All Other Organizations 
  All Lobbying  
Organizations 
Long-Term  
Organizations Only 
All Time Periods  .338  .391 
Within Congress  .559  .598 
Immediate Inter-Congress  .421  .525 
 
Source: Author’s compilation of coalition data from various sources. 
Note: Long-term organizations are those lobbying organizations that lobby on 
retirement policy more than five years out of the total seven years for this study (1998-
2004).  There are a total of 72 long-term organizations. 
 
 
While not completely resolving the issue, the discussion presented so far indicates 
that this particular policy domain evidences durable and strong relationships over 
time, especially for long-term groups.  The next sections discuss how network position 
and structure relate to joint activity. 
Coalition Proposition  
Organizations tied to other organizations by embedded, as opposed to arm’s 
length, ties are more likely both to participate and be leaders in coalitions.  This 
proposition led to the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2.1:  An organization with a superior position in the policy domain 
network will participate in more coalitions. 
Hypothesis 2.2:  An organization that participates in prior coalitions in the policy 
domain network is more likely to participate in future coalitions. 
For this proposition, I first look at the structure of coalitions over time.  Then, I 
employ a zero-inflated negative binomial regression in order to model the relationship 
between the level of coalition participation (i.e., the number of coalitions in which an 
organization participates) and key network and other independent variables.   
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Correlation of Coalition Network Structures – How much change occurs in the 
networks of coalitions over time?  Is more time spent in the retirement policy domain 
associated with more stable relations in terms of joint activity?  A structure of 
networks should be reproduced over time such that there should be positive and 
statistically significant correlations between any two networks.  Tables 4.6 and 4.7 
provide results of the QAP correlations for coalition participation.  As with Table 4.4 
above, Table 4.6 should be read as the correlations for each network listed in the 
column label and each successive network (all correlations are statistically 
significant).  Looking at the first column of results, for example, the correlation 
between the network in the first half of 1998 (denoted as ‘m98’) with the second half 
of 1998 (‘e98’) is 0.748.  Moving down the column, the next correlation is between 
m98 and the first half of 1999 (‘m99’), which is 0.667.  Turning our attention to 
patterns, one can see that in each column of Table 4.6, the correlations generally 
decline the farther in time one gets from the initial time period.
107     
Again, as with Table 4.4 above, the correlations are very high when within the 
same Congress relative to networks in different Congresses.  For example, looking at 
the third column labeled ‘m99’, the first three results are shaded indicating that they 
occurred within the 106
th Congress (1999-2000).  The correlations between the first 
half of 1999 (‘m99’) and the next three time periods (e99, m00, e00) are 0.876, 0.737, 
and 0.681, respectively.  In general, the shaded results are higher than correlations 
between networks across sessions of Congress.   
However, networks also are strongly correlated between two different Congresses.  
These correlations are indicated by numbers in bold.  There are three transitions over 
this time period: From the 105
th to the 106
th Congress (e98 – m99), from the 106
th to 
the 107
th (e00-m01), and from the 107
th to the 108
th (e02-m03)  The correlations for 
                                                 
107 All the correlations remain positive throughout and statistically significant in Table 4.6.  
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these transitions are 0.942 (e98 and m99), 0.696 (e00 and m01), and 0.785 (e02 and 
m03), respectively.  Thus, the network of interest affiliations tends to replicate itself 
over time, and the correlations evidence stability in the relationships involving joint 
activity.  
Table 4.6 compares these correlations against the same correlations for long-
organizations only (results for long-term organizations and non-long-term 
organizations are not shown here).  In all categories, long-term organizations had 
higher correlations.  Across all time periods, the correlation of agenda overlap for 
long-term organizations was 0.752 as compared to 0.521 for organizations that are not 
long-term organizations.  Within each two-year congressional session, longer-serving 
organizations’ agenda overlap correlation was 0.843 versus 0.689 for all other 
organizations.  And from the end of one congressional session through the start of a 
new Congress, the correlation for long-term organizations was 0.888 as against 0.732 
for all other organizations.  In summary, long-term organizations are not only involved 
in more coalitions, but coalition relationships among long-term organizations are more 
durable or stable.  This result, of course, makes sense.  I would expect that in 
relationships that involve some costs and level of risk, such as participating in a 
coalition, organizations that have experience with other organizations in the same 
policy area would be more willing to engage in such relationships.  This result points 
to  the importance of trust in reducing the costs and risks associated with relationships, 
and trust is a topic that is discussed below in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6: QAP Correlations between Coalition Network Structures Using QAP Analysis, 1998-2004 
  m98  e98  m99  e99  m00  e00  m01  e01  m02  e02  m03  e03  m04 
e98  0.740                         
m99  0.667  0.942                       
e99  0.595  0.840  0.876                     
m00  0.491  0.694  0.737  0.788                   
e00  0.454  0.641  0.681  0.801  0.922                 
m01  0.361  0.497  0.525  0.595  0.693  0.696               
e01  0.382  0.328  0.371  0.458  0.654  0.646  0.547             
m02  0.313  0.520  0.552  0.574  0.664  0.693  0.552  0.552           
e02  0.432  0.716  0.759  0.686  0.818  0.766  0.641  0.619  0.748         
m03  0.296  0.546  0.583  0.540  0.612  0.583  0.471  0.460  0.619  0.785       
e03  0.312  0.575  0.614  0.576  0.640  0.619  0.498  0.458  0.644  0.825  0.784     
m04  0.300  0.550  0.587  0.605  0.648  0.660  0.512  0.480  0.665  0.796  0.774  0.939   
e04  0.256  0.475  0.507  0.506  0.565  0.559  0.441  0.407  0.594  0.694  0.715  0.862  0.867 
 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist registration reports. 
Note: Each time period represents a six-month period corresponding to lobbyist reporting periods.  An ‘m’ indicates a mid-year 
filing period while an ‘e’ represents an end-of-year filing period.  For example, ‘m98’ is the period January through June of 1998 
while ‘e98’ is the period July through December of 1998.  Shaded areas indicate correlations of networks that occur in the same 
session of Congress.  Bolded numbers indicate correlations of networks that occur between the end of one Congress and the start of 
a new Congress.
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Table 4.7: Average QAP Correlations for Coalition Networks by Long-term 
Organizations and All Other Organizations 
  Long-Term  
Organizations 
All Other 
Organizations 
All Time Periods  0.752  0.521 
Within Congress  0.843  0.689 
Immediate Inter-Congress  0.888  0.732 
Source: Author’s compilation of coalition data from various sources. 
Note: Long-term organizations are those lobbying organizations that lobby on 
retirement policy more than five years out of the total seven years for this study (1998-
2004).  There are a total of 72 long-term organizations. 
 
Determinants of Coalition Participation: In this section, we move from largely 
descriptive analysis to one looking at determinants of coalition participation.  Because 
the data on coalition participation is count data of the number of coalitions in which an 
organization is a member, I use zero-inflated negative binomial regression to account 
both for the large number of non-participants (the zero-inflated portion) and for the 
relatively few organizations that participate in many coalitions.   
Table 4.8 provides the ZINB regression results for participation in coalitions over 
2000-2001.  Models 1a and 1b comprise a baseline model, provides the independent 
variables for self-represented organizations, the number of policy domains covered by 
lobbying organizations, the average lobbying expense per domain, the number of staff 
employed by the organization, and the financial services dummy variable.  I use two 
different indicators for time.  In modeling whether or not an organization would join 
any coalition (models 1a and 2a), I use a variable indicating whether the organization 
lobbied at any point during the 2001-2002 time period.  For this part of the model, I 
thought it reasonable to assume that a factor in the decision to join a coalition would 
be current interest in retirement policy issues.  However, in assessing the level of 
participation in coalitions (models 1b and 2b), not just the dichotomous ‘join or not  
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join’, I use a variable indicating the total amount of time spent lobbying on retirement 
policy issues.  The assumption here is that higher levels of activity would be a 
function, in part, of an organization’s level of commitment to the retirement policy 
domain.   
In the baseline model 1a, two variables are statistically associated with the 
decision to join or not join a coalition.  The average number of policy domains has a 
value of 0.932, which translates into a log odds of 2.54 (2.54 = exponent(0.932)).  
This means that the more policy domains in which an organization lobbies, the log 
odds of participation in any coalition increases by 154 percent.  The other variable of 
significance is the number of personnel that an organization has working on retirement 
policy issues.  The coefficient for staff is -0.802, which translates into an odds ratio of 
0.448 (= (1 – exponent(-0.802)) such that for each additional staff person working on 
retirement policy, the odds of that organization joining a coalition decline by 55 
percent.  In summary, the lobbying organization that works across a number of policy 
areas is more likely to be in a coalition, but the tendency to join a coalition declines as 
an organization employs more people on retirement issues.  These baseline results may 
reflect a tendency of organizations to use coalitions as a way to leverage their 
resources.  It may also be that an organization that works in more policy areas is more 
visible and hence a more attractive coalition partner. 
Model 1b indicates an organization’s level of participation in a coalition after the 
initial decision to be part of one, and this is found in the second column of results in 
Table 4.8.  Three variables achieve statistical significance, the first of which is the 
total time spent lobbying in the policy domain.  Time has a coefficient of 0.130 for an 
odds ratio of 1.139.  Therefore, for each additional six-month period that an 
organization has spent and will spend on retirement policy lobbying, its level of 
coalition participation will increase by a factor of 13.9 percent.  An organization that  
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is self-represented (i.e., it employs its own lobbyists) has a coefficient of -0.661 for an 
odds ratio of 0.516.  This means that the level participation in coalitions for a self-
represented organization declines by a factor of 48.4 percent (1 – 0.516).  Self-
representing organizations are not likely to join in coalitions, all else being equal, 
perhaps preferring to operate through their trade associations.  Finally, more staff 
working on retirement policy is associated with increased levels of coalition 
participation.  The coefficient for staff is 0.084 for an odds ratio of 1.087; for each 
additional staff person, coalition participation increases by a factor of 8.7 percent. 
Models 2a and 2b add variables representing network position.  Model 2a, which is 
the third column of results in Table 4.8, shows the propensity to join any coalition, and 
only one variable is significant here.  Agenda overlap has a huge effect on this initial 
decision with a coefficient of 9.452 such that the odds ratio is 12,733.  Agenda overlap 
with other organizations strongly predicts the initial decision to join a coalition.  
Model 2b, which is the last column of results, indicates that level of participation or 
the number of coalitions.  Again, there is only one statistically significant variable.  
The number of coalitions in 1999-2000 is associated with higher coalition activity in 
2001-2002: The coefficient is 0.472 for an odds ratio of 1.603.  The more coalitions an 
organization joined in the two years prior increases the level of participation in the 
current period by a factor of 60 percent.  
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Table 4.8: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression of Coalition Participation, 
2001-2002 (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  1a 
Coalition 
Decision 
1b 
Coalition 
Level 
2a 
Coalition 
Decision 
2b 
Coalition 
Level 
Membership Constraint      1.087  0.0162 
      (0.69)  (0.21) 
Agenda Overlap      -8.327**  1.207 
      (3.88)  (1.46) 
Issue Centrality      2.860  0.206 
      (2.23)  (0.41) 
Prior Coalitions      -22.46  0.474*** 
      (6922)  (0.10) 
Currently Lobbying  -0.546    -0.881   
  (0.83)    (0.71)   
Time In Retirement Policy    0.130***    0.0205 
    (0.021)    (0.025) 
Expense  -0.409  -0.00190     
  (0.26)  (0.0081)     
Self-Represented  -1.032  -0.661***  -0.937  -0.280 
  (1.45)  (0.24)  (0.77)  (0.37) 
Policy Domains  -0.932**  0.00296  -0.0417  0.00167 
  (0.44)  (0.015)  (0.056)  (0.014) 
Staff  -0.802*  0.0835**  -0.157  -0.00557 
  (0.43)  (0.037)  (0.15)  (0.030) 
Financial Services  1.494  -0.332  0.329  -0.0591 
  (1.13)  (0.27)  (0.70)  (0.29) 
Constant  2.344**  -1.290***  2.828***  -0.404 
  (1.08)  (0.28)  (1.02)  (0.32) 
Observations  392  392  282  282 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist registration reports and other publicly 
available data 
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Table 4.9 below provides the regression results using coalition participation in the 
next time period, 2003-2004.  As in Table 4.8 above, I present the baseline models 1a 
and 1b and start with the logit model for the initial decision to join in any coalition 
(model 1a).  For this first column of results for model 1a, three variables reach 
statistical significance.  Each dollar increase in average expense or income per domain 
is associated with a with a five percent increase (exponent(0.048) = 1.050) in the odds 
ratio of coalition participation.  Moreover, each addition policy domain in which an 
organization lobbies is associated with a 31 percent increase in the odds ratio of 
coalition participation.  In other words, an organization that engages in more policy 
domains is more likely to join a coalition.  In addition, indicating on one’s lobbyist 
disclosure report that one’s organization is currently lobbying on retirement policy 
domain issues is associated with a nine-fold increase in the odds of coalition 
participation.  That is, organizations that are currently lobbying on retirement policy 
are likely to join a coalition.  Turning to the second set of results for the overall level 
of coalition participation (model 1b), three different variables show statistical 
significance.  In terms of the total time in retirement policy, each additional six-month 
time period is associated with an 8 percent increase in the level of coalition 
participation – More time spent on retirement policy results in a greater number of 
coalitions.  If an organization is self-represented by its own lobbyists, the level of 
coalition participation drops by a factor of 31 percent (=1 – exponent(-0.367) = 1 – 
0.693).  Being a financial services organization also reduces the level of coalition 
participation during 2003-2004 by a factor of 33.4 percent.    
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Table 4.9: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression of Coalition 
Participation, 2003-2004 (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  1a 
Coalition 
Decision 
1b 
Coalition 
Level 
2a 
Coalition 
Decision 
2b 
Coalition 
Level 
Membership Centrality      2.578  0.100** 
      (1.950)  (0.047) 
Membership Constraint      -0.177  -0.018 
      (0.640)  (0.170) 
Agenda Overlap      2.894  0.494 
      (3.260)  (0.810) 
Issue Centrality      -0.0001  0.005 
      (0.021)  (0.007) 
Prior Coalitions      4.993***  0.143*** 
      (1.07)  (0.045) 
Currently Lobbying  2.364***   1.119   
  (0.520)    (0.70)   
Time In Retirement Policy    0.076***    0.029 
    (0.020)    (0.018) 
Expense  0.048*  0.006  0.010  0.006 
  (0.027)  (0.007)  (0.029)  (0.006) 
Self-Represented  0.928  -0.367*  2.794***  -0.192 
  (0.590)  (0.210)  (0.73)  (0.180) 
Policy Domains  0.273***  0.0127  -0.012  0.031*** 
  (0.080)  (0.013)  (0.054)  (0.009) 
Staff  -0.127  0.019  0.023  -0.026 
  (0.097)  (0.034)  (0.12)  (0.025) 
Financial Services  -0.045  -0.407*  -1.226*  -0.087 
  (0.610)  (0.250)  (0.67)  (0.200) 
Constant  -3.535***  -0.173  -3.800***  -0.117 
  (0.610)  (0.280)  (0.77)  (0.230) 
Observations  392  387  387  387 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist registration reports and other publicly 
available data 
   
    
The next two columns of results (models 2a and 2b) are for the model that includes 
network position variables.  For model 2a, the initial decision to join a coalition, prior 
experience in coalitions during 2003-2004 enhances the odds ratio by an enormous 
factor of 147.  Similarly, being a self-represented organization increases the chances  
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of being in any coalition 16 times over.  Financial services firms see their odds ratio of 
coalition participation drop by 71 percent.  Looking at the last column of results for 
overall level of coalition participation (model 2b) indicates that greater centrality at 
the level of membership and client ties produces an increase in the level of 
participation by over 10 percent.  Prior experience in coalitions during 2003-2004 
enhances the number of coalitions by over 15 percent.  Finally, each additional policy 
domain in which an organization lobbies increases the level of coalitional activity by a 
factor of 3 percent.
108 
Looking at common effects across the two time periods, we can see the importance 
of prior coalition participation, which significantly boosted the level of current 
coalition participation.  This could be a learning curve effect by which organizations 
learn to establish and operate coalitions over time.  Both tables also indicate the 
addition of the network variables in model 2b erases the significance of time spent in 
retirement policy.  As time spent in retirement policy is likely related to network 
position and prior experience in coalitions, it is not surprising that we see a reduction 
in significance for the time variable.  A similar process also occurs for the self-
represented (model 1b) and policy domains (model 1a) variables, which lose their 
significance when network-related variables are added in the subsequent models.  
Finally, across both time periods we see inconsistent effects from the network 
variables (other than prior coalition experience). 
Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter was to show the relationship between certain concepts of 
embeddedness and political activity.  In particular, I focused on relational 
embeddedness due in part to the nature of the data, but also because relational 
                                                 
108 In terms of whether a zero-inflated negative binomial model is significantly different from a negative 
binomial model, the z score is consistently significant at the .01 level across all models, and the use of 
the ZINB approach is appropriate.  
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embeddedness gets to the heart of political life in which personal relationships are 
thought to be paramount.  Using a unique longitudinal dataset of lobbyists in one 
policy domain, I constructed and used social network variables that, while somewhat 
correlated with each other, provide a somewhat different approach to the idea of 
embeddedness.  In general, I showed that relational variables like agenda overlap, 
centrality, and prior work in coalitions are associated with political activity.  Perhaps 
just as importantly, I also reaffirmed the importance of time in operationalizing 
embeddedness.  Time spent in any field is critical to establishing relationships and 
building a track record of trust and cooperation.   
The hypotheses related to the Policy Domain Proposition were largely supported.  
We do see long-term organizations that have stable and similar relations within the 
retirement policy domain.  However, I will have to leave it to Chapter 6 for evidence 
about whether and how lobbyists recognize each other in a policy domain.  For the 
most part, we do see long-term organizations with superior network positions in the 
policy relative to more short-term organizations, although the type of network is 
relevant.  The results provided by this chapter suggest that a policy domain is more 
than just a collection of lobbying organizations that work on a set of related issues.  In 
this case, we see a set of organizations within a broader field that not only work on the 
same issues but that have a consistent set of ties and positions. 
In addition, this chapter examined the Coalition Proposition, which argues that 
lobbying organizations that have deep and durable ties to other organizations in the 
policy domain are more likely to participate in coalitions and be leaders of coalitions.  
In general, as shown in Table 4.7, organizations with long-term ties to the retirement 
policy domain will have more stable ties to other organizations through coalitions – 
That is, coalitions are more likely to replicate themselves with long-term organizations 
than with more short-term organizations.  In terms of the determinants of coalitions  
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participation (Tables 4.8 and 4.9), I found a strong effect for coalition participation in 
prior time periods, which again shows the replicating nature of coalition work.  
Network structure had little effect on coalition participation:  Agenda overlap in 2001-
2002 had a negative effect on the initial decision to participate, but increasing 
centrality in the membership-level relationships had a positive effect.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 2.1 is only weakly supported.  Some of the control measures achieved 
some significance in one time period or the other, but no control variable had a 
consistent effect over the two time measures. 
An important finding of the negative binomial regressions is the significance of 
prior coalition work on the level of coalition participation (as opposed to the initial 
decision to join in a coalition).  This certainly confirms Hypothesis 2.2, which stated 
that prior participation indicates a greater likelihood of future participation in 
coalitions.  The finding suggests that prior experience acts as a multiplier effect:  
Organizations are able to somehow leverage that experience into greater joint activity.  
Chapter 6 may shed some light in terms of qualitative evidence as to why prior 
experience is so important, but it might suffice for now to say that perhaps prior 
experience provides a level of comfort against the fear that others may free ride or 
otherwise take advantage of coalition partners. 
The next chapter moves to the issue of influence.  Are these long-term 
organizations effective in some way, and if so, how?  Does embeddedness and joint 
activity matter?  I will take a particular stance on influence and discuss its relevance to 
the policy domain.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
INFLUENCE 
 
 
 
Here shall the Press the People's right maintain, Unaw'd by 
influence and unbrib'd by gain; Here patriot Truth her glorious 
precepts draw, Pledg'd to Religion, Liberty, and Law. 
 
          - Joseph Story
109 
 
The key to successful leadership today is influence, not authority. 
 
          - Kenneth Blanchard
110 
 
In the prior chapter, I discussed the structure of the policy domain and the 
connection between social relations within a policy domain and participation in 
coalitions.  As noted before, membership in coalitions is another level of social 
relationship that exists concurrently with agenda overlap, membership in associations, 
and lobbyist-client relations.  In this chapter, we extend the discussion to consider 
some of the outcomes of relationships within a policy domain.  Specifically, the 
outcomes for this chapter are an organization’s propensity to testify before a 
congressional committee and the number of times an organization is mentioned in a 
major U.S. newspaper or wire service story.  These outcomes I have collectively 
labeled as ‘influence’.  Does increasing embeddedness enhance influence?   
The discussion in this chapter will proceed as follows: I will restate the Influence 
Proposition from Chapter 1 as well as hypotheses that follow from the proposition.  I
                                                 
109 Joseph Story (1779-1845) was an American legal scholar and U.S. Supreme Court justice. 
110 Kenneth Blanchard is an American author and management expert.  
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then briefly review the problems with the concept of “influence” and why I adopt a 
particular perspective on that term.  I next discuss how I operationalized the relevant 
influence concepts and review the applicable methodology.  The policy domain in 
terms of the influence characteristics of the participating organizations is reviewed, 
and then I present and discuss the main empirical results.  To join local and global 
conceptualizations of influence, I bring in qualitative evidence from a small survey of 
lobbyists.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings in the context of the 
prior chapter’s empirical findings. 
The Influence Proposition: As presented in Chapter 1, the Influence Proposition 
states that lobbying organizations increase the likelihood of their influencing policy 
when linked to a group network formed around embedded ties.  Chapter 3 provided 
the following hypotheses from the Influence Proposition:  
Hypothesis 3.1: The more superior the network position of an organization within 
its policy network, the more influence that organization will possess. 
Hypothesis 3.2: The more coalitions in which an organization participates, the 
more influence that organization will possess. 
Influence 
The issues of political power, access, and influence have been theoretical and 
empirical puzzles for quite some time (Hunter 1953; Dahl 1961; Bachrach and Baratz 
1962).  The explosion in interest group activity beginning in the 1960s convinced 
many scholars in sociology and political science that interest groups do, in fact, have 
influence over the political process (see, for example, Salisbury 1992; Arnold 1990; 
Wilson 1974; Berry 1999; Smith 2000).  But despite the plethora of studies on 
lobbying, there are few conclusions about the nature and processes of influence.  “The 
literature on influence is an interesting example of avoidance based on a recognition  
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that previous studies had mostly generated more smoke than fire, more debate than 
progress, more confusion than advance” (Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 13).     
A second problem (and probably a reason for the contradictory findings mentioned 
above) is that there is little or no agreement on exactly what is influence.  Each study 
produces its own definition of influence, which in turn means that each definition has 
its own measure.  Is influence the ability to change the contents of a bill?  Is influence 
the power to change a legislator’s vote?  Because of data availability, roll call votes 
are a popular method of studying influence, but findings of studies have not produced 
agreement on what interest group activities generate changes in roll call voting (Smith 
1995).  Most scholars agree that if legislators are influenced by interest groups at all, 
they are least likely to be influenced when votes are cast (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998).  A second area of focus for prior studies has on been on campaign contributions 
from political action committees (PACs).  But here again, the large number of studies 
have produced contradictory findings most likely because there are a wide variety of 
resources available to politicians other than PAC money (Cigler 1991). 
I do not intend in this chapter to reconcile these divergent approaches to influence.  
The point is that the difficulty associated with studying influence is that the underlying 
quality of influence is one of multidimensionality.  Influence is a form of capital – 
Another term for influence might be political capital.  Much like money, influence 
circulates through the political system, crossing boundaries (Parsons 1963).  And like 
other forms of capital such as financial, human, and social, political capital or 
influence can be created from a variety of sources, stored, and then expended or used 
for a variety of other purposes.  Influence can be created from financial sources, 
expertise over an issue, credibility, and persuasiveness through interpersonal relations, 
to name a few.  Influence can then be applied to enhance the public visibility of a 
group, gain access to important meetings, engage in gossip, and help shape the content  
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of policy products.  This study argues that social capital translates into political capital 
or influence.   
Robert Salisbury (1994) criticized influence studies because they treat politics as a 
game with clear winners and losers when in fact the political process often continues 
without either a discernable endpoint or winner, with even the rules of the game 
evolving over time.  With this admonition in mind, it might be better to view 
influence, at least in some political contexts, not so much as an input that creates a 
political output but rather as a signal (Spence 1976) or mark of status (Podolny 1993) 
within a political domain characterized by a set of relations.  A signal is usually 
defined as an indicator of quality that has two criteria:  the signal must be at least 
partially manipulable by the actor and the difficulty of obtaining the indicator must be 
inversely related to the level of quality (Spence 1976).  Lobbying organizations, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, have some control over their reputations, and a reputation 
for influence is more difficult to obtain if you are not a “player.”  Status in turn can be 
defined in this context as the perceived quality or importance of that actor’s previous 
contributions to the development of policy (Podolny and Stuart 1995).   
Influence is more a perception in this case and can be contrasted rather than 
conflated with power.  Weber (1978) defined power as the probability that one actor in 
a social relationship will be able to carry out his own will despite resistance.  Few 
lobbying organizations have actual power in this sense of the word.  On the other 
hand, influence can be direct and/or indirect.  One can observe another’s influence 
even when the other does not act, and if actors perceive influence as real, then 
influence will be real in its consequences (Thomas and Thomas 1928).  For example, 
when the lobbying organization AARP claims to represent over 35 million Americans, 
few actually believe that all 35 million support the AARP.  But, the clout of the AARP 
is undeniable.    
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Because of the role of perceptions, influence might be thought of as a 
concatenation of mechanisms (Gambetta 1998) that creates and reinforces a hierarchy 
(Podolny 1993).  High status actors can become “focal points” (Schelling 1960) for 
the allocation of resources by the broader array of actors within or around the policy 
domain (Podolny and Stuart 1995).  Those lobbying organizations with large 
“influence” may become the leaders of coalitions or be quoted more often by 
journalists, and prior leadership and media mentions beget additional status or 
influence.  A “Mathew Effect” may thus take hold in part because influence-as-status 
engenders a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (“Call Sarah – She’s plugged in…”) with 
respect to the contribution of the lobbying organization (Merton 1968; Podolny and 
Stuart 1995).  Thus, in conceptualizing influence, as discussed in the next section, I 
am viewing influence as perceived status. 
Conceptualizing Influence 
How might the proposition and hypotheses operate in practice?  Unlike our joint 
activity measure of coalition participation in which the lobbying organization decides 
to join, our influence measures are determined by a third party.  In the case of a 
congressional hearing, a member of Congress (in practice, the staffer to the member of 
Congress) invites the lobbying organization to testify before a committee; for media 
stories, the decision is in the hands of the journalists who are writing a story.  
However, the reasons one is invited to testify are different from the processes that lead 
to an organization being quoted in a news article.  The next sub-section discusses 
separately congressional hearing testimony and news media appearances. 
Congressional Hearings – Members of Congress believe that committee hearings 
are an important vehicle for efficiently gathering information and for exerting 
influence over pending issues (Kingdon 1981).  The final shape of a bill is often 
affected by conflicts among witnesses about how issues should be framed  
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(Baumgartner and Jones 1993), and simply holding a hearing broadcasts the judgment 
of the committee that the issue under discussion is important (Diermeier and 
Fedderson 2000).  And why should lobbying organizations participate in hearings?  
Hearings are often scripted affairs in which questions (and sometimes answers) are 
crafted in advance.  In some cases hearings might be thought of as propaganda 
channels.  However, the fact that organizations with private information usually testify 
is crucial.  Legislators considering whether to support a bill may find testimony from 
experts informative (Burstein and Hirsh 2007), and experts may care about 
establishing a reputation for correctly predicting policy outcomes (Diermeier and 
Fedderson 2000).  Testimony may be the first time that an organization’s private 
information or claims on an issue become public and so may be especially influential 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998).  In short, the lobbyists themselves see committee 
testimony as a measure of influence (Laumann and Knoke 1987).   
In the interest group and policymaking literature, linking interest group 
preferences to committee preferences has been done in the case of congressional 
testimony (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair, and Woods 1991).  
These studies conclude that hearing testimony tends to target sympathetic lawmakers.  
Lobbyists tend to specialize and interact with similar types of people, be they 
lobbyists, legislators, congressional staff, or administration officials (Leyden 1994).   
Moreover, committees, particularly in the House of Representatives, exert 
considerable gate-keeping and agenda-setting powers.  Theoretical work on interest 
groups often begin with the assumption that members of Congress seek to promote 
their conceptions of good policy, to be reelected, and to gain the recognition of their 
legislative peers (Fenno 1973).  In order to promote these goals, members seek 
information of three types: agenda information about the importance of problems they 
are asked to address (Kingdon 1981; Baumgartner and Leech 1998); political  
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information on the electoral consequences of their decisions (Amenta et al. 1992) and 
policy information regarding the consequences of a policy change (Arnold 1990; 
Hansen 1991).  Thus, interest groups likely influence legislators through the 
information that they provide, and the concept of information is a broad one that 
encompasses not only facts but the context that gives meaning to those facts, including 
causal arguments or claims (Burstein and Hirsh 2007). 
In specifying what leads to access or influence, whether through congressional 
testimony or other avenues, researchers tend to focus on organizational resources or 
policy preferences.  “Groups that seek influence must have the kind of costly 
resources that enable them to know, to attain, to frame, and to deliver the sort of 
political and policy information (and interpretations) that are relevant to the goals of 
those legislators who have the power to make decisions that affect policy (Leyden 
1994; Austin-Smith and Wright 1992).  Interpersonal relations, however, are also 
important.  Lobbying organizations spend considerable time establishing ties with 
committee staffers or members in order to convince them that the information they 
wish to convey is relevant or important to the hearing proceedings – The importance 
of prior and repeated contact, in terms of months or years in advance, cannot be 
stressed enough (Leyden 1994).  These relationships and contacts provide a helpful 
basis for conceptualizing the hypotheses that flow from the Influence Proposition. 
In testing Hypothesis 3.1 in terms of superior network positions, I focus on the 
three network measures developed in prior chapters.  First, I would expect that 
organizations that are more centrally located in their issue network to have better 
access to information.  Therefore, their superior network position would be appealing 
to congressional staffers who are looking for witnesses.  The greater the centrality of 
an organization within its policy network, the more likely that organization will be 
asked to testify before a congressional committee.  
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Moreover, an organization that has a high degree of agenda overlap with other 
organizations in the policy domain may be a useful witness for a couple of reasons.  
Recall from prior chapters that agenda overlap is simply a measure of the number of 
issues two organizations have in common divided by their total set of issues.
111  An 
organization that has a high agenda overlap number averaged over all organizations 
therefore is representative of all the issue-based interests of active lobbying 
organizations.  In addition, a high agenda overlap measure may indicate an 
organization’s expertise in the policy domain.  In either case, the higher the 
organization’s agenda overlap with other groups, the more likely that organization will 
be asked to testify before a congressional committee. 
A third network measure is structural constraint, and this measure may also be 
important for predicting a group’s tendency to testify.  Recall from prior chapters that 
constraint measures the extent the other organizations to which an organization is tied 
are themselves tied to each other.  In other words, if organization A has ties to B, C 
and D, and if B, C, and D are in turn tied to each other, then the sheer group density of 
the ties may inhibit A from acting in a way that is contrary to the wishes of B, C, and 
D.  In the lobbying and congressional testimony context, a lobbying organization that 
is highly constrained may have little latitude in presenting information that elevates it 
above the other lobbying organizations.  Moreover, a committee looking for witnesses 
may want only those organizations that stand out from the group and that can reliably 
deliver testimony that suits the purposes of the committee chair and members.  The 
greater the constraint on a lobbying organization in terms of its membership relations, 
therefore, the less likely is that organization to testify before a congressional 
committee. 
                                                 
111 More technically, the agenda overlap index is equal to the total number of common issues between 
organizations i and j divided by the square root of the product of the total number of issues each for i 
and j.  This measure provides an index ranging from 0 to 1.  
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In terms of Hypothesis 3.2, the prior chapter established the importance of 
networked relations in participating in lobbying coalitions, and I would expect in turn 
that coalition participation would be influential in being asked to testify.  The very 
purpose of participating in coalitions is to elevate the issues of common interest as 
well as to raise the profile of participating organizations.  Prominence within a 
coalition or across coalitions may signify an organization’s expertise on an issue as 
well as the gravity of the issue itself.  If an organization participates in more 
coalitions, it seems reasonable that its prominence would be higher both among other 
lobbying organizations and to congressional committees.  The more coalitions in 
which an organization participates, the more likely that organization will be asked to 
testify before a congressional committee. 
News Media Stories – The interest group literature often makes a distinction 
between inside and outside strategies, with inside strategies being those actions that 
target government insiders such as personal lobbying and outside strategies focused on 
outside actors such as the general public (Baumgartner and Leech 1998).  Working 
with the news media has been considered, however, both an insider and an outsider 
tactic (Gais and Walker 1991).  Lobbyists are a frequent source of comment on policy 
proposals for journalists because they often are conveniently located near the halls of 
power and they are attuned to what the press needs and wants (Berry 1977).  Usually, 
lobbying organizations have spokespersons who are articulate and have some 
expertise on an issue.   
Speaking with journalists is a fairly common tactic among lobbyists: Studies have 
found that between 72 percent and 86 percent of lobbyists who were surveyed report 
using the mass media (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991; Nownes and  
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Freeman 1999).
112  Kollman (1998) notes that press conferences by lobbying 
organizations are an important tactic, but that the targets of press conferences are not 
necessarily the general public:  “It seems that group leaders tend to use press 
conferences to explain technical material to the press or to communicate to people 
within the policymaking community” (1998: 95-6).  When asked about media 
publicity campaigns, 51 percent of interest groups in the Kollman study responded that 
their primary targets were the president or Congress as opposed to the general public. 
How do lobbying organizations get quoted in the national press?  There has not 
been much work on this topic.  What research exists suggests that an organization's 
media strategy matters, but that organizational structure and organizational identity 
color these strategies (Rohlinger 2002).   
In line with the prior discussion on congressional testimony, I suggest that social 
relationships and positions within the web of group relations have an effect on who 
gets quoted in the news media.  In terms of quotes, reporters are looking for trusted 
sources of information much as policymakers are.  Moreover, prominence at some 
level of interaction is likely to be attractive in writing a news story as the readers will 
recognize the group.  Since the logic for news media mentions is the same or very 
similar as that for the congressional hearings, I will not repeat them here.  Rather, I 
would expect to see the following: 
·  The greater the centrality of an organization within its policy networks, the 
more likely that organization will be mentioned in the news media. 
·  The higher the organization’s agenda overlap, the more likely that organization 
will be mentioned in the news media. 
                                                 
112 But see Knoke (1990) who reports only 15 percent of lobbyists surveyed report using the mass 
media.  Baumgartner and Leech (1998) suggest that the low percentage may be due to the large number 
of apolitical groups in his sample.  
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·  The greater the constraint on a lobbying organization in terms of its 
membership relations, the less likely that organization will be mentioned in the 
news media. 
·  The more coalitions in which an organization participates, the more likely that 
organization will be mentioned in the news media. 
Variables and Model  
Dependent Variables – As noted above, there are two dependent variables.  The 
first dependent variable measures the number of times that an organization testifies 
before a congressional committee of jurisdiction during a six-month time period.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, there are four committees that have broad jurisdiction over 
retirement policy issues.  In the House of Representatives, the committees are the 
Ways and Means Committee and the Education and the Labor Force Committee, and 
in the Senate there are the Finance and Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
Committees.  I looked at every full committee or a subcommittee hearing on a 
retirement-related issue over 1998 through 2004, the time period of this study, and 
collected data for each instance that one of the organizations included in this study 
testified before a committee.  These counts were aggregated into six month time 
periods in order to correspond with the six month reporting periods for lobbyist 
disclosure filings. 
From 1998 through 2004, the four committees of jurisdiction held 64 hearings 
related to retirement policy.  The lobbying organizations used in this study made a 
total of 119 hearing appearances over this time.  In terms of the types of interests 
represented in these committee appearances, the following list shows the percentage of 
witnesses: 
·  Private employers – 37 percent 
·  Financial services – 23 percent  
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·  Labor – 15 percent 
·  Professionals – 13 percent 
·  Public interest groups – 12 percent 
·  Public employers and workers – 0.8 percent 
A similar method was used to collect every instance that a lobbying organization 
was mentioned in the news media.  I used the Lexis-Nexis database to search mentions 
of lobbying organizations in the major U.S. newspaper and wire service sub-database 
in connection with some aspect of pensions or retirement.  I checked the news stories 
to filter out irrelevant news stories (e.g., obituaries in which the deceased’s affiliation 
with an organization was mentioned).  I made, however, an important distinction in 
collecting news data relative to congressional committee.  For the news media 
variable, I only used those organizations that were membership-based such as trade 
associations, professional associations, broad-based public interest groups, and labor 
unions.  The reason for narrowing the sample is that a corporation will make the news 
for a variety of reasons completely unrelated to its activities on policy.  In contrast, 
membership organizations are inherently representative of some group and are likely 
to be quoted or mentioned for that reason.  By narrowing the category of organizations 
in this way, the sample was reduced from 392 to 120, but as we are looking at the 
same organizations over time, there are in fact 835 total observations. 
The 120 lobbying organizations were mentioned in news media stories 4,323 times 
over the seven year timeframe.  In terms of the types of interests represented in these 
news stories, the following list shows the percentage of mentions: 
·  Labor – 51 percent 
·  Public interest groups – 21 percent 
·  Private employers – 14 percent 
·  Financial services – 9 percent  
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·  Professionals – 5 percent 
·  Public employers and workers – 0.4 percent 
Network Position and Coalitions – As noted above, I use three social network 
position variables over two types of relations: 
·  A centrality measure that captures an organization’s position at the level of 
reported issues;  
·  An agenda overlap variable that is the average of an organization’s agenda 
overlap (in terms of common issues) with all other organizations; and  
·  Centrality and Burt’s constraint measures at the level of membership 
relations (i.e., common and overlapping membership in trade associations 
and connections through joint hiring of lobbying firms). 
I also use a variable for coalition participation, which is the total number of 
coalitions in which an organization participates.   
Controls – In order to isolate the structural effects on influence stemming from 
network position and coalition participation, I control for organizational attributes.  I 
control for group interest like professionals, financial services, labor, and private 
employers, with public interest groups being the reference category.  I also include 
variables for organizational resources (number of staff and amount of expense or 
income averaged on a per policy domain basis), activity (in terms of total policy 
domains in which an organization is active), and longevity (a dummy variable 
indicating a long-term presence – six or more years in the retirement policy 
domain).
113  I also add two period-specific variables in order to capture exogenous 
events.  There is a dummy for the 2001-2002 period in which George W. Bush was 
president and during which the country was in recession (Bush recession) as well as 
                                                 
113 The analyses drops three variables due to collinearity: Dummies for being a membership 
organization or for being a self-representing organization and a variable for the amount of time spent in 
the retirement policy domain in terms of six-month increments.  
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the post-recession period of 2003-2004 (Bush recovery) – The Clinton years of 1998-
2000 are the reference period. 
Models – I divide the independent variables into four models.  There is a baseline 
model, which includes only the control variables.  The Network model adds the social 
network measures.  In the Coalition Model, I add a variable for coalition participation.  
The Full Model incorporates the control variables, the social network variables, and 
the coalition variable. 
As in Chapter 4, the negative binomial regression is used to model the relationship 
between the number of times an organization testifies before Congress and key 
network and other independent variables.  Two sets of analyses are performed, one for 
each dependent variable.  These dependent variables exhibit three qualities that dictate 
the modeling choice: They are over-dispersed, longitudinal count data.  Approaches 
based on the Poisson distribution are appropriate for analyzing count data, but because 
the variance for both the hearing (1.29) and news media (91.38) variables exceed their 
means (0.35 and 35.84 respectively), the negative binomial regression model is 
favored.  The longitudinal format of the data further complicates the methodology by 
violating the assumption of independence in conventional models (Long 1997).  
Problems of autocorrelation and heteroskcedasticity result, producing spuriously low 
standard error estimates.  However, random effects models for cross-sectional time 
series data have been developed to account for the non-independence of events.  I use 
a random effects design rather than a fixed effects because those organizations with 
“0” outcomes – organizations that do not testify and/or do not get mentioned in the 
news media – are dropped from the fixed effects analyses, resulting in substantial 
attrition.  The models are estimated using the ‘xtnbreg’ function in STATA 10 with  
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standard error estimates adjusted for clustering within organizations (in terms of 
multiple observations over time.
114 
Results and Discussion – Before proceeding to the regression analysis and in line 
with the discussion in Chapter 4, I first map in a scatter plot the relationship of time 
spent in the policy domain against the outcome measures of congressional hearing 
testimony and news media appearances in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.  In both 
cases, there is a clear upward slope in the distribution of the scatter plot.  In particular, 
we see that organizations that spend a great deal of time in the retirement policy 
domain have many more appearances before congressional committees and in the 
news media.   
This implicit slope is confirmed by examining the correlation between the amount 
of time spent in the retirement policy domain and each measure of influence: The 
number of appearances at congressional hearings is positively correlated with time 
spent in retirement policy at 0.36, and the correlation for news media stories is 0.33.  
If lobbying organizations need to cultivate ties to congressional committees and 
journalists, time and history matter in the process.  Those organizations that focus on 
retirement policy have likely developed an expertise that is useful for the 
informational goals of a hearing, but there may also be a trust factor in that long-term 
organizations are well-known and dependable.   
                                                 
114 I also conducted a logistic regression analysis by recoding the dependent variables as binary.  For 
example, rather than the number of times that an organization testified before Congress within a six-
month period, the dependent measure was coded as “1” if the group testified one or more times during 
the same time period and “0” if not at all.  The results of the logistic regressions were similar to the 
main effects reported here and are therefore not presented.  
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Figure 5.1: Number of Hearings by Time Spent Lobbying in the Retirement Policy Domain 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbyist registration reports and committee hearing data 
1
9
6
  
 
 
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
M
e
d
i
a
 
S
t
o
r
i
e
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Time Spent in Retirement Policy Domain
 
   
Figure 5.2: Number Times an Organization is Mentioned in News Stories in Major U.S. Newspapers and Wire Services 
Source: Author’s compilation of lobbying data and news media records
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Congressional Hearing Testimony - Table 5.1 below provides the results for 
congressional committee hearing appearances with four models.  In terms of the 
baseline model, there are two statistically significant associations.  As suggested in 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2, organizations that have a long-term presence in retirement policy 
see the level of participation in congressional committee hearings increase by a factor 
of 5 (exponent(1.608) = 4.99), which is a very strong effect.  The other significant 
variable in the Baseline Model is the marker for the Bush recovery period (2003 
through 2004).  Relative to the 1998 through 2002 time period, lobbying organizations 
were much less likely to testify in front of Congress during the 2003-2004 period, 
perhaps reflecting the economic pressures on pensions during the 2001-2003 recession 
were driving the focus of hearings and hence the witness list. 
The Network Model adds the four social network measures for issue centrality, 
agenda overlap, membership centrality, and membership constraint.  None of these 
network variables is significant while the variables for long-term retirement policy 
presence and the Bush recovery variables retain their effects from the Baseline Model.  
The presence of the long-term variable is likely absorbing any effects of the network 
variables.  In addition, the staff variable indicates a positive and mildly significant 
effect (at the 0.10 level).  Thus, controlling for network position and other factors, 
there is some indication that having more resources in terms of staff may help an 
organization secure a spot as a witness at a congressional hearing.    
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Table 5.1:  Results of Negative Binomial Regression of Testimony at 
Congressional Hearings, 1998-2004 (n = 392). 
  Base  Network  Coalition  Full 
Professionals  0.728  0.783  0.156  0.198 
  (0.760)  (0.710)  (0.600)  (0.560) 
Financial Services  0.474  0.535  -0.130  -0.028 
  (0.640)  (0.640)  (0.480)  (0.490) 
Labor  0.687  0.906  0.366  0.487 
  (0.720)  (0.720)  (0.530)  (0.560) 
Private Employers  0.635  0.683  -0.930*  -0.862 
  (0.590)  (0.590)  (0.550)  (0.560) 
Expense/Domain  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Staff  0.106  0.117*  0.096*  0.108** 
  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.051)  (0.051) 
Policy Domains  -0.013  -0.013  -0.022  -0.019 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
Long-Term  1.608***  1.569***  0.449  0.448 
  (0.390)  (0.380)  (0.370)  (0.370) 
Bush Recession  0.049  -0.006  0.060  0.062 
  (0.220)  (0.220)  (0.220)  (0.230) 
Bush Recovery  -0.613**  -0.671**  -0.589**  -0.531* 
  (0.270)  (0.300)  (0.270)  (0.290) 
Issue Centrality    -0.345    -0.498 
    (0.390)    (0.430) 
Agenda Overlap    -1.792    -2.059 
    (1.550)    (1.540) 
Membership Constraint    -0.549    -0.289 
    (0.350)    (0.330) 
Membership Centrality    0.005    0.002 
    (0.004)    (0.004) 
Coalitions      0.251***  0.255*** 
      (0.046)  (0.048) 
Constant  -0.199  9.642  0.451  11.620 
  (2.510)  (400.000)  (3.190)  (464.000) 
         
Log Likelihood  -351.659  -348.605  -334.824  -332.460 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  There were 2,107 total observations over 
time. 
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The Coalition Model adds a variable for the number of coalitions in which an 
organization participates, and the result is a positive and strongly significant 
association with hearing appearances.  Each additional number of coalitions an 
organization participates in is associated with a 29 percent increase (exponent(0.251) 
= 1.285) in the level of appearances before congressional committees.  Thus, joint 
activity may heighten visibility and attractiveness for congressional committees.  
However, the addition of the coalitions variable results in the long-term variable losing 
both the strength and significance of its effect, which reflects the relationship between 
long-term participation in policy and the level of participation in coalitions.  In 
addition, an organization that is or represents a private employer shows a weakly 
negative relationship with hearing appearances.  Membership in multiple coalitions 
may be bringing out a negative effect in being a private employer. 
The Full Model confirms the main effects discussed above.  The more coalitions in 
which an organization participates, the more it will be involved in congressional 
committee hearings.  The effect of coalitional participation is also shown by the model 
fit statistic of Log Likelihood.  The model fit is significantly improved in the two 
models in which the coalition is included.  These effects confirm our Hypothesis 3.2 
for congressional hearings.  As I discussed above, prominence within a coalition or 
across coalitions (which the number of coalitions in which a group participates acts as 
a proxy) may signify an organization’s expertise on an issue as well as the gravity of 
the issue itself.  Although the other hypotheses were not confirmed, these results 
show, in addition to organizational resources such as the number of staff working on 
retirement policy issues, the importance of joint activity and the social relations that 
underpin that activity. 
In terms of congressional hearing appearances, Hypothesis 3.1 is not confirmed as 
the social network measures showed no significant effects, but Hypothesis 3.2 does  
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appear to be confirmed.  Coalition participation clearly trumps network position, and 
this may occur in this context for a couple of reasons.  First, because congressional 
committees have (somewhat) clear boundaries in terms of jurisdiction over policy 
issues, those organizations with a long history of working on those issues may have a 
clear advantage in being invited to testify over organizations that just dabble in a 
policy domain.  Second, because congressional staffers running hearings typically 
have more requests to testify than actual slots, inviting those organizations that are 
part of broad coalitions may be easier to justify both to committee members and to 
disappointed applicants.  Third, a latent effect may also be significant.  As mentioned 
above, relationships with congressional staffers may matter a great deal more in terms 
of getting an invitation to testify than inter-organizational relations in a policy field, 
but I do not have a direct measure for the congressional staffer relationship.   
News Media Appearances - We see similar results for news media analysis, which 
is presented in Table 5.2, and for that reason I will not present a model-by-model 
description.  As in the prior table, being a long-term player in retirement policy boosts 
the level of news media visibility, but this effect dissipates into insignificance when 
the coalition variable is added to the mix.  The coalition variable is strongly significant 
at the p<0.01 level.  We also see a consistently negative, strong, and significant effect 
of representing a private employer.
115   
A striking difference from the results for congressional testimony in Table 5.1 is 
the effect of private employers’ interests.  Relative to other types of interests, groups 
and trade associations that represent private employers are not likely to be receive as 
much media attention and this effect is strengthened when the coalition variable is 
added to the model as was the case with congressional hearings.  Why might this be 
                                                 
115 Recall that in this portion of the analysis, I am only looking at organizations that represent other 
organizations on a membership basis.  Thus, private employers are excluded.  
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so?  Recall that this sample only covers membership groups like trade associations and 
unions.  One answer may be that a news story that focuses on employer or corporate 
interests may be more likely to quote the corporation or employer directly rather than 
its representative trade association.  Larger employers certainly have their own public 
relations staff. 
We do see some significant effects for two network variables.  Membership-level 
constraint is negatively and robustly associated with media attention although its 
statistical significance is weak at the 0.10 level.  Thus, being more constrained by 
redundant ties to others in the network of trade association and for-hire relationships is 
likely to dampen an organization’s ability to attain media visibility.  This makes sense 
in that redundant ties probably indicate a lack of distinguishing characteristics or 
limited information that would be of use to the news media.  In addition, higher 
centrality at the membership level boosts, albeit weakly, an organization’s visibility in 
the news media.  In general, an organization that can belong to other organizations in 
way that makes it the center of relationships with diverse ties to other membership 
organizations is likely to receive more mentions in national news media coverage.  It’s 
possible that journalists may have a sense through repeated interaction that 
organizations with such central network positions are able to provide more insights on 
policy questions.   
In terms of our hypotheses, then, we see some weak support for hypothesis 3.1, 
which argued that superior network position boosts influence in the form of news 
media visibility.  However, we see consistent and strong support for hypothesis 3.2, 
which stated that greater participation in coalitions would be associated with greater 
influence although this effect is not as strong as was the case with congressional 
committee testimony.  
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Table 5.2: Results of Negative Binomial Regression of Number of News Media 
Stories, 1998-2004 (n = 120). 
  Models 
  Base  Network  Coalition  Full 
Professionals  -0.742  -0.701  -0.750  -0.743 
  (0.510)  (0.500)  (0.500)  (0.490) 
Financial Services  -0.475  -0.571  -0.633  -0.694 
  (0.510)  (0.500)  (0.510)  (0.500) 
Labor  -0.209  0.080  -0.231  0.041 
  (0.470)  (0.470)  (0.460)  (0.460) 
Private Employers  -0.907*  -0.866*  -2.034***  -1.882*** 
  (0.490)  (0.470)  (0.630)  (0.630) 
Expense/Domain  0.001   0.001   0.003   0.002  
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Staff  0.059   0.070   0.036   0.049  
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Policy Domains  0.001   -0.006  0.002  -0.006 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Longterm  0.551*  0.544*  0.324   0.343  
  (0.290)  (0.290)  (0.290)  (0.290) 
Bush Recession  0.396***  0.319***  0.423***  0.348*** 
  (0.086)  (0.088)  (0.086)  (0.088) 
Bush Recovery  0.329***  0.202**  0.347***  0.220** 
  (0.087)  (0.096)  (0.086)  (0.096) 
Issue Centrality    0.008     0.018  
    (0.062)    (0.060) 
Agenda Overlap    0.378     0.320  
    (0.490)    (0.490) 
Membership Constraint    -0.271*    -0.266* 
    (0.140)    (0.140) 
Membership Centrality    0.005***    0.004** 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Coalitions      0.111***  0.102** 
      (0.040)  (0.042) 
Constant  0.594   0.604   0.568   0.602  
  (0.530)  (0.520)  (0.530)  (0.520) 
         
Log Likelihood  -1346.552  -1340.746  -1342.588  -1337.683 
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Local versus Global Influence – The results from Tables 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that 
influence, at least as operationalized here, is partly a function of network position and 
social relations in the form of joint activity like coalitions.  This kind of influence is 
visible and can be thought of as global in the sense that it is objective from third 
parties such as congressional committees and news journalists.  But there are other 
forms of influence, some of which exist at a micro-level and are more local in nature.   
In early 2007, I mailed a survey out to the 392 DC-based lobbying organizations 
that worked on retirement policy from 1998 through 2004.  Because the response rate 
was relatively low (51 organizations), I have decided not to include its results for the 
empirical analysis of this project.
116  However, the survey responses provide some 
interesting qualitative data that illustrate some larger ideas and nicely complement the 
quantitative data.  Among others, the survey asked the following three questions: 
1.  List up to 5 organizations, if any, that you regularly (e.g., weekly or bi-
monthly) discuss general issues or developments in retirement or pension 
policy. 
2.  In your opinion, which 5 organizations (other than your own) are especially 
influential in developing retirement policy issues and policy positions PRIOR 
to introduction of legislation or issuance of proposed regulations? 
3.  In your opinion, which 5 organizations (other than your own) are especially 
influential in affecting retirement policy issues and setting policy positions 
AFTER introduction of legislation or issuance of proposed regulations? 
                                                 
116 Overall the response rate is little more than 15 percent of the sample.  However, it should be kept in 
mind that approximately 150 organizations lobby on retirement policy at any one moment in time and 
that only 50 organizations consistently lobby on retirement policy.  So, the responses may not be as low 
as they appear on first glance.  
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These three questions address local influence: who talks to whom, and who has the 
most credible reputation for influencing policy both prior to and after policy proposals 
are made public.   
Figure 5.3 maps the flows of regular discussion of policy interests from question 1 
(what I am calling the ‘regular discussion network’).
117  Overall, one can see a 
division that we saw in earlier network maps and that is also intuitive: Financial 
service (dark green) and pro-management (light green) are clustered together among 
themselves, and labor (red) and public interest (pink) groups tend to talk only among 
themselves.  The two large clusters are connected by a professional (grey) association, 
number 261, that is in the center of the network and which talks to organizations in 
both clusters.  Organization 261 acts as a bridge among the two major clusters of 
business/financial service organizations and labor/public interest organizations.   
Looking at individual organizations, we can see in each cluster that only a few 
organizations are the targets of many organizations for regular discussion.  In effect, 
we have hubs of information.  On the management/financial services side, we can see 
organizations 121, 120, 177, 223, 208, 155, and 194 as the beneficiaries of a number 
of in-coming ties, each of which indicates that sending organizations go to them for 
policy-related conversation.  On the labor/public interest side, organizations 234 and 
273 perform similar roles.   
                                                 
117 In this figure, one can see a few ‘halo-like’ effects around certain organizations (e.g., organization 
number 234).  These loops indicate organizations that hold regular discussions about retirement policy 
within their organization.  
 
 
11
294
234
50
273
235
76
120
194
121
153
177
92
155
208
113
248
223
127
180
156
231
171
178
261
193
145
211
213
64
246 262
268
267
40 276
60
304
278
279
298
416
297
485
250 20
254
504
520
224
 
 
Figure 5.3: Map of Organizations that Regularly Discuss Retirement Policy Issues With Each Other 
Source: Author’s compilation of survey data
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Similarly, we see the patterns of influence nominations in terms of question 2 
(influence prior to introduction of legislation) and question 3 (influence after 
introduction of legislation), which are mapped in Figures 5.4a and 5.4b below, 
respectively.  Like the map of regular discussion patterns, the influence patters are 
mostly clustered along lines of interest (i.e., financial/management versus labor/public 
interest), but the clusters are not as distinct as in the regular discussion network; there 
is more overlap.  Some influence nominations, for example, go from the financial 
services and management side to organization 234, a public interest group.  In sum, 
one’s influence is slightly more visible beyond the horizon of one’s discussion 
network.   
Does this conception of local influence (local in the sense of your discussion group 
and a couple of ties beyond it) connect with the more global perspective that was 
discussed in the prior section on congressional testimony and the news media?  
Consider Table 5.3 below which provides the rankings of the organizations in terms of 
the number of groups linking to them in the discussion network, nominating them in 
the local influence networks (both prior and after legislation introduction), the number 
of appearances before congressional committees, and the number of news media 
mentions.  Each column of categories (regular discussion, prior influence, after 
influence, media, and hearings) is ranked from highest (1) to lowest.  The most central 
organizations in the regular discussion, prior influence, and after influence networks 
are ranked number 1 in each category.  A number 1 ranking in media is the 
organization with the most news media mentions over 1998-2004, and a number 1 
ranking in hearings is the organization with the most congressional committee hearing 
appearances over 1998-2004.  A ranking of ‘1’ in the regular discussion network 
indicates that the organization is the most-frequently mentioned partner for policy-
related conversations.    
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Figure 5.4a: Map of Nominations for Influence Prior to Legislation 
Source: Author’s compilation of survey data
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Figure 5.4b: After Introduction of Legislation 
Source: Author’s compilation of survey data
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Table 5.3: Ordinal Rankings (within category) of Congressional Hearing 
Appearances, News Media Mentions, and Centrality in Local Regular Discussion 
and Influence (both Prior to and After Introduction of Legislation) Networks 
(n=41) 
 
ID 
Regular 
Discussion 
Prior 
Influence 
After 
Influence  Media  Hearings 
120  1  1  1  11  1 
177  2  3  4  25  2 
155  3  8  1  86  13 
208  4  12  7  19  6 
223  5  5  11  7  13 
234  5  2  1  2  4 
121  7  4  5  28  6 
194  8  8  7  6  20 
273  9  7  5  1  3 
153  10  11  9  16  26 
231  11  12  11  12  26 
261  11  5  11  38  6 
294  11  12  14  14  9 
20  14  16  14  44  26 
40  14  16  14  32  26 
50  14  20  20  8  57 
76  14  8  9    57 
171  14  20  20    57 
180  14  20  20  42  57 
248  14  12  14  30  13 
250  14  16  14  72  57 
304  14  20  20  4  57 
416  14  16  14  49  57 
11  24  20  20    57 
13  24  20  20    57 
92  24  20  20    20 
113  24  20  20  60  26 
127  24  20  20    13 
156  24  20  20    57 
178  24  20  20  58  26 
193  24  20  20    57 
211  24  20  20  86  26 
213  24  20  20    57 
246  24  20  20  86  57 
262  24  20  20  60  57 
Source: Author’s compilation of congressional hearing data, 
news media reports from Lexis-Nexis, and survey responses 
from lobbying organizations.  
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As a general pattern, organizations that are very central in their regular discussion 
network are also highly ranked in the other networks or lists.  When these lists are 
correlated with each other, the correlations are high and positive:  The number of 
hearing appearances is highly correlated with the regular discussion network (0.78), 
the prior influence network (0.84), and the after influence network (0.76) while the 
number of news media mentions is not as highly correlated with the regular discussion 
network (0.28), the prior influence network (0.48), and the after influence network 
(0.44).   
I do not wish to make more out of this survey data than is warranted, but the 
implications are interesting.  The difference in the general pattern of correlations 
makes sense.  We might expect higher correlations between the local networks and the 
number of hearing appearances because the process of testifying before Congress is 
much closer to these local networks of discussion and peer-based influence 
nominations than the process of news media mentions, which is diffused across the 
country.  The congressional staffer who sends out invitations to testify probably has 
had many conversations and meetings with lobbyists and is familiar with the broad 
pattern of relationships.  This connection between local and global influence may 
occur, for example, if a congressional aide taps into the discussion network or asks 
others for the reputation of potential witnesses. 
Conclusions  
The purpose of this chapter was to move the discussion from the focus on the 
organizations and their relations with other groups to an analysis of the outcomes, if 
any, associated with such relationships.  There are such outcomes, and they make 
sense.  The major finding, which confirms Hypothesis 3.2, is that joint activity in the 
form of participation in coalitions is likely to boost an organization’s influence as  
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operationalized in the form of congressional committee appearances and news media 
visibility.  This is a striking result given that the outcomes are distinctly different.  
Underlying network positions such as centrality, constraint, and agenda overlap show 
some significant connection to influence but are not as important as coalitional 
activity.  Thus, Hypothesis 3.1 is only weakly supported in the case of news media 
visibility and not at all in the case of congressional testimony. 
Unlike prior studies of influence, this chapter has not tried to measure influence as 
an input, such as with campaign contributions.  Rather influence is treated as an 
output, a reflection of position in the network of relationships.  Status in the form of 
influence and network position reinforces each other as a continuous process.  Those 
organizations with superior network position or that participate in more coalitions tend 
to get mentioned more in the news media.  Others read those stories and seek out the 
representatives of those organizations, thereby contributing to their enhanced network 
position.  As noted above, a “Mathew Effect” takes hold as a result:  When discussing 
count variables in Chapter 3, I have shown a huge variance with the dependent 
variables in this study, necessitating the use of negative binomial models because the 
“rich get richer.”  
So we have some basis to conclude that social relations among lobbying 
organizations matter in terms of cooperation and influence.  But how do they matter?  
What is it about these relations that lead to these outcomes and others not studied 
here?  Next, chapter 6 engages the qualitative evidence of networked relations among 
lobbyists and policymakers.  In this chapter, we will hear these actors discuss what 
they think trust is and how it operates in policymaking.  Not only will this discussion 
provide some ‘flesh on the bones’ of the structure we have examined so far, but it will 
also set up the following discussion in Chapter 7 about the interaction between policy 
domain insiders and those on the outside trying to effect change.  
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CHAPTER 6:  
COOPERATIVE NORMS 
 
So, those relationships of trust, you know, are, if not the most important, 
certainly the ones that come up most frequently because you interact with these 
people on a daily basis…I would say that there are a lot of really positive 
issues of trust that really make the whole system work. 
            - “Andy”, a lobbyist
118 
 
This study began by asking why lobbyists cooperate and suggested that long-term 
relationships lead to trust and thence to cooperation.  The first and third chapters 
sketched out a theoretical argument, and the last two chapters put some empirical flesh 
on the theoretical skeleton.  This chapter and the next provide the spark of life by 
engaging the lobbyists themselves as they describe how trust and related norms 
operate.   
Specifically, this chapter is focused on the role of trust and the associated 
cooperative norms as described by lobbyists.  Such norms include general calls for 
cooperation, and they also include more particular expectations such as “provide both 
sides to an argument”, “be a straight shooter”, and others that are discussed more fully 
below.  When actors are self-organized, trust and cooperative norms are mechanisms 
that make policy interactions possible over a long period of time.  The everyday work 
of lobbying and policy making is made possible by these norms because they facilitate 
exchange and interaction by reducing risk and enabling joint problem-solving.  In 
addition, however, norms that reflect trust and underpin cooperation within a cohesive 
community may also facilitate collusion. 
                                                 
118 All interviews that are cited in this chapter were conducted with promises of confidentiality.  
Therefore, I do not cite the identity of the interviewees and in the text recode their names to protect 
their identity.  Quote is taken from an interview with the author conducted on January 20, 2006.  
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It may be helpful to restate the Cooperative Norms Proposition of Chapter 1 and 
its associated hypothesis of Chapter 3: 
Cooperative Norms Proposition: Lobbyists whose relations are characterized by 
close-knit  ties are more likely to maintain social norms that maximize group welfare.   
Creating and maintaining relations is a choice, a choice that entails real costs and 
benefits for lobbyists.  When two lobbyists have a relationship or tie, the cost of that 
relation is reduced through the selection of trust-based social norms.  People continue 
to cooperate because norms of cooperation and reciprocity ensure that violators of the 
norms will be sanctioned through a variety of means such as future non-cooperation or 
reputation loss.  This idea is especially critical in a complex and crowded environment 
where organizations have to search for information and resources – Those that conduct 
such searches through a reliance on others will choose partners who share similar 
expectations and values.  Moreover, agents want to minimize not only the amount of 
‘deadweight losses’ from failures to cooperate but also the transaction costs related to 
enforcement of cooperative norms (Ellickson 1991:174).   
In practice, we should expect to see that most lobbyists with a long-term stake in a 
policy process cooperate, that detected defections from norms are regularly punished, 
and that society is rife with aspirational statements about the virtues of cooperation.  
When it is difficult to observe cooperation and enforcement, aspirational statements 
are likely to provide the best evidence (Ellickson 1991).  Hence, the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4.1: Organizational representatives who value or exhibit durable ties 
to other organizations in the policy domain will also value trust, uphold trust-based 
norms of cooperation and reciprocity, and choose the least costly forms of sanctions. 
What Hypothesis 4.1 suggests is that people in a lobbying community value the 
relationships that develop over time with others.  As Hardin (2002) suggests, two  
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people who wish their relationship to continue will take each other’s interest into 
account when they act.  In this way, lobbyists subscribe to norms (e.g., present both 
sides of an issue; don’t sign my name to a letter without my okay; stay focused on the 
meeting’s agenda) that are designed to help the group.  Even if someone in the group 
merits a sanction, lobbyists should apply them in a way that does not punish others in 
the group.  This is not to suggest that self-interest has no role here.  It does.  But what 
this chapter argues is that in pursuing their own goals, lobbyists in a close-knit 
community realize that they often can pursue their interests more effectively through 
the group and therefore take relations with other group members into account. 
This chapter is organized as follows:  I first provide background on the sources 
and nature of the qualitative data.  I next discuss the nature of embedded or close-knit 
ties in the retirement policy domain and the associated importance of trust to those 
who work in the policy domain.  The discussion then turns to the composition and 
operation of norms and their enforcement.  Trust and associated norms arise in 
contexts of interactions among lobbyists and policymakers, and I will be focusing on 
typical interactions that involve joint activity, including the so-called ‘Hill visit’, 
coalitional work, and sharing of information.  I will describe these situations in a little 
more detail below.  Next, the importance of trust and cooperative norms are discussed 
through the words of the lobbyists themselves.  The chapter concludes by 
summarizing the role of trust in a policy domain and previewing the next chapter, 
which focuses on the interactions between insiders and outsiders to a policy domain. 
Qualitative data sources  
The data for this chapter primarily come from a series of semi-structured 
interviews I conducted with a range of individual actors in the retirement policy 
domain, but I also rely on survey data collected from a sample of organizations.  For 
the individual interviews, I met with 25 people from January through September 2006.   
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The interviews lasted anywhere between 45 minutes to nearly 2 hours.  I used a set of 
standard questions, but I allowed interviewees considerable latitude in discussing 
topics.
119  Moreover, as opportunities to probe and delve more deeply into specific 
topics presented themselves in the course of the discussion, I would depart from the 
standard interview format. 
In terms of the composition of the interview sample, the following provides a 
breakdown in terms of interests: 
·  Private employer/management – 40 percent 
·  Financial services – 16 percent 
·  Public interest – 24 percent 
·  Labor – 4 percent 
·  Governmental (legislative and executive branches) – 12 percent 
·  Professional – 4 percent 
These do not match the representation of interests in the broader sample, but there 
is a reasonable approximation.  The interview sample is under-weighted in terms of 
the financial services, public interest, labor, and public employer/civil service/military 
sectors and somewhat over-weighted in terms of the public interest sector.  In terms of 
the organizational types represented, the interviewees were constituted as follows: 
·  Membership organizations (unions/associations) – 40 percent 
·  For-hire firms (law firms/consulting firms) – 20 percent 
·  Self-representing organizations (corporations/non-profit organizations) – 28 
percent 
·  Governmental organizations – 12 percent 
Recall from the descriptive statistics of Chapter 3 that the distribution of 
organizational forms was approximately evenly divided among membership 
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organizations, for-hire firms, and self-representing organizations.  The qualitative 
sample deviates from this distribution with more weighting towards membership 
organizations, but it does not seem unduly unrepresentative.  It should also be noted 
that many of the interviewees have experiences in different organizations.  A person 
might have worked over time as a congressional staffer, a lawyer, an executive branch 
official.  I do not account for such overlapping experiences here, but for some these 
long periods of different experiences in policymaking no doubt color their remarks. 
In general, I have tried to let the lobbyists speak for themselves with a minimal 
amount of comments from me.  I have provided context when appropriate to clarify 
the passages, but much of the text contains lengthy quotes as I believe the informants 
make the best case for trust and cooperative norms. 
Before we discuss the specifics of trust and cooperative norms from the 
perspectives of lobbyists, I will first discuss the interactional contexts in which these 
concepts operate.   
Focal Interactions  
Trust and cooperative norms arise in several situations, but I focus on certain 
routine or typical interactions that characterize workaday lobbying.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 3 and borrowing from Ellickson (1991) and Uzzi (1996), trust serves as a 
governance mechanism of embedded relations in that it promotes voluntary, non-
obligating exchanges of resources and services, and the norms facilitate workaday 
interactions in a way that maximizes group welfare.  In the interviews, informants 
would often refer to typical situations that framed their comments so some preliminary 
background is appropriate.  The typical interactions discussed here are coalitional 
work, the ‘Hill visit’, and information sharing. 
Coalitional Work – I already spent some time in prior chapters discussing 
coalitions, but those discussions were more abstract.  If one were to sit in on a  
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coalition meeting, one might observe the following events.  Usually, there is a steering 
committee or lead person who performs a couple of coordinating functions.  They 
send out the notices of the meeting times and place; they might host the meeting; they 
develop the agenda (with input from others); they call the meeting to order and 
facilitate the discussion.  Depending on the size of the coalition, the steering 
committee usually is comprised of a few individuals from organizations that have the 
most at stake in the issue(s) around which the coalition is forming.   
Outside of this inner group are organizational representatives who are of two 
types.  One type is the organization that has a stake in the outcome of the relevant 
issue but whether because of time or other constraints cannot take a leading role.  
They likely will contribute something to the group, such as financial support, sign 
group letters, or help in setting up advocacy meetings with policymakers.  They will 
have input but will not, however, drive coalition meetings or decisions.  The other type 
is the organization that has an interest in the issue but is not deeply committed to it.  
They may be just monitoring developments or have an ancillary issue.  This second 
type of organizational representative is not likely to contribute much in the way of 
time or other resources and may be present distantly (such as through telephone 
conference hookup or subscription to a coalition’s email listserve). 
Many coalition meetings are conducted in person at an organization’s office, but 
telephone conferencing is usually made available.  Meetings consisting solely of 
conference calls are not unknown, either.  The facilitator opens the meeting by asking 
people to identify themselves and their organizations.  Between 25 and 50 people 
could be present so not all will know each other, even after several meetings.  Then 
the meeting goes through the agenda, which involves releasing the latest intelligence 
on the issues, bills, regulations of interest.  “I heard Senator so-and-so is introducing 
his bill next week.”  “The XYZ issue will not be added to the budget bill moving  
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through the House.”  Much of this is gossip, but by sharing what they know, the group 
can get confirmation or disconfirmation by triangulation: “That’s not what I heard.”   
After taking stock of where things stand, strategy and tactics are updated or 
revised.  Should we send a group letter to the Hill?  What about releasing it to the 
press?  Can we schedule some visits with the key Republicans on the Ways and Means 
Committee?  Did we get any response from our member organizations?  Do we need 
to follow-up or rebut the other side with a study?  Ideas are thrown out and a 
consensus is reached.   
At that point, action items are agreed upon:  “We need to set up meetings with key 
staffers on Capitol Hill – Who will take the lead?”  The steering committee members 
(and others with a big interest) pull out their congressional directories and datebooks.  
“I know the staffer at Representative Smith’s office; I’ll call her to schedule a 
meeting.”  “I’ll go with you – We have a client in her district.”  Others on the 
periphery hang back and do not volunteer. 
The meeting breaks up, and people linger in conversation and others leave quickly.  
The steering committee members stay behind to assess the meeting and perhaps 
schedule the next one (a notice goes out to the rest of the group later).  Those lobbyists 
who schedule meetings with policymakers follow-up with emails about dates, times, 
and invitations. 
The Hill Visit – The Hill visit is a catch-all term used by lobbyists to describe 
meetings with congressional staff (hence the reference to Capitol Hill) in which 
lobbyists advocate for their position.  While such meetings can consist of one lobbyist 
and individual policymaker, here I focus on two or more lobbyists meeting with one or 
more policymakers.  As mentioned in the prior section on coalitional work, one person 
sets up the meeting with the staffer (I will use the common meeting with the 
congressional staffer as an example) and then invites the rest of the group.  At the  
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appointed hour, the lobbyists gather at the congressional office, waiting until all have 
arrived before notifying the staffer that they are present.  After being ushered into a 
room, introductions, if necessary, are made and business cards are given to the staffer.  
As the lobbyists make their presentations, sometimes the staffer will interrupt with 
questions or wait until the end.  After discussion of questions or issues that come up in 
the course of the meeting, the meeting ends with the staffer giving her feedback and 
any request for follow-up.  Follow-up may include more detailed analyses of the issue, 
relevance to the member of Congress in terms of local constituents affected by the 
issue, and/or simply filling in gaps in information.  Very often, the lobbyists will have 
prepared written materials that present the arguments made during the meeting with 
perhaps background material.  These ‘leave-behinds’ are then left with the staffer 
before the lobbyists exit. 
Whether in the hallway or in the cab ride back to the offices (many lobbyists are 
within walking distance of each other and hence share cabs), a brief post-mortem 
ensues.  The lobbyists discuss additional steps need to be taken, new information to be 
digested or disseminated, and/or who will follow-up with the staffer. 
Information Sharing – The act of information sharing occurs throughout the 
interactions that occur in the course of a lobbyists’ day, including the events described 
in the preceding paragraphs.  Here I focus on a specific kind of information sharing in 
which the information is proprietary in nature and when there are very good reasons 
not to share.  The story that opened Chapter 1 is a good – and actual – example.  
Congressional staffers do call on lobbyists to provide input and technical assistance 
during the course of legislative drafting.  In terms of concrete examples, the staffer 
could send over a draft bill, as discussed in Chapter 1, or the staffer could convene a 
meeting during which suggestions for legislative content and strategy are requested.  
This kind of information transfer between policymaker and lobbyist can occur in other  
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contexts that can be more public or formal, such as a letter of endorsement for a 
legislator’s proposal or the giving of testimony at a congressional hearing.  And 
certainly the information transfer is two-way as the policymaker can supply a lot of 
intelligence about process and substantive policy. 
This sort of information sharing also can occur among lobbyists.  Lobbyists are 
looking for information from each other about policy developments, strategy, and 
opportunities for policy advocacy.   
I have not meant to cover the field of what constitutes a typical day or set of 
activities for lobbyists.  Rather, I wanted to provide context for the discussion of the 
following comments by lobbyists themselves, who often refer to these typical 
situations when discussing the concepts of trust, cooperative norms, and sanctions.  
With these concrete contexts in mind, the next section reverts to our more abstract 
concepts and how they are described by lobbyists. 
The Importance of Trust  
Nearly to a person, lobbyists stated that trust was important for their work and 
that most of their peers could be trusted.  In the survey of lobbyists that was described 
in Chapter 5, 70 percent of respondents state that lobbyists in the retirement policy 
domain could be trusted.  To be sure, relying on trust carries risks, and these risks 
come from different sources.  Certainly there is a risk that you could be a sucker in the 
proverbial Prisoner’s Dilemma – You cooperate, but your partner does not reciprocate.  
This is more likely when there is a power imbalance, such as between a decision 
maker like a member of Congress and a lobbyist.  In introducing bills or staking out a 
position on an issue, members of Congress are particularly eager to show that they 
have support of different communities.  The fear from the lobbying community is that 
communications could be misinterpreted.  Andy, a lobbyist with a trade association  
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that represents employers, cites the risk that comes from sharing information with a 
member of Congress: 
 
As you know, one of the things that members of Congress love to do - 
chairmen of committees and sponsors of bills - is to ask people in the 
advocacy community, ‘Would you please give them letters of endorsement?’  
So there's always a dance: Do you 'commend' or do you 'applaud?'  Or do you 
ever use the magical 'E' word of endorse or support, or do you just commend 
their efforts and not the final product?  Whatever letter you may send that may 
be positive, even if it also lists a whole number of different concerns that you 
may have, that those letters get held up in a committee markup or on the floor 
of Congress, and the person says, "I am holding in my hands letters of support 
from [trade association A and trade association B]..."  And we may not have 
meant it that way, but you take a certain calculated risk.
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In some cases, merely engaging in dialogue or meeting together can be 
misconstrued.  In the following passage, Andy, a pro-business lobbyist, discusses a 
series of meetings convened by a liberal Democratic Senator in order to resolve a 
contentious employee benefits issue.  The Senator took positions on the issue contrary 
to Andy’s trade association but had wanted different viewpoints represented at the 
meeting.  For Andy, the comfort level of such a meeting with broad participation was 
not high enough: 
 
We made it very clear from the outset that our participation in those meetings 
was not to be interpreted as, you know, supporting the direction he would go 
because we really didn't have a great deal of trust in the outcome.  And we 
were afraid that our cooperation could do a couple of things that would be 
harmful.  Number one, we could be co-opted because it would look like we had 
continued in good faith, you know, to work with them and then because we did 
not like the final product that we were disassociating ourselves from it.  Since 
we didn't have a great deal, really, any confidence that we would like the final 
product, we were concerned, whether intentionally or not, that our ability to 
oppose it later on would be compromised.   
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Dave, a lawyer representing financial interests, makes a related point about the 
perceptions of others:  “You've got to be careful that you are not seen by your clients 
or your stakeholders as compromising too much, being insufficiently strong in defense 
of the business perspective.”  Moreover, he notes that in the case of sharing 
information and services with congressional offices, you have to be concerned about 
how that information is shared after you send it:   
 
But, nonetheless it wouldn’t even just be with the [Senator’s] staff, how the 
staff would characterize it.  It is, how would other allies of the [Senator’s] staff 
characterize it?  Even if the staff relates something objectively, how would that 
be characterized by other stakeholders?  So you’ve kind of, and maybe this is 
something to point out to, you’ve got to have, you don’t always have a single 
audience… 
 
This issue of different audiences or publics was mentioned by another lobbyist, 
Carl: 
 
I mean it's it comes down to whether I trust him or not.  I mean, I am less apt to 
call someone and pick someone's brain on a particular issue or tell them my 
strategy if…I think that telling them that is going to leak to the wrong person 
or they will perhaps ever use that against me in a conversation with somebody 
else.  So you know, it is a small town, and you know, the people you keep 
closest alliances with are the people that you trust…
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Carl’s quote suggests quite vividly the importance of encapsulated interest in 
supporting trust.  He is clearly calculating how much the other has invested in their 
relationship before he provides confidential information.   
These concerns are not just limited to situations of interacting with 
policymakers who have more power.  Interactions with the news media, for example, 
are another situation in which trust is a factor that facilitates or impedes interaction.  
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As with lobbyists and policymakers, time or history of the relationship is relevant.  
Betty lobbies for industrial firms, and she has had extensive dealings with journalists: 
 
Media people who call here definitely have reputations, especially the trade 
press, and we know who has an agenda.  They've written the story before 
they've even picked up the phone to call you, and they're just going to fit your 
quote into what they're saying.  And I can name a few of those people, and 
when they call, we do talk to them but we are very cognizant of that fact.  I 
mean there's one [Washington] Post guy who calls frequently and I rarely get 
quoted because I am so guarded in what I say to him because I know the few 
times that I haven't been guarded, I've regretted it.  There's other reporters 
around town that you can have a frank discussion with, whom you trust,...
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With other lobbyists, a lobbyist could be concerned that a colleague may take 
advantage of joint activity like a coalition in order to further their own agenda.  Carl 
stated, “You may not want them to, if you are in a meeting, you may not want them to 
take control and drive the bus, so to speak.”  Working together, I was told, requires 
knowledge of how your allies will act and trusting that they will play their part.  Andy 
spoke of situations in which your organization may be in a coalition with ‘allies of 
convenience’ such that all have the same goal but there might be some distrust or 
distance.  In these cases, coalition members have similar concerns that untrustworthy 
allies might take advantage of cooperation for their own gain: 
 
So, if you portray yourself as the leader of the coalition because you want to 
impress the media or your members or your prospective members, well, you 
know, why should this other organization that's working equally hard, is just as 
much a leader, you know, cooperate with you because you're trying to hog all 
the credit?   
 
Trust is also critical to information sharing.  In the following passage, Andy 
discussed a typical situation in which the lobbyist has valuable and nonpublic 
information.  While hoarding such information has an opportunity cost in terms of 
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potentially boosting one’s own prestige or influence, there are risks associated with 
sharing such information.   
 
You know, you want to share it to be helpful in the common objective that you 
all want to achieve, but you may want to keep it quiet because you do want to 
be the first one to reveal it to the different audiences so there may be some 
competitiveness on your part to do that.  Or sometimes because you are afraid 
that if you share it with so-and-so, it could deliberately or inadvertently end up 
in the wrong hands and that would undermine your objectives, and that of 
course relates to the trust between and amongst allies because you may be 
withholding information for all the right reasons but you are still withholding 
information. 
 
However, cooperation occurs in the shadow of the relevant political 
institutions.  For example, even though bills are introduced and revised in the course 
of formal processes like a committee meeting, substantial revisions can occur in the 
lead-up to introduction when groups informally give input.  In the next quote, Andy 
discusses an invitation from a Senator who was convening different groups in informal 
meetings in order to resolve a legislative issue.  Andy’s trade association declined to 
participate:   
 
The other part of it was we didn't feel that this venue that he was setting up, 
this informal venue, was the appropriate place to hammer out a solution but 
rather there were the proper committees of jurisdiction that would ultimately 
have to develop something and that was the better place to do it. And it might 
be resented, frankly, by those who were operating within that realm that even 
though he was a member of one of the committees of jurisdiction, that the 
proper way for him to do that was within the committee within which he sat, 
not on his own independent agent.   
 
While trust carries risks, trust can reduce risks and fosters cooperation in 
everyday situations.  It can enable organizations to work together and share resources 
in more meaningful ways.  When trust reduces the risk of rent-seeking such as  
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hoarding information or claiming credit for coalition success, greater cohesiveness can 
be achieved.  Betty discussed why trust and cooperation in a group were important in 
putting out a unified front to policymakers: 
 
One thing my old boss, [name omitted], who is a veteran lobbyist in D.C., 
always emphasized is the importance of keeping the business community 
united.  That is always our goal because once you go up to the Hill and you've 
got somebody who's off the reservation, staffers, particularly if they're not 
ready to commit to supporting your idea, they see that little wedge in there.  
They're going to use that as an excuse to not support your idea.  And they are 
going to say, "Look, I am confused as to your position.  You know, when you 
decide what your position is, come back and see me then."  Or that kind of 
thing, to sort of put you off.  So it can work to your detriment if you are not all 
on the same page and not speaking with one voice. 
 
As Fay, a corporate lobbyist noted, information sharing provides a key 
example:  “When you've developed a relationship and you know the person, you are 
willing to share.”
123  As Andy explained: 
 
And [trust] can come up in innumerable ways in terms of somebody in your 
respective membership or someone on Capitol Hill shared some information 
with you on the one hand, you have to make a judgment call between sharing 
the information because it would be helpful for the other person to know; not 
sharing the information because maybe the person who shared the information 
specifically does not want it to be shared with this other group who is your ally 
for whatever reason that relates to their own relationship or their own distrust 
that it remain confidential or whatever it might be.   
 
In addition, a relationship based on trust enables more fine-grained information 
to be transferred because the credibility of the information is a function of the 
relationship that transmits the information.  Dave, an attorney for a respected 
Washington law firm, remarked that when he is asked to review draft legislative 
proposals by congressional staffers, the usual worries about his input being 
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mischaracterized as an endorsement may be alleviated by trust-based relations.  The 
relationship creates tacit expectations:  “There are some staffers, some offices where 
you wouldn’t have to ever think about that.  It would just be understood...”  Similar to 
a quote from Carl above, Dave also puts it this way about information sharing 
generally: 
 
And you know it's a lot of what we do is sort of informational exchange.  I 
often feel that I am a broker.  Like I am gathering information from various 
sources and disseminating it out to various sources.  It's a big part of what I do.  
And when you feel that you've clicked with someone, whether you're relatively 
early in that relationship or you've got a very significant relationship, it's easier 
to pick up the phone, it's easier to shoot the email than if you don’t feel that 
connection with someone because you are less worried about putting 
somebody out, you're less worried about somebody taking it out of context, 
you're less worried about confidentiality, all the things that facilitate trust and 
information flow are easier when there's that sense of connection... And 
probably the degree to which you’re careful and a degree to which you’re 
explicit [in terms of explaining your position] rises as the commonality 
perspective decreases or the trust level decreases.
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Eric, who represents an association of professionals, explained this in terms of 
whether being a powerful lobbyist versus being technically smart and useful matters 
more. 
 
Certainly with the committee staff the relationships, probably on the 
technical staff, that’s where the relationships matter more because, like as we 
said, the stuff’s complicated, and they want to know that the person I am 
talking to, one, knows what they’re talking about and, two, is not going to give 
them bum advice or bum information. 
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Martha, a long-time lobbyist who works for a trade association representing 
corporate employers, noted that close-knit relationships gave her access to views and 
information from policymakers relative to less experienced lobbyists: 
 
Again I have noticed this in the last 4 or 5 years that we were having a meeting 
with other pension types downtown, and people would be worried about this or 
that or the other thing on, wondering where labor is, or wondering where 
AARP is, or wondering where [a pro-labor Democratic staffer] is, and I just 
would go and pick up the phone and call.
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These quotes demonstrate that the reasons for trust center on relationships and 
the need for ongoing relationships with the result that these trust-based relations 
provide real benefits in terms of better information.  Trust and cooperative norms also 
support ongoing relationships through what Uzzi (1996) calls joint problem-solving 
arrangements.  Relationships that are characterized by durable ties that have a history 
and are predicated on trust provide more rapid and explicit feedback than do 
mechanisms in arms-length relations like “exit” (Hirschman 1970): “They enable 
firms to work through problems and to accelerate learning and problem correction” 
(Uzzi 1996: 679).  This process fosters new solutions and combinations of ideas.  
Some of the quotes referred to a competitive environment among lobbying 
organizations, and many organizations in the retirement policy domain do compete for 
members or clients.  In this context, Andy described a coalition in which his trade 
association and another association were competitors in terms of membership. 
 
There wasn't a conflict between us and [the other trade association]; there were 
just problems that just arose in the course of this effort, and the existence of 
mutual trust helped us kind of end up in as good a place as we collectively 
wanted to be, you know.  So that was an example of problems that arose that 
weren't necessarily either organization's fault but because there was this 
reservoir of trust and good faith we were able to work it through and get a 
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resolution.  Whereas if things had been more negative, it very much would 
have fallen apart.   
 
In this sense, communication is not just about knowledge transfer; it is also 
about problem-solving.  Eric characterizes problem-solving in terms of the ability to 
talk through it: 
 
We will have a call, I think like Friday’s call, and we will see if there is a way 
to resolve the dispute, and there may not be, I mean, there is maybe an impasse 
and a difference of opinion.  Mostly it’s communication.   
 
Helen works for a pro-worker public interest organization, but she has been 
involved in a number of activities with pro-business lobbyists.  She comments on the 
effect of personal relations and trust on solving broader problems in terms of 
substantive public policy: 
 
I mean there is no way, first of all, you know I have a really good relationship 
with [certain business trade association lobbyists], I have got a really good 
relationship with [the president of a business trade association], … I think with 
[him] and I, when we’re on TV shows together now, it’s less adversarial in 
certain ways.  I think we come off being more, looking at the same issue from 
different perspectives, we try to find common ground even we are doing TV 
shows and stuff like that together. 
 
Trust is an important concept to lobbyists, and they recognize that it is a 
critical element to doing their jobs.  But from where does trust originate?  The next 
section discusses factors identified by the lobbyists as sources of trust in relationships. 
Sources of Trust  
In speaking to lobbyists, a combination of factors tend to produce 
interpersonal and within-group trust.  These factors include time and history in a 
relationship, personality and common interests, and the roles or positions of the  
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lobbyists and/or their respective organizations.  These factors come up in a variety of 
ways, but the most fundamental source is the direct contact such that interpersonal 
considerations are most important.  As Carl said:  “It is individual, it's not 
organizational.”  But trust can be more meaningful to some lobbyists than to others.  
As Helen noted, “But I do think that so much of lobbying relationships, the trust 
issues, is also likeability…People like to be among people that make them feel good 
about themselves.  Washington’s all about that.”  Certainly personal qualities and 
beliefs play a role in this, as Carl and Dave acknowledged separately:   
 
Sometimes, it comes down to, I think it ultimately is whether you trust them.  
But trust is built off of how well you get along with them 
personally…Sometimes you have a personality that just clashes and, you 
know, for whatever reason, and sometimes it might have something to do with 
some of the traditional political affiliations that you align with.   
 
You go in, you have a meeting, and you’ll sort of hit it off with the staffer or 
the member [of Congress].  The sense of humor is the same, the conversation 
is particularly stimulating, the back-and-forth across the issue is particularly 
interesting.  So you go, 'Hmm.  That was fun.  That was a good engagement.'  
Therefore I'm more likely to take the volunteer assignment when a coalition 
has to go lobby that office.  "I'll set up that office; I know that person." That 
can be a way that you can get more interactions.   
 
Dave further comments on what he looks for in personal qualities, focusing on 
how other lobbyists do their jobs when he works with them: 
 
So you have an occasion to lobby together with a lot of people and see how 
they do it, and that's in a sense a very telling indicator: Do you like the way 
they lobby?  Do you like their style?  Do you like their approach? Do they lay 
things out like you would lay things out?  Do they not lay things out as much 
as you think they should?  So that sort of observation of their lobbying 
approach has a lot to do with trust.  Style is part of that.  Do they lobby in a 
style that you are comfortable with or do they lobby in a different style?  And 
some of this, too, is, what is the culture of their individual company or trade?  
How above-board are they?  How underhanded are they?  Are they making 
side deals and backroom deals?  Are they more Machiavellian in their  
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approach?  Are they more straight-forward?  Are they more data-based in their 
approach?  You get to know that about particular institutions and particular 
lobbyists.  So I think for me, personally, all that stuff gets factored into how 
closely I work with or how trusting I am in a particular lobbyist.  I can work 
with a lot of people that I don't trust as well because we have a lot of 
commonality of issue agenda.  I can be, I can trust extensively someone with 
whom I don't have much issue agenda in common.   
 
Personal qualities, interests, and attributes can deepen existing professional 
relations as explained by Walter, who works for business-oriented consulting group: 
 
But, I think you could probably talk to any of the lobbyists around town, there 
is an intersection between their personal circle and their professional circle, 
and when somebody is inside both of those circles in the Venn Diagram, that’s 
a unique relationship.  So, I have personal friends who, for whom the 
friendship pre-dates in a professional connection, who are chiefs of staffs to 
Members of Congress, who are legislative directors to Senators, who are 
political appointees in the Bush Administration; that’s relevant to my lobbying 
and professional set of relationships…For me, for example, I’ve kind of got a 
gay/lesbian community circle.  But, there’s a whole, we joke about it; we call it 
the ‘velvet mafia.’  There’s a whole sort of, the gay lobbyists and the gay Hill 
staff and the gay executive branch staff pretty much know who each other is.  
And there is to some extent kind of an extra ‘looking out’ for each other 
amongst that community.  So that might, in some sort of instant way give me a 
little more rapport with the staffer or a little bit higher trust level with the 
staffer because of that dynamic.  And that’s totally different from what you’d 
seen in certain standard literature but it’s very real in terms of people’s 
networks.  The tax coalition, that sort of women tax professional group, which 
is current and former Ways and Finance staffers and lobbyists and women 
lobbyists who are just doing tax, exclusively for women, no male members.  
That’s a very connected group, and those women feel very, I mean, very loyal 
to one another.  And that influences, clearly influences working relationships, 
not just personal relationships. 
The tax coalition was sort of founded because of a professional-related 
thing, but it’s a way for those relationships to be deepened and strengthened 
and they flower into personal relationships that go well beyond professional 
relationships.  And like the gay and lesbian community, these are people that 
primarily have been people that I’ve known anyway socially who have roles in 
the policy process, but sometimes it can be meeting someone for the first time 
through a lobbying contact, and kind of figuring out that they’re gay or lesbian 
and that can have some significance in terms of how deep the relation it gets or  
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how trusting a relationship gets.  So that’s kind of the sort of secondary 
networks and the way they play into the primary network. 
 
From initial personal qualities, time and history of the relationship are 
important at solidifying trust among lobbyists and policymakers.  Eric, who represents 
a group of professionals, noted that these qualities matter in developing trust with 
congressional staffers:  “You have got to be right, and you have got to be able to give 
folks correct answers and be balanced in terms of the presentation.  And you have got 
to do that consistently.”  Tom puts in a similar way:  “You just spend time.  You do 
issues with people and you just spend years on it…The only way to get them 
ultimately to rely on you is to help them do their jobs and that's true of associations, 
it’s true of outside consultants.  I mean you have to add value the same way in 
anything in the world.”  Dave notes that relations between lobbyists and congressional 
offices can come from variety of sources: 
 
But typically for me, a relationship typically begins when I pay that first 
lobbying visit to a particular staffer or office.  So, typically, that means the 
office or member sits on a committee of jurisdiction relevant to a piece of 
legislation that I am working on for a client.  And I am going and making the 
initial visit on X, Y or Z issue.  And from that point, I think the way they get 
deepened is, one, either that's a member in an office that's devoting some 
notable or unusual degree of emphasis to a particular topic like pensions, like 
savings, like long-term care by dint of the member's interest, by dint of a nexus 
to their district or to their state, whatever the cause may be where that office 
has a somewhat deeper interest than a run-of-the-mill office.  You're more 
likely to get repeated discussions going with that office.  They're more likely to 
be more interested in the expertise that you can bring to bear.  So that's 
definitely one way that it happens, a pretty dominant way that it happens which 
is that there is a greater than ordinary degree of interest in that office in a 
particular topic. 
 
In a similar way, opportunities for developing relations can come through 
organizational contexts, as Dave, a lawyer, remarked:  “To some extent, if you are  
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hired into a role, the institution into which you are coming may have preexisting 
relationships.”  For example, narrowly focused groups that specialize in a policy 
domain or two may talk to each other more because they see each other more.   
For lobbyists without large resources, qualities related to trust may be critically 
important for their work.  Andy, who works at a smaller trade association, is acutely 
aware of this fact: 
 
I think that trust is the single most valuable asset that a good lobbyist has, 
particularly if you a lobbyist for an organization that is not intrinsically 
powerful.  Because, you know, if you work for one of the behemoths that is 
influential by virtue of political money that you can distribute, the amount of 
grassroots that you can muster, you can get away more readily with cutting 
corners and not being trustworthy and not dealing as professionally with all 
sorts of people that you interact with.  And maybe that's a bit of a helpful way 
of looking at how Mr. Abramoff went awry, because he was very well 
connected and, you know, if I can believe what I hear, rather arrogant in the 
way he comported himself because he could get away with it.
126  But if you are 
like most of the advocacy community, you can't rely on that; then your word is 
your bond.  And it's the old story, you know: Fool me once, shame on you.  
Fool me twice, shame on me.   
If there are other organizations that are very, very important at 
advocacy and who deal with things at the 30,000 foot level, they may be 
somewhat less involved or interested in being cooperative with the adversaries 
because that's just not the level at which they are operating.  Our strength and a 
good chunk of our credibility come from the fact that we are the organization 
that represents the people who actually have to make it work and actually care 
about the substantive outcome a great deal.  And I don't mean that as a 
criticism of organizations that deal with this at another level.   
 
Rhonda, who works for a small, pro-worker public interest association, 
mentioned the AARP, the giant public interest organization that claims to represent 
over 35 million elderly Americans, as an example of this.   
 
You know AARP is the 800 pound gorilla in the room on any issue.  They 
don’t tend to play well as groups because they are large.  They tend to like to 
                                                 
126 Jack Abramoff was an influential lobbyist who was convicted in 2006 of defrauding clients and 
corrupting public officials.  
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work as independently as they can, don’t sign on a lot of group letters, don’t do 
a lot of group lobbying.  Even if they do, they always have their almost side 
operations going on. 
 
Thus, trust is produced in a variety of contexts and from a diverse set of 
sources.  But how is trust made concrete in the everyday work lives of lobbyists?  Part 
of the answer has to do with the nature of the community of lobbyists, which is a 
close-knit group.  Cooperative norms are only possible in close-knit groups, as 
discussed below. 
A Close-knit Group   
One of the important conditions for the emergence and maintenance of 
cooperative norms are what Ellickson (1991) calls the existence of the close-knit 
group.  In close-knit groups, there is widespread informal power, which means the 
credible and reciprocal prospects for the application of power against one another in 
order to enforce expectations about the group.  In addition, close-knit groups have 
fine-grained information transfer.  That is, information about past and present behavior 
flows easily.  Fine grained information transfer involves more proprietary and more 
tacit information than what is exchanged in arm’s length relations.  Finally, the 
identity of the individuals and the quality of their social ties are as important as the 
information itself.  “Social relations make information credible and interpretable, 
imbuing it with qualities and value beyond what is at hand” (Uzzi 1996:678).   
The lobbyists I interviewed certainly felt that a close-knit community existed.  
After I mentioned to Dave that I counted over 300 organizations working on 
retirement issues in recent years, he said, “Of the 300, it's probably the 30 to 50 
organizations and lobbyists who do this week in and week out.  This is sort of the 
community on retirement.”    
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Tom has held positions in the legislative and executive branches but is a 
partner in a Washington law firm.  He also characterizes the size of the pension 
community as small and in this way: 
 
Now there are more associations who are interested, but having said that, like 
everything else in the world, there are only a few who do all the work.  20 
percent of people do 80 percent of the work.  That’s what happens here.  So 
many of these people here, they go to meetings, they sit there, they take notes, 
they report back to the office.  Well, they don’t set policy, they don’t drive 
policy, they don’t make a difference; there is only a few that make a difference 
ultimately.  And in our world, it’s probably 5 or 6 on different issues, so.
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We already saw above a concern that information could be misinterpreted 
because information in this community flows fairly easily to different audiences.  Eric 
noted the close-knit nature of the pension community in Washington by noting how 
difficult it is to mischaracterize another’s position because information flowed so 
easily and quickly:  “It always gets back to me.  That’s the funny thing about this.  I 
don’t understand why people don’t realize that it wouldn’t, and in the end it makes 
them look bad but…” 
Echoing Eric’s thoughts, Jim represents a small trade association but has 
working in the retirement policy domain for several years, and he notes a similar 
characteristic of the retirement policy community: 
 
It is such a small community, it’s a riot.  There are no secrets at all, its just 
blows your mind and you can actually, I mean, you can see in the course of a 
day a story gets circulated and comes back to you.  “I heard that.”  And you 
know it could be something you started and it’s the first step down and it’s 
coming back to you, and you can trace the whole damn thing.  It really shows 
how small we are…I send reporters down the line and, or the reporter talks to 
me, I can easily tell who they talked to before they talked to me even though 
                                                 
127 Interview conducted by the author, August 30, 2006.  
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they don’t name them, then I tell them, “You talked to so and so,” which is 
funny.  It’s only, how many of us?  A couple of dozen of us probably.
128 
 
The other part of the definition of a close-knit group is the ability of group 
members to wield informal power in order to enforce expectations.  I reserve this 
discussion to the section below on sanctions, but from my conversations with the 
lobbyists and through personal observation, I would say that the lobbyists I studied 
were not averse to confronting others with whom they had very close ties.  As 
discussed below, there is the concern about how sanctions and confrontation would 
impact others (such as in a coalition context), but enforcement of expectations does 
occur.  First, I want to discuss what those expectations or norms are. 
Substantive Norms of Workaday Interactions  
In terms of specific norms, following Ellickson (1991), I divide norms among 
lobbyists into substantive and procedural norms.  Substantive norms are the dos and 
don’ts of everyday interactions. In summary, the following are substantive norms that 
were discussed by the informants: 
·  A general call to cooperate 
·  Present both sides of an argument 
·  Don’t put another organization’s name on a coalition letter without their 
permission 
·  In a Hill visit with other groups, don’t pursue your own agenda at the 
expense of the group 
·  Don’t misrepresent or undermine another’s position 
·  Keep information confidential 
As I will argue in the conclusion, these norms are mentioned by lobbyists 
because they maximize group welfare by fostering continuation of interpersonal and 
                                                 
128 Interview conducted by the author, May 31, 2006.  
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group relations.  The glue that holds these norms together is trust as emphasized by 
Hardin (2002), who argued that trust is a result of encapsulated interest:  I trust you 
because I know that you want our relationship to continue.  These norms as discussed 
below embody this idea of encapsulated interest and are a vibrant part of a close-knit 
community. 
 Cooperation – There is first a substantive norm that consists of a general call for 
cooperation, which in turn is made concrete in a number of informal rules that govern 
certain ordinary interactions.  Andy spoke about occasions during which his 
organization was asked to provide feedback on ideas or proposals, either from 
policymakers or other lobbyists.  In terms of cooperation in this instance, time and 
history figure quite large, as he explained: 
 
And [another reason for trust] is the ongoing relationship; that these are the 
same people who, you know, may be our adversary on this issue but they may 
be our allies on another issue.  And we have many issues in which the same 
member of Congress, in the same staff person, at the same time, is our 
champion on retirement policy and our adversary on health policy, and vice-
versa.  I mean, right now we're working very closely with Senator [name 
omitted] on some healthcare issues even though we are largely at loggerheads 
on this retirement policy issues.  As you know, in years past we have worked 
very closely, collaboratively with Congressman [name omitted] on the pension 
issues but have been on the opposite side on healthcare issues.   
But for the most part, we do agree [to cooperate] for many, many 
reasons.  The first of it is that who is your friend and who is your opponent, 
adversary, in retirement policy is not by any means a clear cut issue.  Right 
now on this pension funding issue, among some of our best allies are the 
Democrats who very often would be elsewhere because they share a lot of the 
same concerns about these pension funding bills that we do.  They're not really 
our strongest allies necessarily on the issue of hybrid plans, for example.  So it 
really can change very much on the basis of the dynamics of the particular 
issue.  
 
Part of the issue with time is that lobbyists are generally forward-looking, that 
their future discount rate is quite low.  In this context, Andy discussed cooperation in  
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terms of information sharing such as the situation, mentioned in fictionalized form at 
the beginning of Chapter 1, in which a congressional staffer has requested a review of 
draft legislation even though his association is likely to oppose the bill when 
introduced: 
 
So back to your original question, why cooperate?  …there's always the 
possibility that even if we are going to oppose it, and they know we are going 
to oppose it, and we tell them that we are going to oppose it, that they could 
win, we could lose, therefore we want to make the bill as good as we possibly 
can.  I mean, is it true that it's easy to oppose a really bad bill or a really bad 
regulation rather than one that through our efforts and the efforts of others has 
been made better?  Sure.  They do take away some of your arguments if they 
address your concerns.  And, they may even somewhat take away your 
credibility - not credibility perhaps - but you've cooperated with them so you 
have to be careful that it doesn't look like bad faith that you were cooperative 
and now you're bashing them over it.  So that's why there's this understanding 
upfront that you are not making any commitments to support something and 
you may even go further than that and say, "There's no way in the world that 
we are going to support you.  But, you know, you've been good enough to ask 
for our help, or you haven't been good enough to ask for our help but we're 
going to give it to you anyway.  So here's your bill and here are our comments 
and we're going to appeal to your sense that you will also want a bill that will 
be administrable at the end of the day.”  If you really mean what say, you are 
not really looking to wreak havoc; you are looking to make things better, and 
we can tell you based on our understanding and our expertise and the reactions 
of our members that here are some helpful suggestions.  So there's always the 
idea that at the end of the day that you want to do this.   
 
In another context, coalition work is also a form of cooperation.  In some 
cases, cooperation can play to complementary strengths among organizations. 
 
This is why I think it's so interesting why there is collaboration among groups 
like the [very large trade associations] on one level, and then other groups that 
are more focused and narrow [smaller trade associations] on another -Tthere is 
a very good synergy that we all bring our respective strengths, whether they be 
political strengths or substantive strengths.   
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Roles and Staying on Message – Related to the idea of complementary 
strengths is a division of labor that is a form of cooperation.  This is most likely to be 
a factor in group activity, such as coalitional work or, in the case of the following 
quote, a group visit to the office of a member of Congress.  In the case of the Hill 
visit, there are agreed-upon expectations of who will do what during the meeting.  
Betty describes this arrangement: 
 
I think also that there is an informal pecking order…If we are going into a 
meeting today, the first person who would talk would be the person who 
organized the meeting.  If they want to turn it over, their choice to turn it over 
to someone more technically-oriented, whatever.  And then if there are any 
companies that are constituents of that staff person, they definitely get top 
billing on that because at the end of the day, that's going to make a huge 
difference…But you almost got a script together after a while as to who was 
going to say what.  There would be one person at the end who sort of cleans 
up and makes any point that people have just not made.  And it's like a little 
routine that you get into that hopefully the staff person didn't realize it and say 
that.  But you sort of know what your strength is…You have people that really 
do have assignments throughout the group.  And actually with the most recent 
effort, there was a stage at which we were doing visits and before the meetings 
we would say, “Okay, who wants to talk about smoothing?”  And someone 
would say this.  “And who wants to talk about, you know, whatever, 
premiums,” or whatever the issue was.  And someone would volunteer. 
   
As noted above, the appearance of unity among the group (even if the reality is 
lacking) is critical in these situations.  Staying within your role and on the group 
message prevents opponents and congressional staffers from driving wedges between 
group members.  The lobbyist has to accept the part in the drama that is put on by the 
group even if their key issue might be somewhat different. 
Don’t put someone’s name on a letter without their approval – Coalitional 
work involves group decision-making, and there are norms related to that process.  
Probably the most important tool that any coalition has is the group letter because it 
states the position of the group as well as often indicates the strength and unity of the  
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coalition (“we represent X million Americans…”).  Letters from broad coalitions are 
designed to impress policymakers with their long list of signatories so the temptation 
is there to pad the membership list.  However, as Tom, an attorney, noted, individual 
organizations will closely guard the use of their names: 
 
Yes, there are some dos and don'ts.  There are clearly dos and don'ts although 
people break the rules.  There is a constant struggle I think and it’s come up in 
the Pension Coalition to never put another association’s name on something 
without their okay.  And because of a few guys in association, you have lost, 
you can’t let other people do that to you, it’s just wrong, but I mean lot of 
people do it; inadvertently, maybe, but they do it.  And the fact is, it’s not like 
it makes that big a difference, not like anybody's studying this list of people 
who signed this letter and there are 23 names, they are on it.  But it is very 
touchy subject and that can be tense… 
 
As will be discussed below, violations can result in groups leaving the 
coalition.  This norm is designed to give all coalition members some control when, as 
is often the case, the coalition is being run by a small group of members. 
Present Both Sides – A trust-related norm that applies to lobbyist-policymaker 
relations is “Present both sides of an argument.”  Arguably, this might be related to the 
norm from McCauley’s classic study (1963) of Wisconsin businessmen.  In that study, 
respondents emphasized that commitments must be honored; one should produce a 
good product and stand behind it.  In a similar vein, the arguments made by lobbyists 
should not just be persuasive but also be accurate and acknowledge the opposing view.  
Many informants said that effective lobbying included presenting both sides to an 
argument, and this certainly fits with a view of lobbying as a profession.  Your 
argument should stand up to criticism.  However, there are important reasons in terms 
of the personal relationship with a congressional staffer in offering both sides to an 
issue, as Andy notes: 
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[O]ne of the most effective ways to be a credible lobbyist is to acknowledge to 
those you are trying to persuade the weakness of your own position…I also 
think that you earn yourself a great deal of trust with the people you are 
lobbying - and this is probably also true in your interactions with others, 
within the advocacy community; it most comes up between those who are 
lobbying and those who are being lobbied - I think that they are grateful that 
you are alerting them that, "Hey, there's another side to the story here."  And 
because it saves them a lot of time, first of all.  It saves them from being 
embarrassed, either themselves or giving their boss only half the story.  And it 
shows that you are an honest, honorable person.   
And it never ceases to amaze me that you sometimes see advocates who 
are unwilling to portray that, the weak side of their own argument.  Now, do 
you always try to put your own spin on it?  Try to craft something in the most 
positive way?  Of course you do.  Do you always want to bring all the negative 
things, particularly if it's in a written document?  Well, you want to be careful 
about that, you know, you want to make sure that you putting out stuff in 
written testimony or in written talking points for a meeting that leaves people 
with the impression that you want to leave them with.  But, it's also just a very 
effective way to be an advocate, just to say you know, "Critics of this 
legislation would say X, but here is where their argument falters."  And the 
other side.  And I think that to the extent that people take those intellectual 
shortcuts, they undermine their own credibility.  And so, do I always do it 
perfectly?  I am sure I don't.  But, as a philosophy about how to go about doing 
it, I think it works best, and that's what earns you the admiration of people 
even who disagree with you for being a straight shooter. 
 
Martha, a pro-business lobbyist, observes that there are consequences for the 
personal relationship for not following this norm: 
 
And at first, if you are going to have a member carry an amendment for you, 
the most valuable thing you can tell them is who is going to rise up in 
opposition so that they can appropriately prepare for that.  But if you go in, 
you tell them that everything is hunky-dory and do this thing and they go out 
there and somebody has a hissy fit, well, they are not going to come back to 
you very much. 
 
Helen, a pro-worker activist, notes, “I guess I would say to someone new 
doing this [job] is, do it on an issue you really believe in, but listen to the other side 
and make sure that you are advocating a position as fair and balanced.”  Eric, who  
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works for a professional organization, comments on the function of the norm of 
providing both sides to an argument.  He noted that congressional staffers, whether 
they work for a committee or for an individual member of Congress, are very smart 
and expect technical proficiency from retirement lobbyists: 
 
And if you go in there and you are not technically proficient, you will lose 
their trust on the pension stuff.  They have got to believe that you are good at 
giving them the straight scoop whether it’s, both the good and the bad.  I 
mean, they recognize that you have got an agenda and that you are trying to 
push something.  But you need to tell them, right here is what people could 
criticize it about, here is what people could say positively about it and you 
need to be able to convey both sides of something otherwise they are not going 
to feel confident in relying on you because, like I said, the stuff is so technical 
that trust issue is critically important.  Whenever you get into stuff that’s super 
hyper-technical like pensions, having staff who will trust you is very, very 
important. 
 
Quincy, who works for a financial services firm, connects the norm of 
presenting both sides back to the core issue of trust: 
 
I think you [create trust] by showing up time after time with good, substantive 
information and not seeming like a sales person.  And the way I try to do it is 
by making sure that when I am presenting information on the Hill that I try to 
present both sides.  I know that when I worked on the Hill I always felt a little 
uneasy when someone would come in and give me a big sales picture and not 
acknowledge that there was another side to it.
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Dave remarks that a lobbyist has to be a straight-shooter: 
 
It goes to the issue of trust.  These are ongoing, long-standing relationships, 
particularly when you are talking about the particular world you play in.  There 
are committees of jurisdiction, there's a handful of committee staff who drive 
all the outcomes on issues that my clients care about.  So you don't want to be 
seen hiding the ball…And I do think that goes mainly to the issue of trust.  We 
                                                 
129 Interview conducted by the author, August 2, 2006.  
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don't want to snow these folks in any way because if they feel snowed, that's 
not going to be a good thing for you or for your clients over the long haul 
 
Irene, who works for an employers’ trade association, provides a concrete 
example of presenting both sides to an issue: 
 
There is an issue on the Hill related to the prohibited transaction exemptions; 
Pension Rights Center hates it.  I called up the Pension Rights Center.  I said, 
what do you hate about it?  They said, well, they didn’t know exactly but they 
had called up, a benefits attorney had called them and said it was bad because 
it will allow anybody to create a hedge fund.  And I said, okay, well, do you 
know what rules hedge funds have to comply with in order to be a hedge fund?  
No, they hadn’t thought about that.  So I tracked down the rules that the hedge 
fund has to comply with only to find out that there is a list of rules that the 
hedge funds have to comply with; you just can’t go out and have the ‘John 
Scott’ hedge fund, you have to be able to comply with SEC’s rules…And so, 
you have some rules you have to comply with, and so this benefits attorney 
was looking at it totally from a benefit, from a tunneled perspective and not 
taking into account the larger regulatory environment.  So I am free to go to 
the Hill and say, “Hey, look they do hate it, but here’s why they hate it.  It’s 
based on this one attorney’s interpretation and here’s, he’s interpreting the 
benefits rules, not the other regulatory rules.”  Well, the staff for that office is 
free to decide whether they want to go with Pension Rights Center or they 
want to decide against the Pension Rights Center.  But at least I provided them 
the reasons and tools to go my way, not making them go my way, but they 
could if they wanted to. 
 
Don’t Undermine Another’s Position - In general, lobbyists should be upfront 
with each other, as Tom comments:  “Another do and don't that is violated sometimes 
is never stab people in the back.  It’s just to be upfront about what you are doing and 
that’s violated all the time but at great risk…”  If you are a lobbyist, and you have 
represented your client’s position in a certain way, you would care very much if others 
tried to undermine or misrepresent what your client wants (“they won’t mind if you 
insert my provision into the bill” or “the bill failed because that group refused to 
compromise”).  While the lobbyists I interviewed acknowledged that a certain amount  
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of this goes on and can be tolerated, they did indicate that this was an issue that invited 
sanctions, as will be discussed below. 
Keep information confidential – Recall above Carl’s statement that he is 
mindful of the level of trust when he is conveying confidential information, which 
may be new developments, his own strategy, or simply asking what others are doing.  
Also, we read Andy’s quote that in deciding to give information to others, he has to 
consider whether those others are allies who would need the information.  Again, this 
is a calculation that considers the interests of others because he wants the relation to 
continue. 
   
Norm Violations and Non-Substantive Norms  
In the prior section I have detailed a number of substantive norms, some broad 
like a general call toward cooperation and some narrow like “don’t send out anything 
with an organization’s name without first getting permission.”  These norms enable 
everyday transactions in the community of lobbyists.  However, violations can and do 
occur, particularly in pressure-packed situations, as Andy relates below:   
 
[T]he closer you get to a bill coming to the floor for a vote or in a conference, 
the more this stuff happens because the more pressure things get in terms of 
time, the more misrepresentations are made or things are being done in haste 
and people are forgetting to cross all the t's and dot all the i's and a lot of stuff 
can get nasty just because people are not paying attention and doing it in haste 
and maybe have other, their own agendas to try portray somebody as being 
less helpful than they are or that they are being more helpful, you know.  And I 
mean, let's say somebody up in Congress, you know, one staff member will 
say, "Well, my Senator is really going to bat for you all, but the other ones are 
really the source of the trouble here."  And that may be an exaggeration or 
misinterpretation or an outright bald-faced lie that they're doing for whatever 
reason to promote themselves. 
  
245 
 
What do you do?  What happens when someone does not consult with you first 
or misrepresents your position to third parties?  What are the remedial tools available 
to you?  Ellickson (1991) calls these non-substantive norms – others might call them 
sanctions – and they fall into rough categories of what is the process of sanctioning 
violators, what is the appropriate remedy, who are members of the group subject to 
sanction, and who gets to enforce the rules.   
What is the Process?  - The issue here is the process of identifying and 
correcting a violation.  To use the parlance of the law, these procedural norms are 
about obtaining and using evidence.  How do we obtain and weight the information 
about violations of others?  When can we apply sanctions?   
Lobbyists, particularly those that work in a particular area over long stretches 
of time, have densely overlapping ties and relations.  Moreover, these social relations 
are an important component of their work.  The nature of the work and structure of the 
relations help define the process through which one seeks to correct violations of 
norms.  Because of this context, lobbyists are initially reluctant to confront other 
lobbyists who violate expectations of certain behavior.  Consider the following 
passage in which Andy had mentioned that some lobbyists will misrepresent his 
position to third parties:  “If it's a minor thing and you just suspect it, and it's part of 
the rough and tumble and give-and-take, you know, you by and large let it go, and you 
don't make a stand over every specific instance.” 
Why let some infractions go?  More broadly, sanctioning one person may 
affect the broad pattern of relations, say in a coalition, as Betty noted:   
 
If you are working with someone who is working for another trade association 
or lobby organization, and they have been assigned to this issue, you're not in a 
position to fire them.  And if you're part of a coalition and they're paying or 
whatever, you're stuck with them so you try to make the best of it.   
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However, at some point the cost of doing nothing outweighs the cost of the 
sanction.  Resembling almost a logistic function, the propensity to sanction another 
lobbyist is quite low at first and then accelerates after some threshold has been 
reached.  As Dave said, “Is the conflict or is the problem significant size that it’s worth 
the engagement that will be necessary to address it or correct it?”  Andy also speaks to 
this: 
 
But sometimes something gets bad enough that you have to make a stand.  It's 
never pleasant, but if somebody did something that deliberately double-crossed 
you, you can't let them make you out for a chump because it will happen again 
and again and again.  So you have to stand up and let them know that you are 
not pleased about it.  It may come from a quarter where it is an organization 
that you deal with everyday so you can't let it affect the ongoing relationship 
that serves both of you well.  You just have to get it out there and clear the air.  
A lot of that depends on how much trust is there in the underlying relationship. 
 
Therefore, in terms of process, among the close-knit community of lobbyists, 
one does not immediately seek a remedy for run-of-the mill infractions because of the 
high cost to sanctions in a close-knit community.  Obviously, this entails some 
judgment and likely depends on context.   
What’s the Remedy? - The next set of non-substantive norms is remedial 
norms.  Remedial norms deal with the nature and magnitude of the sanction.  What is 
the type of remedy that is most appropriate to the violation?  Ellickson’s Shasta 
County ranchers used both gossip to third parties and direct action, what he called 
‘self-help’, such as ‘borrowing’ farm tools from offending neighbors.  Depending on 
the context, lobbyists apply certain remedial norms that could be called “direct and 
discrete”.  In the context of the Hill visit, a lobbyist may be suspected of not toeing the 
coalition line in an upcoming meeting with a congressional staffer.  Before the 
meeting, the lead lobbyist might approach a “loose cannon” in this way:  
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Well, what I have said is, "Look this meeting is, say, on 30-year Treasury 
[interest rates].  I know that you’re supporting it even though you have a 
different number one issue.  I can't prevent you from bringing it up in the 
meeting, but please let the staffer know that it is separate and distinct from this 
issue and that's an issue that you're pushing because you know, it's really not 
fair to us.”  And I have never had anyone who balked at that kind of thing. 
 
Another lobbyist mentioned the importance of assigning roles prior to a Hill 
visit meeting as a technique to keep people in line.  This is done as a group and helps 
enforce mutual expectations within the group. 
 
You huddle pregame with the problem people and just make sure that this 
meeting is about XYZ, and here's our message points, remember here's what we 
want to drill into their heads.  That type of thing.  Sort of reinforce the message.  
Not that, you know, you want to do it, obviously you have to approach it 
delicately.  You wouldn't want to be singling them out.  A lot of times what 
we'll do, and I think it's a good thing, if you're starting up a new coalition and 
it's a new issue that a lot people haven't worked on.… And we would meet 5 or 
ten minutes beforehand just to sort of go over what we were going to talk about, 
just in the hallway, and, you know, make sure we reinforce the talking points in 
our minds, who was the leader, who was going to say what.  
 
The other way of approaching the problem is, I guess, is to go about it more 
gently and to say, "You know, well maybe in future meetings we should stick 
to the point," as a suggestion and not, “Let's not talk about something.” 
 
With the latter quote, the lobbyist Carl, who is speaking, is appealing to the 
other lobbyist’s sense of process rather than trying to shut her issue down.  If it occurs 
during a meeting, you also approach it gently but firmly by speaking directly to the 
person involved:  “And I think there is a polite way that you can say it.  But I have 
indicated or had someone else in my group indicate that, ‘Hey, we are not really here 
on this.’” 
Sometimes more direct methods have to be employed.  Dave provides an 
example of direct self-enforcement:  
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But I certainly had conversations where, somebody in a trade association was 
out giving speeches, asserting or hinting that one of my clients was doing X.  
And my client wasn’t doing X.  But this person wanted to be sure that my 
client didn’t think about doing X.  So I had to sort of engage with them directly 
with them and say my client is not doing X, we’re not planning on doing X, 
stop giving the speech. 
 
This author witnessed direct pressure to cooperate in a coalition context.  A 
coalition had been formed over an issue that was under active contention, and an 
important congressional hearing had just been announced.  One trade association in the 
coalition received advanced notice of the hearing and was able to secure a spot at the 
witness table.  Because there were very limited opportunities to testify, the prestige of 
the trade association would have been boosted by having a witness appear before the 
congressional committee.  But when one member of the coalition found out, they 
applied very direct pressure on the trade association to have their witness appear on 
behalf of the coalition rather than on behalf of just the trade association.  After some 
shouting (“You can’t do this!”), the trade association yielded.  In this instance, the 
parties involved knew each other very well from years of working together.  These 
organizations were at the center of the very closely knit relations in this policy domain.  
This familiarity may have made the individuals feel that they could speak more freely 
because they needed to clear the air. 
As noted above, norm enforcement is costly so lobbyists are reluctant not just 
in when they apply sanctions but also in the choice of remedial tools available to them.  
In what way are remedial tools costly?  Andy was asked why, when others deliberately 
misrepresent his organization’s position, he does not spread gossip about the offender.  
He replied, 
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I mean, I don't do that only because my mama and daddy didn't raise me that 
way!  Does it go on?  Sure.  Do I vent my frustrations or concerns about that 
within the family of my own colleagues within my own organization?  Yes.  
But, do we also try very, very hard to make sure that that kind of 
disappointment or criticism just doesn't get out to the outside world and other 
member companies or other associations or the Hill?  Yeah, I think we try very 
hard to make sure that that does not get outside because, you know, that's the 
type of thing that irreparably damages a relationship, to try to use some 
information to hurt others and…you just sort of have to hope that, in the final 
analysis, that it all comes out in the wash and that kind of having a reputation 
as being somebody who doesn't bad-mouth others inures to your benefit more 
than it may sometimes hurt you not to be able to tell people exactly what went 
on.       
 
Part of the answer, then, lies in protecting one’s own reputation and for a very 
practical reason:  By spreading gossip to third parties, you essentially signaling that 
you cannot be trusted or that you might violating the norm of against “don’t stab 
someone in the back” through malicious rumor.  Carl expressed the concern that your 
gossip may get back to the party that is the object of the gossip: 
 
Well, it's also a very small town, and like you said, if you are going to be 
working on a certain set of small issues, you're going to see these people again 
and again and again.  And, you know, you really don't want to have any bad 
blood.   
 
In addition to the cost to one’s own reputation, there is a cost to the lobbyist in 
terms of damaging relationships within the community.  “And what do you do?  You 
do not want to start getting in the middle of other people's battles…”  So one has to be 
very careful about how one handles people that violate some shared expectation. 
Aside from “direct and discrete” remedial norms, there are long-term effects – 
reductions in cooperation – that reflect the culture of lobbying.  Quincy explained this 
aspect at length in the context of working with congressional staff: 
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It’s not that the doors would be closed to them at all.  I think it’s just more of 
people behind closed doors would roll their eyes.  And they wouldn’t 
necessarily pick up the phone and call that person if they needed off the record 
advice…I think, lobbyists are people pleasers.  And so with some exceptions 
it’s not necessarily in our nature to say, ‘you lied to me or I heard you were on 
the Hill lobby against our proposal, can we talk about that?’ and it’s been 
going on for seven years.  That’s just my perception.  And then to get to your 
question about this credibility issue, I think that there are consequences, but 
the consequences are not always obvious.  There are definitely people that I 
feel like I have learned not to trust and yet I do work with them and I’m 
perfectly cordial to them and I would never say to them… 
 
Interviewer:  ‘I don’t trust you’? 
 
Respondent:  ‘I don’t trust you,’ yeah.  And that has lot to do with my 
personality and maybe that’s probably why I’m lobbyist, I am a people pleaser.  
But those people are also not people that I would ever voluntarily make contact 
with.  I’m forced to, because of the work situations and that’s fine; it’s not like 
I hate them, I just don’t trust them.  So I think that those consequences are a lot 
harder to measure. 
 
In some situations that do not involve trust or cooperative behavior, coalitions 
did erode or fall apart.  In the situations that follow, there is a norm that says you do 
not send out anything in writing with an organization’s signature or do anything in the 
coalition’s name without getting prior approval from all members of the coalition.  In 
those cases in which there were not very good or strong relations, exit was the only 
option sanction for violating this norm.  The following quotation discusses a situation 
in which a coalition of some 70 organizations sent out a joint letter.  A couple of 
months later, a new development on the issue inspired the coalition to re-send the letter 
with modest changes.  Because it was basically the same letter, to save time coalitions 
were asked to opt-out of the letter rather than opt-in:  Vernon, a pro-business lobbyist, 
discloses what happened next: 
 
Well, you know, one person who was out on vacation didn't have a chance to 
respond.  They were very angry.  And they just exited the coalition just like 
that despite my mea culpa, and I should have got their opt-in ahead of time…I  
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didn’t know this person, there was not a lot of good will between us to begin 
with, I mean, they were just part of this coalition, more passive.  And they 
were able to withdraw without any consequences because it wasn't like we 
could work it out because we knew each other over a period of time.  If it was 
someone like [a similar trade association], they would say, "Hey, I didn't like 
the way you did that.  Just make sure you contact me directly, etc."
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I asked Tom about violations against the norms of not stabbing people in the 
back, which he said is violated all the time.  “Interviewer:  Yeah but is there a cost to 
that?  Respondent: Over the long haul.” 
Who’s in the Group and Who Enforces the Rules? - Finally, I should offer a 
brief word about norms that define who is subject to group norms and who can apply 
those sanctions in the lobbying context.  So-called constitutive norms identify who is 
part of the group through various ways, including dress, speech, etiquette, and/or 
rituals.  These are the membership rules and rituals of solidarity.  In some ways, the 
sources of trust mentioned above make up some of these constitutive norms:  Common 
interests and ways of doing your job are but one example, and the dress of lobbyists 
might be thought of as distinctive (the lobby outside the Senate Finance Committee 
hearing room has been referred to in the past as “Gucci Gulch” due to the 
preponderance of expensive footwear loitering outside the hearing room).
131  It is 
telling that one of the outside social movement activist leaders remarked that the 
Congressional staffers enjoy hearing from him because he is not the typical lobbyist – 
He does not wear a tie on purpose, and he does a lot of walking.
132   
As to who does the enforcing, again, this is a close-knit group that knows each 
by how they are quoted by the newsmedia, as the passage from Jim showed.  
Membership in this particular sub-community is measured in terms of doing the work, 
                                                 
130 Interview conducted by the author, January 20, 2006. 
131 There is a well-known popular book on lobbying in the 1980s that incorporates this moniker: 
Showdown at Gucci Gulch, by Jeffrey Birnbaum and Alan Murray (1988, New York: Vintage). 
132 Interview conducted by the author, March 22, 2006.  
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day in and day out, for years.  In terms of who enforces the rules, in the case of 
lobbyists, it is pretty clear that first person enforcement is expected for reasons 
mentioned above.   
Conclusion   
In this chapter, I discussed the cooperative norms that underpin everyday 
relations among lobbyists in a policy domain.  In prior chapters, I showed with some 
success that certain lobbyists in a policy domain are connected to each other in 
relations that are durable and multidimensional.  Moreover, these ties are strongly 
associated with joint activity in the form of coalitions, which in turn is associated with 
heightened influence or visibility.  What this chapter shows is that these close-knit ties 
have content in the form of mutual and overlapping expectations.  If you meet these 
expectations – if you play by the rules – can work in coalitions, get proprietary 
information, and have influence. 
Specifically, the qualitative interview data indicated that trust among lobbyists 
was important on many levels.  Trust reduces risk for all parties and makes possible 
many positive outcomes, such as unity, division of labor, and joint problem-solving.  
Trust among lobbyists is a product of a constellation of interacting factors, such as 
personal chemistry, mutual interests, comfort with observed patterns of work-related 
behavior, and the organizational context into which a lobbyist is hired.  The lobbyist 
community is a close-knit community in that information about what others say or do 
easily circulates within the community.   
The trust generated through these sources translates into a general trust-based 
norm of cooperation, which also is expressed in concrete situations as norms of 
“present both sides to an argument”, “be a straight-shooter”, “always follow-up”, “stay 
within your assigned role in Hill visits”, and “don’t send out letters with organizational 
signatures without permission”, among others.    
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It may be objected that these are not norms at all because they are not 
enforceable; that the sanctions mentioned above are not really sanctions.  And indeed 
the quotations indicate that violations occur.  I would argue that these specific 
expectations are enforceable, but lobbyists are likely to choose enforcement strategies 
that are not costly to their own reputations, to their direct relations, and to the fabric of 
the community at large.  Therefore, most lobbyists will let some infractions go up to a 
point, after which they confront the offender directly, particularly if they know the 
other lobbyist.  Lobbyists do not engage in gossip as a sanction tool because of 
reputation effects, but third parties who have power, such as congressional staffers, can 
enforce some norms by keeping parties “out of the loop”.  Moreover, lobbyists in a web 
of relations take the long-view about everything including sanctions.  The price, as 
Tom said, is paid “over the long haul.” 
Hypothesis 4.1 argued that organizational representatives that value or exhibit 
durable ties to other organizations in the policy domain will also value trust, uphold 
trust-based norms of cooperation and reciprocity, and choose the least costly forms of 
sanctions.  To the extant that one can evaluate this hypothesis through qualitative 
interview data, this hypothesis is largely confirmed.  When lobbyists were concerned 
about reputation and future relationships, they generally valued the idea of trust and 
upheld cooperation while recognizing that such ideas and norms should be enforced in 
the least conflictual or costly way possible.  Such lobbyists know each other and are 
conscious of each other.  They are both backward-looking in terms of remembering 
the history to a relationship as well as forward-looking in terms of maintaining good 
relationships.  Because trust is judged on personal qualities and behavior, one can 
readily see that time and history in a relationship matter; that is, close-knit ties  matter. 
However, this latter point does suggest an alternative hypothesis, which could 
be called a professionalization hypothesis.  This hypothesis might state that what is  
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guiding lobbyists and congressional staffers is not so much the strength of 
interpersonal ties but their professionalism.  By carefully observing the professional 
performance of each other over time, they can rank each other based on the quality of 
performance in terms of professional standards.  Chapter 2 suggested an evolution 
from an atomistic and highly personal set of relations between lobbyist and politician 
to one that was structured through inter-association ties.  Some of the quotes provided 
in this chapter also hint at this professionalization hypothesis, such as when Dave 
noted that sources of trust can come from the lobbying styles of other lobbyists (“Do 
you like the way they lobby?  Do you like their style?  Do you like their approach? Do 
they lay things out like you would lay things out?  Do they not lay things out as much 
as you think they should?”).  If a lobbyist performs in a certain way, we might be more 
comfortable working with him.  Moreover, Andy noted that cooperating with 
congressional staff was the right thing to do if one cares about policy.  And it is 
certainly arguable that expectations of behavior that initially derive from personal 
relations could become generalized into standards that form the basis for professional 
judgments. 
A professionalization hypothesis is appealing, but it does have some problems 
relative to the Cooperative Norms Proposition laid out in this chapter.  Unlike 
Abbott’s (1988) discussion of professionalization, lobbyists as a group do not have 
any explicit set of guidelines or certification requirements that work to guard the 
jurisdiction of their profession.  Many lobbyists have legal training and may apply the 
bar association’s guidelines to their work, but many lobbyists are not lawyers or other 
professionals.
133  Abbott (1988) makes the point that the social organization of 
                                                 
133 Washington, D.C. is likely the only place where one will see non-lawyers working as professionals 
in law firms although they might work outside of the traditional associate-partner track.  Such 
professionals have a variety of names, like legislative consultant or policy associate.  It may be that 
such persons have to subscribe to legal professional norms, but then again they may not.  
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professions affects the kinds of jurisdictional claims they make and success in 
achieving those claims: Relatively less organized professions have certain distinct 
advantages in workplace competition.  Because they lack a clear focus and perhaps a 
clearly established cognitive structure, they are free to move to available tasks.  Abbott 
(1988) gives the example of computer programmers are able to use this freedom to 
float out from programming into planning and operations, and similarly, lobbyists 
have an ability of lobbyists to ‘float’ across tasks and organizations, such as into 
government service and back.  Moreover, the discussion on the sources of trust clearly 
indicates the personal quality of trust and hence the importance of cooperative norms 
for ongoing relations and joint activity.   
In addition, even if the professionalization hypothesis were true, it would not 
necessarily exclude Hypothesis 4.1.  Individual behavior and performance (how a 
lobbyists advocates) can and is distinct from intra-group behavior (how a lobbyist 
cooperates).  Group welfare-maximizing norms can exist separate and apart from 
individual norms of performance and professionalism.   
This is not to suggest that other norms do not exist or that pure self-interest 
never comes into play.  I do argue that trust matters for maximizing group welfare 
because it is built on the desire to continue the relationships that constitute the group.  
Hence, norms that maximize group welfare come into play – not in every situation, but 
in many.  The interests of the members of a close-knit group are part of the 
calculations of any member of the group. 
Finally, this chapter has made some passing references to normative policy 
outcomes.  For example, an early quote from Andy suggested that sharing information 
made policy better.  However, the kind of group welfare-maximizing norms that have 
been discussed here can cut both ways in that cooperation, sharing information, 
keeping confidential information secret, and not deviating from the group agenda can  
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also lead to collusive outcomes.  In other words, if a group of lobbyists are colluding 
to change the law in a way that is purely in their self-interest and to which most would 
object, at least most of these norms would assist them as well.  Collusion involves a 
secret agreement to gain something illegally or fraudulently.  A secret agreement 
would almost certainly require a high level of trust and may require norms of 
cooperation such as the kind discussed here.  The lobbyists I have interviewed here 
believe that they are not colluding for any illegal purpose, but for someone on the 
outside of a close-knit group looking in, these norms would appear to operate on a 
knife’s edge. 
At the very least, these cooperative norms have an exclusive characteristic.  If 
you are an outsider to the group, you have no time or history in terms of relationships.  
Thus, full participation in the information flows in a policy domain may be limited for 
those without close ties to insiders.  If that is the case, do close-knit relations hinder 
participation in the policy process by outsiders?  Are close-knit relations a threat in 
terms of collusion?  These are the questions that Chapter 7 takes up next.  
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CHAPTER 7:  
INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS  
 
 
In 2003, the following excerpt appeared in an article in the Wall Street Journal: 
 
THE RETIREMENTS OF millions of Americans could hang partly on the 
relationships between those who regulate pension plans -- and are drafting 
regulations -- and pension lobbyists and consultants hired by employers and 
financial firms. 
The relationships are social as well as professional.  Consider a recent party 
at the Washington home of William F. Sweetnam Jr., a lawyer at the Treasury 
Department who is playing an important role in drafting regulations for what 
are known as cash-balance pension plans.  The party was thrown to welcome a 
new congressional staffer working on pension issues.  It was co-hosted by 
Brian Graff, a lobbyist for the American Society of Pension Actuaries, a group 
representing those who make a living running employer-sponsored pension 
plans, which has lobbied in favor of cash-balance plans. 
Not invited were any of the few lawmakers and congressional staffers who 
have staked out strong positions against cash-balance plans, which offer 
financial benefits to employers but can reduce payments to older workers. 
Instead, among the invited guests -- aside from a smattering of 
congressional and Treasury staffers who work on pension issues -- was a long 
list of lobbyists representing employers on pension and retirement matters.  
They included individuals from the Erisa Industry Committee and the 
American Benefits Council, whose members include International Business 
Machines Corp., AT&T Corp. and hundreds of other large employers with a 
financial stake in the outcome of the pension regulations Mr. Sweetnam is 
drafting. 
Also invited were lobbyists from the American Council of Life Insurers; 
Wall Street's Securities Industry Association; Davis & Harman and Groom 
Law Group, law firms that lobby on behalf of employers and benefits 
consultants; and Cigna Corp., which is defending an age-discrimination suit 
involving its cash-balance plan. 
Mr. Sweetnam, the Treasury's benefits tax counsel, says the party to 
welcome Judy Miller, an actuary from Montana joining the Democratic staff of 
the Senate Finance Committee, was a social event, not work, and the staffers 
and lobbyists he invited were people with whom he works regularly and "who 
are also my friends." 
Says Mr. Graff, executive director of the ASPA, who has also worked on 
the staff of the Joint Tax Committee of the House and Senate, and for Groom 
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Law Group: "The pension community is certainly a relatively close-knit group 
. . . because there aren't that many people with a great deal of technical pension 
expertise" (Schultz and Francis 2003b). 
 
Several themes that are prominent in this excerpt are also relevant for this 
chapter.  One theme is the overlapping nature of relationships in the retirement policy 
community and the close-knit nature of the group, a theme that was illustrated in the 
prior chapter.  A second theme is the tight connection between business and policy and 
the revolving door between public service and private sector employment – Note how 
the article mentioned prior employers of one of the party’s co-hosts, Mr. Graff.  A 
third theme that is more implicit is the role of money in public policymaking.  For 
example, the financial stakes to various entities and interests represented at the party 
were made clear.  Finally, a fourth theme is the distinction between those invited to the 
party and those who were not.  This last theme connects to the overall focus of this 
chapter, which is the distinction between insiders and outsiders in policymaking. 
In the first six chapters of this project, I focused on the structure and workings 
of a single community of lobbyists.  The perspective has been largely internal as I 
have studied the nature and extent of relations among lobbying groups, how they work 
together, to what extent their relationships generate influence, and the role of trust and 
cooperative norms within this community.  This chapter represents a shift in 
perspective as we consider how those outside of the everyday relationships of 
lobbyists, such as the journalists who wrote the excerpt quoted above, as well as 
others, view relations in a policy domain.   
In this chapter, I am concerned with how these close-knit relationships fare 
when put under the microscope by outsiders.  While social activists might be a typical 
example of outsiders in the context of policy circles – and I have certainly referred to 
activists in this way – outsiders also might include agents who, while not socially  
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distant from embedded lobbyists, nonetheless lack close-knit ties within the policy 
community.  Such outsiders might be the principals who hire lobbyists, and I will 
consider those principals in addition to social movement activists.  In both cases, we 
shall see some pressure on trust-based relations within the retirement policy domain.  
Before we discuss outsider perspectives, I want to restate the proposition and 
hypothesis that motivate this portion of the research: 
Collusion Proposition: When a group characterized by close-knit ties is 
challenged by socially distant actors, the challenging actors are likely to frame group-
specific norms of cooperation as ‘collusive’ or ‘corrupt’.  To summarize from 
Chapters 1 and 3, groups seeking to change policy (e.g., social activists) are faced with 
a choice of tactics and actions in which to make their claim(s).  This choice is a 
function, in part, of the level of cohesion of the opposing group (e.g., lobbyists) and 
the amount of social distance between the challenging group and the opposing group.  
If the level of cohesion is high enough and the social distance great enough, the choice 
of the challenging group would likely shift from a tactic that is solely focused on the 
substance of a claim to a tactic that includes a focus on the nature of the opposing 
group.  Thus, the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5.1: The greater the social distance between challenging and 
challenged groups and the greater the level of embedded relations within the 
challenged group, the higher the likelihood that the challenging group will focus its 
action on the challenged group itself. 
I argue that retiree activists move from a straight-forward claim of employment 
fairness to incorporating a narrative of collusion among close-knit pension lobbyists as 
part of their claim-making.  In order to do so, they borrow frames and narratives from 
available sources, such as journalists and policy experts who create a portrait of 
collusion.  These collusion narratives draw on reservoirs of cultural portrayals of  
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lobbying that have been filled up over decades of political life – We discussed these 
cultural portrayals in Chapter 2.  These narratives of collusion go beyond the claims of 
the prior chapter by alleging a secret agreement for illicit purposes among the 
corporate pension lobbyists.  While I argue that such a collusion narrative is a function 
of both the close-knit ties among lobbyists and the social distance between lobbyists 
and activists, a possible alternative hypothesis is that charges of collusion would have 
been made regardless of social distance and close-knit ties.  I discuss this alternative at 
the conclusion of the chapter. 
This chapter is organized as follows:  The next section briefly discusses sources 
and methods for this discussion, which includes a review on frames and narratives.  A 
brief note on social distance follows.  The major portion of the chapter deals with the 
cash balance controversy and the activists working on cash balance issues.  The first 
section, supplementing the general description of retirement policy from Chapter 3, 
provides some brief background on the cash balance issue that was prominent from 
1999 through 2006.  I do this because some of the qualitative data that are included in 
this chapter will make references to those issues, and in addition, I hope to show that 
in one case the substantive claims are not unrelated to the perceptions of collusion.  
Following that background, I will go through the outsiders’ perspectives on close-knit 
relations among lobbyists first from the point of view of activists who oppose them.   
After the cash balance discussion, I also include a section on the tensions between 
principals and agents when the agents are our lobbyists in a close-knit group.  While 
not as socially distant as outside activists, principals share similar concerns about 
collusion.   
Sources and Methods – This chapter relies on a variety of qualitative materials, 
some of which come from interviews that I conducted and that were described in the 
prior chapter and much of which also come from a variety of public sources that will  
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be cited more formally.  The narrative section is split between what I call external 
sources like the news media and internal sources such as the activists themselves.  For 
the external sources, I relied mostly on news stories and columns, and the bulk of 
these come from the Wall Street Journal.  The main Journal reporter for pension news 
was Ellen Schultz, the co-author for the excerpt that opened this chapter, who 
provided a steady series of reports on pension policy and retiree-worker activists.  In 
my interviews with lobbyists and activists, she was mentioned time and again as being 
especially influential and so I focus on her stories here.  For the internal activist 
sources, I focus on two main groups, activists for IBM workers and retirees and a 
coalition group called the National Retiree Legislative Network (NRLN).  While 
cutbacks in pensions and healthcare benefits certainly occurred before 1999, everyone 
acknowledges that it was IBM’s decision to change their pension benefits in April of 
1999 that brought these issues to the forefront of the popular and business press as 
well as to the top of the policy agenda.  The NRLN was not the first coalition of retiree 
and worker activists, but having formed in early 2000 and continuing to this day, they 
are very representative of a broad range of older employee groups.  Therefore the 
activist sources largely focus on these two groups. 
Moreover, the process of showing the Collusion Proposition (if not actually testing 
it) will involve largely the telling of a narrative drawn from these qualitative sources, 
which narrative links key targets together into a storyline that is used in the advocacy 
of outsiders.  In sociological and anthropological research, the word “frames” is often 
used to analyze qualitative material so I want to just briefly discuss the relationship 
between the term “frame” and the narrative that I develop here.   
According to Snow and Benford, a frame is  
 
An interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” 
by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events,  
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experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past 
environement. (1992: 137) 
 
Collective action frames are accentuating devices that either “underscore or 
embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and 
immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable” (Snow and 
Benford 1992: 137).  Frames are not merely repetitive of traditional cultural meanings; 
if they were, social movement activists would be prohibited from challenging them 
(Tarrow 1998).  Instead, activists engage in what Snow and associates call frame 
alignment processes in which the activists align their own values and goals with those 
of the broader culture (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986).  This is an 
active and processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention.  Frames are 
constructed and contested through multiple sources and actors, including the use of 
brokers who create new connections between in this case previously unconnected 
cultural products (Tilly and Tarrow 2007).  They also have sources in “cultural 
reservoirs” from which activists draw selectively (Tarrow 1998).  We saw in Chapter 
2 that the portrayal of lobbying over the years created just such a cultural reservoir of 
which reforming politicians repeatedly availed themselves. 
“Master frames” are larger cultural frames that provide the interpretive scheme 
through which agents associated with disparate movements assign blame and express 
goals (Tarrow 1998).  These master frames are larger in scope such that multiple 
social movements in the same movement cycle might borrow them.  For example, a 
“rights” frame might be borrowed simultaneously by Civil Rights, Women’s Rights, 
Gay Rights, and Human Rights movements. 
While the discussion in this chapter is reliant on this frames context, I use 
instead the word “narratives” in order to get closer to the action and expression of the 
actors involved.  For me, analytic narratives are a combination of frames that combine  
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into seamless and nuanced stories that encapsulate the problem or grievance, the 
blame for the problem, what needs to be done in terms of tactics and strategies, the 
motivation for acting, and have multiple uses by multiple actors.  I hope that this term 
of “narrative” will be useful to the reader. 
Social Distance – Before getting into the narrative surrounding the cash 
balance controversy, I just want to insert a word on social distance.  Recall from 
Chapter 1 that social distance was a function of both boundaries (which in our study is 
comprised of group norms) and identities.  Several actors noted differences between 
the lobbyists and the activists.  Repeating a reference from Chapter 6, one of the 
outside social movement activist leaders remarked that the Congressional staffers 
enjoy hearing from him because he is not the typical lobbyist – He does not wear a tie 
on purpose, and he does a lot of walking.
134  When asked about some of the more 
aggressive assertions against corporate lobbyists, pro-worker lobbyists were quick to 
disassociate themselves, as Irene commented: “We didn’t do that…At one point, you 
set these activists in motion, there is no controlling after that.”  While not dispositive, I 
think these examples provide some indications that both lobbyists and activists were 
aware of a social distance between the two groups.  However, in the narratives below, 
the process of identity creation, both of the activists themselves and of the opposing 
lobbyists, will also add further weight to the argument of the existence of social 
distance. 
At the end of the chapter, I include a discussion of perceived collusion in the 
principal-agent relationship.  The principals in this case are major corporations who 
hire lobbyists as well as belong to trade associations.  While they have ongoing 
concerns about pensions and benefits, these corporations do not usually have a 
continuous focus on pension politics and policy.  Typically, corporate government 
                                                 
134 Interview conducted by the author, March 22, 2006.  
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relations personnel have large portfolios and rely on their hired lobbyists and trade 
associations to monitor pension policy.  While not as socially distant as retiree 
activists, they are nonetheless outside of the close-knit community as we shall see. 
In order to understand the narrative of activists and the concerns of principals 
who hire lobbyists, the next section provides a little background on the specific cash 
balance controversy that figures prominently in the outsider-insider tension. 
The Cash Balance Controversy 
Cash Balance Pension Plans – A recent and significant controversy is over new 
types of plans known as cash balance or hybrid pension plans (henceforth, I refer to 
these plans as cash balance plans).  These plans became popular in the 1990s, and 
roughly 25 percent of the Fortune 1000 sponsors of defined benefit plans currently 
have a hybrid plan (Watson Wyatt 2005).  Table 7.1, reproduced from Chapter 3, 
below illustrates the trend in the number of cash balance pension plans.  The first 
adoption of a cash balance plan was by Bank of America in 1985.  By 1999, 599 plans 
with 100 or more participants had adopted the cash balance formula.  This number 
nearly doubled to 1,037 in 2003, the last year for which we have data (Buessing and 
Soto 2006).   
To recap, traditional DB pension plans typically provide a benefit as a percentage 
of pay, which is usually some average of the worker’s final years of salary.  Under this 
traditional scheme, benefits are weighted at the end of a career when earnings and 
tenure are highest.  In contrast to traditional DB pension plans, benefits in cash 
balance plans accumulate as a hypothetical account balance (hence the name cash 
balance) – mimicking a 401(k) plan – that is typically paid as a lump sum when the 
worker leaves the firm.  Benefits accrue more evenly over a worker’s tenure as 
compared to traditional, and this even accrual allows for more predictable funding.  A 
conversion to a hybrid plan might provide more benefits in the early or middle part of  
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a career, but it might lack the exponential increase in benefits that accrue at the end of 
a working career.  Thus, many have charged that switching current workers to a cash 
balance pension plan reduces future benefits for those workers who will not realize 
that accelerated increase in benefits at the end of their careers (Watson Wyatt 2005).
135  
As a result, much of the effort of worker-retiree activist groups is to prevent the 
legitimization of conversions to these new cash balance plans. 
 
Table 7.1: Distribution of Retirement Plans Among Fortune 100 Companies 
Type of Plan  1985  1998  2002  2004  2005 
 
Traditional Defined Benefit Pension  89%  68%  50%  42%  37% 
Hybrid Pension Plan  1%  22%  33%  33%  27% 
Defined Contribution/401(k) Only  10%  10%  17%  25%  36% 
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide (2006a). 
Note: Most of the firms that offer a traditional defined benefit pension plan or a hybrid 
pension plan also offer a 401(k) plan. 
 
In response to these trends, pension activism began to take shape in the mid-1990s.  
The first umbrella group for pension activists was the Coalition for Retirement 
Security, which formed in 1996.  In 1999, IBM converted its traditional DB pension 
plan into the new cash balance pension, which event generated a large number of 
media stories, and the number of activist groups and their connections to each other 
increased.  I identified 20 individual (that is, company-based) social movement 
organizations (SMOs) and two coalitions that include some of the 20 SMOs that are 
devoted to pension and retiree healthcare issues.  Most of these groups generally are 
still active and engaged in lobbying and/or litigation. 
                                                 
135 Federal law does not permit the reduction of benefits already earned or accrued, but it does allow 
firms to eliminate benefits that have not yet accrued.  
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Groups of workers and retirees at affected companies have used a multitude of 
strategies to slow pension changes at some firms.  Between 1996 and 2006, at least 26 
class action lawsuits charging age discrimination just with regard to cash balance 
pension plans have been filed (American Benefits Council 2006).  Workers and 
retirees also held protests at shareholder annual meetings and regulatory hearings, led 
proxy fights, lobbied for legislation, wrote grassroots letters, testified before agencies 
and Congress, and worked the media. 
Various bills relating to cash balance plans were introduced beginning in 1999, but 
representatives for labor and management could not agree on key issues, particularly 
regarding past conversions to cash balance plans and shielding employers from 
lawsuits.  Beginning in 1999, the regulatory bodies governing pensions were 
beginning to take a look at cash balance pension plans with the lead regulators being 
the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service.  Acting on a belief that the 
regulations would favor employers, Congressman Bernie Sanders (I-Vermont), who 
had a large contingent of IBM workers in his state, began sponsoring legislation that 
would limit the spread of cash balance plans and limit the legality of prior 
conversions.  Specifically, from 2000 to 2003 Representative Sanders successfully 
amended spending bills funding the Treasury Department and IRS, which amendments 
prohibited the use of funds for regulations that covered cash balance plans.  In 2004, 
the Treasury decided to shelve its regulatory project.  In 2006, the Pension Protection 
Act legalized cash balance plans on a going forward basis but did not bless prior 
conversions.  It was not until 2007, however, when court cases finally turned back 
lawsuits against employers on age discrimination grounds that the controversy seemed 
to subside. 
These controversies over corporate pensions led to the pressure being put on the 
retirement policy domain by outsiders, who targeted insider-lobbyists.  The next  
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section discusses the development of the cash balance narrative and its adoption by 
activists. 
The Cash Balance Narrative  
In this section, I focus on the development of the narrative used by activists to 
press their claims on the cash balance issue.  According to the cash balance narrative, 
employers and their service providers instigated the cash balance program in order to 
cut costs, but such plans were inherently illegal so that a legislative fix was needed.  
To show the development of this narrative, I first present two narratives from external 
sources such as journalists and policy experts, one that focuses broadly on the social 
contract represented by pensions and another that concerns the development of cash 
balance policy.  I then examine how these broad narratives are incorporated in the 
claims of worker/retiree activists.  However, before getting to the narratives, I first 
want to highlight the key actors that are featured prominently in the narratives that 
follow. 
Targeted Opponents – In order to understand the narrative that unfolds in the 
qualitative data below, it will help to describe the major organizations active on the 
pro-business side and that are referred to repeatedly throughout the various forms of 
the narrative.  First is IBM, which is held up as the primary example of employers 
converting their traditional defined benefit pension plans to cash balance plans.  IBM 
was by no means the first employer to convert to a cash balance plan, but they were the 
first to receive substantial public backlash for their decision.  The narrative also 
includes retirement plan service provider firms.  These include consulting and actuarial 
firms like Towers Perrin, Kwasha Lipton (now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers) that 
design and operate cash balance plans as well as law firms, most prominently 
Covington & Burling, a Washingon, D.C., firm, that specializes in employee benefits 
policy and litigation.  Some of these service provider firms came together around 1990  
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to form the “Cash Balance Practioners’ Group” in order to resolve legal issues related 
to creating and implementing such plans.  Then there are trade and professional 
associations that lobby on behalf of employers and service provider firms.  The best 
known of these are the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC), the American Benefits 
Council (ABC), and the American Society of Pension Professionals & Actuaries 
(ASPPA).   
In addition, there are overlapping relations among these organizations.  For 
example, IBM belongs to both ERIC and ABC.  Covington & Burling represents both 
IBM and ERIC.  Many of the prominent service provider firms belong to ABC, ERIC, 
and ASPPA as well as providing actuarial and legal services to ERIC and corporate 
employers such as IBM.  Finally, as we saw in Chapter 4, lobbying organizations like 
ABC and ERIC worked together in coalitions.  Figure 7.1 provides a simple schematic 
of the nature of these relationships.  Arrows indicate the flow of resources from one 
entity to another.  For example, the arrow going from IBM to ERIC means that IBM 
was a member of the ERIC trade association. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Interrelationships Among Firms Mentioned in the Cash Balance 
Narrative 
Source: Author’s calculations from original data 
IBM 
ERIC 
(trade 
association) 
ABC 
(trade 
association) 
Covington & Burling 
(law firm) 
Actuarial Firms 
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The External Narrative – Sources of the broad narrative include news media 
accounts as well as policy experts.  A basic theme is preventing the breach of a social 
contract, which consisted of a promise that companies offered a pension that created 
wealth and security in old age and in exchange workers agreed to remain loyal to the 
company during their career.  The New York Times noted that “I.B.M. was once the 
standard-bearer for corporate America’s compact with its workers” (Walsh 2006).  
“That social contract is under severe pressure” (Lowenstein 2005).  Indeed, President 
Bush repeated this theme:  
 
Many companies offer traditional pensions and fulfill their obligations to their 
employees and retirees. But too many companies do not put away the money 
needed to fund these promises. If a company gets into financial trouble or goes 
bankrupt, its failure to fund pensions will leave retirees with slashed pension 
checks. Every American has an interest in fixing this system because the 
Federal government insures these pensions and has to step in when companies 
fail to meet their responsibilities. Companies need to keep their promises and 
have an obligation to make sure money is set aside so workers get what they 
have been promised when they retire.  (White House 2005; emphasis supplied).  
 
  In October of 2005, Time Magazine came out with a cover story entitled, “The 
Broken Promise.”  For the Time writers, the issue was clear: 
 
Corporate promises are often not worth the paper they’re printed on.  
Businesses in one industry after another are revoking long-standing 
commitments to their workers.  It’s the equivalent of your bank telling you 
that it needs the money you put into your savings account more than you 
do – and then keeping it.  Result: A wholesale downsizing of the 
American Dream (Bartlett, Steele, Karmatz, McLaughlin, Tsiantar, and 
Levinstein 2005).   
 
A second narrative developed as the news media began to show interest in the 
cash balance controversy over the summer and fall of 1999.  The new narrative that 
reflects this shift incorporates the prior elements of the greed of corporations and the  
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executives who run them as well as the breach of a social contract between employers 
and workers.  But it adds new themes, such as (a) these cash balance plans had serious 
legal and equitable issues from their very conception; (b) because of these legal 
problems, corporate America needed a “legislative fix”, which only well-connected 
interests could obtain in secret through (c) the collusion of corporate lobbyists and 
policymakers through campaign contributions and ‘revolving doors’ of employment in 
the public and private sectors.   
The term “legislative fix” had its source from a 1999 article by Ellen Schultz, 
then a reporter at the Wall Street Journal, who wrote about the “Cash Balance 
Practioners’ Group” that met in 1990 to work legal issues associated with the plan 
design:  “Others fretted.  Hugh Forcier, a lawyer at the firm of Faegre & Benson, 
warned in an October 1990 memo to practitioners at consulting firms that he didn't 
think the IRS would agree -- nor that they could achieve ‘a legislative fix.’  He feared 
that cash-balance plans would be found to violate the law and that the subsequent costs 
to employers could be ‘truly staggering’” (Schultz 1999). 
Following this 1990 meeting, members of the pension professional community 
began to meet with Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Department officials.  What 
the pension professionals sought was regulatory “safe harbor” language that would 
protect corporate sponsors of cash balance plans from age discrimination lawsuits.  
The safe harbor language was eventually contained in a 49-word sentence in a 1991 
pension regulation.  Schultz (1999) picks up the story here: 
 
To make their case, benefits consultants and lawyers formed a sort of cash-
balance practitioners' lunch and slide-show brigade for officials at the IRS, the 
Treasury, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. and Capitol Hill….While few 
Americans pay much heed to how pension law is developed, the story of the 
49-word sentence and its paternity is pertinent to the lives of millions of baby 
boomers as they move closer to retirement.  A review of government 
documents shows that the promoters of cash-balance pensions had some early  
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fans at the Treasury Department.  Among them was Richard Shea, then the 
associate benefits tax counsel, who became convinced early on that this new 
form of pension was a good idea and urged others at Treasury and the IRS to 
include the "safe harbor" sentence. 
A month after The Sentence made its appearance, Mr. Shea left 
government to join Covington & Burling, a law firm that advised many large 
employers on pension matters and that later helped corporate clients such as 
Eastman Kodak Co. and International Business Machines Corp. with their 
pension plans… 
The day after the proposed regulations were published, on Sept. 12, 1991, 
Mr. Shea told members of the Erisa Industry Committee, an employer group, 
that the proposals "provide a clear road map" for companies seeking to 
establish or change to a cash-balance system.  It was his last public appearance 
as a Treasury official. Later that month, he joined Covington & Burling… 
His firm, Covington & Burling, has written articles for the Erisa Industry 
Committee to distribute in Congress and to the media, countering criticism of 
cash-balance plans. The law firm, besides defending clients in age-
discrimination and pension suits, is helping clients squelch nascent litigation 
brought by employees who contend the new-style plans discriminate against 
aging workers… 
 
Consonant with Schultz’s story, on July 14, 1999, Norman Stein, a law 
professor at the University of Alabama and legal expert on pensions, testified before a 
Department of Labor committee studying cash balance pensions.  His testimony 
echoes on the Cash Balance Working Group’s activities on Capitol Hill: 
 
The "adoptions" of cash-balance plans are, so far as I can tell, always 
conversions of existing traditional defined-benefit plans.  If I am right, this 
raises two questions: first, why do employers want to end traditional defined-
benefit plans and replace them with defined-contribution plans; and second, 
why don't employers just terminate their existing traditional defined-benefit 
plans and replace them with new defined-contribution plans.  
The advocates of cash-balance plans have been pretty forthcoming with 
their answers to the first question.  Stung by newspaper articles critical of 
cash-balance plans, industry-group supporters of cash-balance plans hosted a 
private Capitol Hill lunch briefing for key members of Congress to defend 
cash-balance plans.  Notably absent from the luncheon, by the way, were any 
critics of cash-balance plan conversions.  
At the meeting, representatives of a group calling itself the "Cash Balance 
Practitioners Group," explained why employers want to get out of traditional 
defined-benefit plans. (Stein 1999; emphasis supplied)  
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In his testimony before the House of Representatives on July 7, 2004, Robert 
Hill, an attorney who represented several employees in cash balance lawsuits, provides 
the relevant background that closely tracks the narrative from media sources: 
 
For example, following a 1990 meeting of what later became known as the 
Cash Balance Practitioner’s Group, attendees which included representatives 
from four large pension consulting firms and two major law firms--circulated a 
memorandum acknowledging that “it is well known that a [cash balance] plan 
is at risk under a literal reading of” the age discrimination laws.  The 
Practitioners Group memorandum acknowledged that the practitioners had 
“heard representatives of the [Internal Revenue] Service express concern that 
because the benefits under cash balance plans are frontloaded, such plans may 
violate a literal reading of“ the age discrimination laws.  In addition, the Report 
noted that a “number of practitioners believe that there is a very significant risk 
that the Service will ultimately take the view that it cannot avoid a literal 
interpretation of the statute.”  For that reason, the group focused on the need for 
a “legislative fix” a prospect that the group did not view with great optimism.  
Finally, the practitioners warned that, absent a legislative change, “the potential 
employer exposure is extremely high” potentially increasing the plan liabilities 
four or five times. (Committee on Education and the Workforce 2004) 
 
Faced with a political crisis, the legal and actuarial community continued to 
search for its “legislative fix” by relying on private meetings with congressional staff.  
However, the emergence of the controversy in 1999 made any legislative fix unlikely 
as worker activists refused to compromise.  Moreover, preliminary judicial rulings in 
class action lawsuits were favorable to the workers and retirees. 
Therefore, beginning in 2000 and continuing through 2003, the search for a fix 
shifted back to the regulatory process, as the story at the top of this chapter showed.  
At a time when the regulatory authorities at the Treasury and IRS were drafting 
regulations, the story indicates that key bureaucrats were socializing with corporate 
lobbyists, and clearly these relationships were important for policy goals.  For 
example, in September 2003, when a vote on a Sanders amendment cutting off funding  
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for cash balance regulations was about to be held, a Wall Street Journal article (Schultz 
and Francis 2003a) reported that IBM lobbyists were distributing a set of talking points 
created by the Treasury Department that opposed the Sanders amendment.  However, 
the talking points were an internal document that had been reformatted by IBM 
lobbyists:  
 
…an International Business Machines Corp. lobbyist distributed a document 
that may have been doctored to show Treasury opposed controversial pension 
regulations,…  
An IBM spokesman acknowledges that the company "reformatted the 
document" but says that it did so only to "clearly identify it as a document 
from Treasury" and that "our intent was not to misrepresent the document."  
He says IBM believed the document to be public. 
An article in Wednesday's editions of The Wall Street Journal reported that 
an IBM lobbyist on Monday sent a document she called the "Treasury's 
statement of opposition" to various lawmakers' staffs.  The Treasury document, 
on official Treasury letterhead, noted "Treasury Strongly Opposes the Sanders 
Amendment" and advised lawmakers to oppose the amendment. 
 
In a subsequent investigation, it was found that the Treasury official, William 
Sweetnam, who was mentioned in the story that opened the chapter, apparently 
emailed in confidence the talking points about cash-balance pension plans to an 
attorney at Covington & Burling, which represented IBM as well as ERIC and which 
also was lobbying actively against the Sanders amendment.  When the Wall Street 
Journal article quoted above came out, the Treasury official called the IBM lobbyists 
to complain (MarketWatch 2006). 
The clear fear of activists at this point was that the pension community and 
their lobbyists would seek to reverse recent unfavorable litigation through an obscure 
and collusive regulatory process.  Karen Friedman, Director of Policy Strategies at the 
Pension Rights Center, a Washington-based pro-worker nonprofit organization, stated 
at the time, “We need to create plans anew, authorized by Congress, not created in the  
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dark of night and that don’t fit the statutory framework of the pension law” (Byrnes 
2003: emphasis supplied).   
The Activist Narrative – Against the backdrop of media reports and policy 
expert pronouncements, retiree and worker activists were creating their narrative as a 
tool in rallying support and action for their goals.  This narrative evolved over time and 
varied with different purposes.  When IBM Corporation announced in April of 1999 
that it would be transferring many employees from the traditional DB plan to a new 
cash balance pension plan, almost immediately, IBM employees began to organize 
against the company.  As part of the mobilization, worker-activists created a website as 
a clearinghouse of their efforts, and workers could post comments.  Excerpts from the 
websites comment page provide a glimpse of the focus of employee and retiree anger 
(Note: Many of the quotes below refer to “Lou” or “L G” who was Lou Gerstner, the 
CEO of IBM at the time of the pension change): 
 
Comments: After 21 years with IBM, I feel like I've been SCREWED, LOU'ED, & 
TATTOOED. 
Comments: IBM for almost 25 years...and just lost 48% of my pension. I earned it. I 
want it back! IBMers don't hide under a rock Speakups, tell all the other employees, 
write to Congress and the Media,write to the top management that ripped us off and 
tell them it's wrong and we won't stand for it. Webber, Tsao, Gerstner, the "Board", 
the whole "gang"... We all deserve our pensions back.  
Comments: Worked for IBM for 18 years, 42 years old. Feeling poorer and badly 
treated. Ready to rock and roll! Would love to meet Lou face to face.. 
Comments: 22 years with IBM all across the country. Currently reside in Boulder. In 
my wildest dreams (mightmares) I never imagined that IBM would steal the money 
earned by generations of IBM employees. It disgusts me to think that a single group of 
self-serving individuals (our fine board and CEO) can potentially set the tone for 
disaster down the road. This doesn't just affect a select few, it affects all of us. Even 
the younger folks have said... "it is just a job." That is not an attitude that lends itself 
to loyalty, quality or the dedication required to run a services business. To all the 
stock holders investing in this once ethical and & proud corporation, take your short 
term gains. Nothing can come of this environment in the long run. Put your money in 
a company that reflects your values. A company with loftier goals than just lining the 
pockets of the executives (because currect law facilities).... 
Comments: I missed the old IBM pension plan by 28 days and my wife missed it by 5 
months. How do they expect us to live on that amount. Just give me L G's stock and 
I'll be happy  
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Comments: Having 22 years with IBM, and beeing affected by the travesty 
announced in June, I want to go on record to have my voice heard that this action by 
IBM and other corporate entities is not only unjust and immoral, but has far reaching 
affects for ALL Americans in the future as these traditional pensions plans are 
replaced by cash-pension plans. Shame on corporate America and big business 
AGAIN! Ultimately, the little guy loses again and the large companies and their "fat 
cats" prosper with the rich ~ getting richer. 
Comments: 19 years and screwed. Lets all join together and have a Blue Flu week. 
Dont give up the fight. Take off your running shoes at work and put on your loafers. 
Lou makes us all sick,but what makes me even sicker are the flunkies from HR who 
shovel out all this crap with a friggin grin on their faces. How do these people sleep at 
night? … If anyone is wondering what that noise from the east is just go visit TJ 
Watsons' grave site
136 and you will find him 20 feet deeper from spinning in his grave. 
Wonder what he will say to Lou when he dies. Oops they wont be able to speak Tom 
is in Heaven and Lou will be in lets just say a very warm place. 
 
The narrative in these and literally dozens from the website is the breach of a 
promise by those running the company, who are outsiders to the old “true blue” 
culture of IBM and thus focused on personal short-term gain rather than long-term 
company growth.  In so doing, it draws on the social contract frame discussed above 
as many of the comments are phrased in terms of years of loyal service.   
But the activist narrative also changed in line with the cash balance narrative 
described above.  What was the mechanism that changed their narrative from one 
centered on a social contract and their companies to one that included a corrupt 
political process?  Their change in narrative likely began when they began to take a 
view of the pension (and eventually healthcare) issue that was broader than just their 
individual corporations.  A coalition of worker groups had existed since 1996, but in 
the summer of 1999, a few worker and retiree representatives were invited to hearings 
held by the Department of Labor – the same hearings at which Norman Stein testified 
as discussed above.  They were pulled aside by Professor Stein, who advised them that 
they were going to lose their class action suits due to legal precedents in the federal 
courts.  He advised them that they would be more effective if they changed existing 
                                                 
136 Thomas J. Watson, Sr. (1874-1956), was the founder of IBM.  
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law.  The worker and retiree representatives met later and formed the coalition called 
the National Retiree Legislative Network (NRLN) in January 2000.
137  The following 
is the NRLN’s mission statement, which was taken from its website (www.nrln.org): 
 
The NRLN was organized several years ago by a group of retiree organizations 
that realized that corporate America was quietly seeking ways to circumvent 
the objectives of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 
1974. We realized that while we had been busy enjoying retirement, tending to 
our gardens and grandchildren, the politicians and big business interests of 
America were collaborating in passing laws that were not in any retiree’s best 
interest.  
 When lobbying Congress did not produce the relief they sought, [we] 
turned to the judicial system to grant them favorable interpretation of the 
existing laws. After sometimes bitter years of disputes with their various 
former employers and investing many dollars in class action suits, these small 
groups concluded that the best remedy was to band together and seek changes 
in ERISA through the United States Congress. (emphasis supplied.) 
 
The themes in this opening statement tie together short-term corporate greed, 
lobbying, and a frustrated political process.  These relational themes also are evident in 
early comments by IBM employees that were posted anonymously in 2000 to the IBM 
pension club, an employee/retiree website (emphasis supplied in all cases): 
 
And do you do that, Hanoi Jane,
138 by lobbying and using massive loopholes 
that allow the company to escape their responsibilities for paying a pro-rata 
part of promises made and communications made over generations to your 
employees?  Defined benefit pension plans are marvelously cheap and good for 
shareholders as well as employees--when the proper laws are in place.  I've got 
some bad new for you, Ms Jane.  We are on to what your are doing and before 
this is over many people are going to pay one helluva lot in money and some 
people may well wind up in jail.  Tell your bosses that. (July 2000) 
 
They thought they could get by with doing this and few would notice and even 
fewer complain by obscuring it all in gobble-de-gook--just like numerous 
actuaries say in those Enrolled Actuaries meetings.  Those transcripts are sort 
                                                 
137 Interview conducted by the author, March 22, 2006. 
138 Here the commenter is responding to a pro-employer posting.  
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of like bank robbers discussing exactly how they are going to rob the banks---
and then leaving behind the plans.  Well, it seems they miscalculated a little.  
The law of unintended consequences, I think I heard ERIC and APPWP
139 say 
a few times. (August 2000) 
 
Sooner or later the public will demand an answer to the following:  Why were 
a few "ringleaders" allowed to dictate - through various puppet groups - the 
entire Public Pension Policy for an entire Generation of Private U.S. workers 
???  Who were/are these "ringleaders" hiding in the shadows ?  What are/were 
the relationships between these puppet groups, ringleaders, congressional 
staffs, and lobbyist ?  How could so few, manipulate so many, and set DB 
Pension Policy for an ENTIRE Private sector U.S. Workforce ?  Sooner or 
later - THERE WILL BE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS...THEY 
WILL BE EXPOSED TO THE SUNLIGHT and FLUSHED OUT FROM 
UNDER THE "ROCKS"! (August 2000) 
 
Either way, they win, you lose.  Some senior level actuaries in major 
consulting firms up to their eyeballs in this awful stuff.  Violation of SOA 
professional ethics rules, Enrolled Actuaries rules, and, in many cases, age 
discrimination laws and possibly other laws too.  Some major help from key 
Congressmen, influenced by corporate lobbyists. (September 2000) 
 
Compared to the focus on employer-employees relations in the IBM employee 
quotes posted in 1999, we can see a change in emphasis in these passages.  In the 
highlighted words and phrases of these quotes, we can see relationships among terms 
for criminal-like acts (‘violations’ ‘bank robbers’), lobbyists (‘ERIC’), and secrecy 
(‘obscuring’ ‘under the rocks’ ‘hiding in the shadows’).  This is not simply griping 
about what management did; these are charges of collusion in the political process. 
Similarly, in 2003, after the news reports of lobbyist-policymaker social events 
and IBM appropriating the Treasury memo, Jim Norby, president of the National 
Retiree Legislative Network, made the following observations in his newsletter, A 
View From Washington.  The sub-theme here is a variant of the themes discussed 
previously as he stresses the ‘big versus little’ motivational quality of the fight: 
                                                 
139 APPWP, for Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, was the antecedent name for the 
American Benefits Council (ABC), a pro-employer trade group mentioned above.  
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Next, let’s get serious about how we communicate with our elected 
representatives. I’ve become increasingly convinced, over the last few months, 
that Congress knows what our problems are and, furthermore, they know how 
to fix them. They have, unfortunately, to date, chosen to follow the dictates of 
the lobbyists employed by our former employers. Individual Congressmen have 
made many excuses as to why they can’t go along with our requests for 
support.  What they really have been telling us is that they would rather take 
the money support from the business interests rather than our voting support. 
There are exceptions, of course.  This is an obvious generalization.  But, the 
point is, that the above is true for the vast majority of our elected 
representatives.  This has been hard lesson for me to learn over the last few 
years… 
It should be obvious to everyone that we can’t play with the “big boys” 
without at least some of the tools that they have at their disposal… 
We need to increase membership size and support staff. We have to 
compete against ERIC, an association that has greater lobbying strength and 
much deeper pockets for lobbying legislators and advertising its programs 
publicly. At this point, the NRLN can’t afford sending a newsletter to its two 
million members… 
I have thought long and hard about this and have concluded that we cannot, 
long term, achieve our objectives without leveling the playing field somewhat. 
Unless we were to become another AARP, we will never be able to match the 
business interests that are fighting us tooth and nail. ERIC is a lobbying group 
supported by the Fortune 500 companies.  I read somewhere that their lobbying 
expense is about $100,000 per month (Norby 2003; emphasis supplied). 
 
In this case, Norby is leveraging the widespread belief about collusion and 
using it to make the case that the retiree activists must develop a presence in 
Washington.  What was a shared perception about perception is now used 
instrumentally to mobilize support for the NRLN.  Norby also names the corporate 
lobbying group ERIC (the acronym for the ERISA Industry Committee), which 
represents large employers.  ERIC is a long-time lobbying organization in retirement 
policy and is one of the more central organizations in the policy domain. 
Another sub-theme is that the lobbyists use questionable tactics, such as lying 
or threats.  For example, in August of 2005, the IBM employee website provided a 
document entitled, “Cash Balance Legislation: Myth Versus Fact.”  Myth number 7  
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was, “If Legislation Allowing Conversions to Cash Balance Plans Is Not Retroactive 
Some 1,600 Large Pension Plans with Hybrid Plans Are Likely to Either Freeze or 
Terminate Their Plans.”  As part of their “Fact” response, the document (IBM 
Employee 2008) states, 
 
Putting aside the question of how many large employers have hybrid plans, it is 
clear that some employers and certain employer groups, such as ERIC, have 
threatened and will continue to threaten massive terminations in an attempt to 
scare Congress into giving them immunity for their prior illegal age 
discrimination. (emphasis supplied.) 
 
Here, not only are lobbying groups using money and secrecy to create the 
legislative fix, but they are also using threats or duplicity in pressing for their policy 
objectives.  Like the Norby passage just quoted above, the implication is that the 
corporate special interests are using their outsized influence.  On October 4, 2005, 
Kathi Cooper, a prominent IBM activist and lead plaintiff in a class action lawsuit 
against IBM, wrote a letter to certain Senators who were considering pension 
legislation.   
 
In the course of the Cooper litigation, we learned that the companies, their 
actuaries and their lawyers have known since the late 1980's that the cash 
balance plan design violates section 204(b)(1)(H), but believed they could 
lobby either the Treasury Department or Congress to bend the law in their 
favor. A 1991 memorandum submitted to the IRS by the Cash Balance 
Practitioners Group candidly admitted that "a number of practitioners quite 
strongly believe that [a cash balance plan that guarantees interest credits to the 
date of distribution as does the IBM plan] does not comply with a literal 
reading of" the age discrimination prohibition in ERISA section 204(b)(1)(H). 
As a result, the group concluded that unless they could dissuade the Internal 
Revenue Service from a literal application of the statute or a "legislative fix" 
could be obtained from Congress such plans faced significant risks.  
… The Wall Street Journal quoted Ms. Mazo
140 as confidently stating that 
the giant corporations were no longer worried about their cash balance plans 
                                                 
140 Judy Mazo is a benefits consultant for the Segal Company, a large consulting practice.  
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being exposed as illegal.  “Companies who now have these plans are 
sufficiently powerful, sufficiently big and have enough clout that they could 
get Congress to bend the law ... to protect their plans,” she said.  
…I also trust that you will not be misled by misstatements and threats from 
special interest groups or employer lobbying concerns, like those of the 
Chamber [of Commerce.] (Cooper 2005; emphasis supplied.) 
 
In the summer of 2006, when Congress was considering a major overhaul of 
the pension laws, the NRLN sent out a membership solicitation that included 
references that connect special interest lobbying with the huge pay packages given to 
executives:   
 
For too many years, policy decisions by Congress have favored corporate and 
special interests over workers, leaving millions of older Americans to face an 
impoverished retirement…While claiming they can’t afford to put money in 
their pension plans, these same corporations continue to hand out huge salaries 
and special retirement packages for their executives and spend millions on 
lobbying efforts to defeat much needed pension reform legislation in Congress. 
Your financial contribution is essential if we are to succeed in furthering 
our legislative agenda in Congress and at the regulatory levels of government.  
Corporate special interests are working overtime to water down and weaken 
pension reform and reduce health care benefits to retirees.  One of those special 
interests, the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC), spends more in one month in 
its lobbying efforts than NRLN’s entire annual budget (National Retiree 
Legislative Network 2006; emphasis supplied). 
 
In the prior passages, I made clear that lead activists were using the belief in 
collusion in ways that included their claim-making to policy makers, in mobilizing 
financial support, and generating more favorable public reaction.  While this appears to 
be instrumental, I do not want to detract from the belief of these activists that collusion 
was real.  In my conversations with activists, for example, both those on the outside 
and those on the inside, many felt that their message was not able to get through 
because of their inability to provide campaign contributions.  In one interview with a 
member active with the NRLN as well as his own company-based organization, I  
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asked if he felt he had sufficient access to make his case.  “It’s difficult to get the 
attention of members of Congress, particularly in the House.  Access is often based on 
campaign contributions, which are made by major companies.” 
He gave the example, reported in The New York Times, of Senator Lautenberg 
(D-NJ) and the pension bill that was then pending before Congress.  A lobbyist 
working on behalf of Prudential got Sen. Lautenberg to ask Sen. Baucus to insert a 
new provision in the Senate bill, making it easier for corporate employers to transfer 
money from their pension plans to fund other corporate benefits.  This was inserted 
into the legislation after the Senate had already voted 98 to 2 for the bill prior to the 
change and without anyone seeing the new provision.  The Prudential lobbyist just 
made a telephone call; the informant said he doesn’t have that kind of access.  He 
continued: 
 
[The NRLN] would be blind without its Washington counsel.  Washington is 
unlike any other place in the world.  You see it in the restaurants and other 
places: the credit card society.  I have to work to get policymakers to put that 
attitude aside and get them to see the NRLN viewpoint, the ‘real life 
experiences’ of NRLN members.  Translating that experience for Washington 
is a big challenge.  Access is a very big problem.  The insiders have the power, 
the contacts, and the access.  Once NRLN people get in to see them and they 
hear us, they understand. 
 
I asked him if his organization could ever reach a compromise with the pro-
employer lobbying community that they could trust.  He answered:  “Yes and no.  I 
would trust them to honor the deal, but the NRLN would continue to monitor and 
verify that no future changes occur.  Part of it stems from the fact that management 
could change, but they still have the same greedy motivation to boost short-term 
profits.”    
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In summary, retiree and worker activists believed that the close-knit relations 
among pro-employer lobbyists and politicians were real and were real in their 
consequences.  Technical experts and politicians made decisions in secret that 
permitted the use of cash balance plans that were plainly, in the eyes of activists, 
illegal.  Eventually, the activists would learn that the corporate lobbing organizations 
were staffed with former officials of the bureaucracy and former staffers of Congress.  
The frames and narratives produced by the news media and policy experts generated 
anger and helped the creation of activist organizations.  In turn, these organizations 
leveraged these frames and narratives as part of their everyday operations. 
I now turn from true outsiders to insiders who are nonetheless not part of the 
web of embedded relations.  Despite being socially closer than retiree activists, these 
actors are perhaps equally concerned about the effect of embedded ties. 
Don’t Compromise: Principal-Agent Relations  
As with the preceding section, I first provide a brief summary of a substantive 
issue within the retirement policy community.  There were, of course, a multitude of 
issues over the 1999-2004 time period, but the pension funding issue was particularly 
significant for elevating pension issues on the corporate agenda.  Suddenly, pension 
issues were being discussed in the executive offices of major firms, and those firms in 
turn were applying pressure on their government relations representatives. 
Pension Funding – The pension funding controversy began with the advent of 
the recession in 2001 during which equity returns plummeted and interest rates 
dropped.  The equity returns reduced the value of plan assets available to pay benefits, 
and the interest rate decline inflated the value of the liabilities.  In other words, 
pension plans had fewer assets to pay larger benefits.  The government estimated that 
traditional DB pensions were under-funded in excess of $450 billion (Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation 2005).    
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The changed market conditions required sharp increases in contributions by 
employers.  From 1980 to 2001, total employer contributions to traditional DB 
pension plans fluctuated in a stable range of $25 to $50 billion.  But the drop in asset 
values beginning in 2001 and associated drop in interest rates necessitated a vast 
increase in contributions.  According to Buessing and Soto (2006), defined benefit 
plan contributions by employers went from $44 billion in 2001 to $98 billion in 2002 
and $101 billion in 2003.  The funding liabilities and increased contributions had a 
sharply negative effect on corporate balance sheets.  This new financial reality 
combined with the advent of new accounting standards
141 diminished the value of 
traditional DB pensions in the eyes of corporate employers. 
These financial pressures have made pensions less attractive to employers.  
Companies in declining and highly competitive markets such as the airline and steel 
industries are shifting their pension liabilities to the other stakeholders through 
bankruptcy, accounting changes, or bond offerings.  But a number of commentators 
have noted a recent trend of very large employers closing plans to new hires (a 
practice known as ‘freezing’ the plan) (see, e.g., Munnell et al. 2006).
142  For example, 
in early 2006, IBM announced that it would freeze its $48 billion pension plan benefits 
                                                 
141 The International Accounting Standards Board and the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board 
are proposing a new standard that would remove smoothing techniques and require the recognition of 
changes in plan assets and liabilities on an immediate basis (Financial Accounting Standards Board 
2006b; Tweedie 2006).  The result of this globalization of accounting standards will likely be the 
injection of greater volatility in corporate financial statements and a negative effect on corporate 
financial statements and stock prices (Stickel and Tucker 2007).  While the actual proposals are still in 
the process of implementation, their main points have been known and debated for several years now 
such that financial managers have had ample opportunity to adapt strategies.  Companies that sponsor 
traditional DB plans can eliminate the risk of market fluctuation on their balance sheets by freezing or 
terminating their pensions, and as will be discussed, many companies have already done so. 
142 Generally, a freeze in a pension plan means stopping future accruals.  Pensions earned up until the 
date of the freeze are not changed or reduced, but current employees cannot earn additional benefits and 
new hires cannot enter the plan.  The authors note a number of reasons for pension freezes in addition to 
plan finances, namely that U.S. companies are cutting labor costs in the face of global competition, 
employers are cutting back on pension benefits I the face of growing health care costs, and that with the 
enormous growth in CEO compensation, traditional pensions have become irrelevant to upper 
management who receive almost all their retirement benefits through special arrangements outside of 
the plans that pay benefits to rank-and-file employees.  
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for its 125,000 American employees in 2008 and offer them only a 401(k) plan in the 
future.  IBM, ‘following a global strategy to move toward defined contribution 
retirement plans,’ expected that the shift would save them as much as $3 billion 
through 2010 and provide it with a ‘more predictable retirement plan costs’ (IBM 
2006).
143 
In this context, employers were lobbying to relieve their pension funding 
problems.  For example, U.S. automakers have lobbied intensively against proposals 
that would have required them to make much larger contributions to their legacy 
pension plans (Shepardson 2006).  In the summer of 2006, Congress debated and 
passed what became known as the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), which 
generally required employers to increase their funding contributions to traditional DB 
pensions as well as pay higher premiums to the PBGC, which is the federal agency 
that protects the solvency of the private pension system.  During the process leading 
up to the enactment of the PPA, two legislative proposals were of great concern.  One 
proposal would have disallowed the use of advance funding contributions in good 
years that permit companies to forego contributions in lean years.  The other proposal 
would have required additional contributions from companies with poor credit ratings.  
The automakers favored the first proposal and opposed the second proposal:  They had 
used the advanced funding technique extensively and built up substantial credits 
towards funding, and both General Motors’ and Ford’s corporate debt had been cut to 
junk bond status.  After furious lobbying over the Pension Protection Act that passed 
                                                 
143 However, there is another perspective on employers that should be noted.  Some employers can be 
characterized as less than benign, at best, when it comes to their pension obligations.  An anecdotal case 
in point is the Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Company, which announced in early 2004 that it was 
canceling its medical and pension benefits for all employees.  A charge against the principal owner of 
Kaiser is that he is shedding pension and medial benefits in order to pay for the junk bonds that were 
used to purchase the company.  Using bankruptcy law, Kaiser is able to terminate pension and medical 
benefits, thereby shifting the burden of the pension promises onto the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation.  (Seattle Times 2004).  
  285 
in August 2006, the automakers were largely successful in getting their pension 
funding credits retained and avoiding additional contributions because of credit status. 
Principal-Agent Concerns – In the context of heightened pressure on 
corporations from pension issues, additional light on the everyday relationships and 
practices of lobbyists might be shed by those who hire the lobbyists.  In this case, it is 
unlikely that these principals would characterize the relationships as collusive or 
corrupt in accordance with the Collusion Proposition and Hypothesis 5.1.  Nonetheless, 
because they are not part of the insider process, they are likely for their own reasons to 
view such relations as a possible threat to their interests.  This concern is a common 
one in principal-agent relations in which the central problem is how to align the 
interests of the agent with those of the hiring principal.  Dave, a lawyer representing 
financial interests, makes the point about the perceptions of those hiring lobbyists:  
“You've got to be careful that you are not seen by your clients or your stakeholders as 
compromising too much, being insufficiently strong in defense of the business 
perspective.”   
In Chapter 3, I discussed how the retirement policy domain has changed over 
1998 through 2004 with an increase in the number of lobbyists working in the domain.  
In 1998, there were only 98 registered lobbying organizations but by 2004 this had 
grown to over 150.  Earlier in this chapter, I discussed how pension funding had 
become an important issue for employers that were looking at hundreds of millions of 
dollars in required contributions to their pension plans due to the recession and other 
factors.  This was confirmed by the lobbyists themselves in the interviews, and 
particularly by those lobbyists who have worked in this area for some time.  Eric 
comments: 
 
I think that the dollars at stake have just gone up so dramatically since the 80s 
when I started doing this; that just there is just more, there is more money at  
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stake.  The service providers have become more lobbying savvy.  So they have 
got lobbyists.  Probably a large part of this is there’s just more lobbyists doing 
the stuff.  And I mean you have, I mean lobbyists are by nature looking out for 
their clients’ interests, and when you have got all these people looking out for 
their clients’ interests and trying to show that they have value, you tend to 
create wedge issues and differences and things and so the result is that there is 
more friction.  Jesus, when I started doing pension issues, there were probably 
like 25-20 people lobbying, if that many, maybe like a handful that were really 
good at it.  Now its just dozens of people.  You have got like regular corporate 
lobbyists now lobbying pension issues.  It’s sort of insanity. 
 
This increase was also noted by Quincy, who provides a more accurate source 
of the increase: 
 
And I wouldn’t have said that that group got a lot bigger.  I mean I have 
noticed that the number of lobbyists, period, has gotten a lot larger.  So what I 
would have noticed first is that the companies that I work with, not necessarily 
organizations themselves, but the companies are more likely to hire somebody 
like me.  [This company] for years had nobody doing just retirement issues and 
then they hired me, one fulltime person to do it all the time.  And so I definitely 
noticed an increase in the number of lobbyists for a company who [just] work 
on retirement issues.  That’s not exactly the same thing as new organizations 
coming up. 
 
This increase in lobbyists creates more diversified interests and hence conflict 
as noted by Eric above, and he continued: “People have their different interests, and 
there are different folks that they are representing and the fact that there are more 
players on the ice means that people bump into each other more often.”  As Eric noted 
in a quote in Chapter 6, the ‘corporate lobbyists’ are able to speak to staffers with 
credibility because of the size of their employer and hence “the corporate guys 
involved they just, they operate in a different, they operate under different rules and 
one of their different rules is that they are much more hardcore and play hardball and 
they will do things like that.”  This echoes similar comments from Chapter 6 that noted  
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how some organizations and individual lobbyists, like the AARP and Jack Abramoff, 
were able to skirt workaday relations and norms because of the size of their influence. 
As the number of lobbyists increases in the policy domain and as the stakes 
increase for the corporate interests, the pressure also increases on the embedded 
relations within the policy domain.  Dave noted that the increased interest in retirement 
has had an effect on interactions among long-standing organizations: 
 
And we’ve seen it, we’ve seen a sort of heightened bit of that dynamic in the 
last couple of years in the funding and in the hybrid debates where there are 
corporate interests with really, really strongly held views, huge bottom-line 
financial repercussions for some of the issues.  And, they’ve been policing their 
trade associations.  “We want you to be on message and not compromising and 
not weakening.”  Probably the collegiality has been frayed a little at the same 
time because the stakes are so high.  So, some of this kind of policing of trade 
association purity that I talked about, I think there’s just a lot at stake in some 
of this pension reform stuff going on right now.  So that can fray collegiality a 
little bit.  And because there are some new players on the scene, the levels of 
relationships are not as deep as they are for some others.  So that may lend 
itself to not as much trust. 
 
Conclusion 
As with Chapter 6, it would be difficult to say Hypothesis 5.1 is confirmed on 
the basis of qualitative evidence, but I do feel justified in stating that there is 
suggestive evidence that close-knit relations in a policy domain can be viewed and 
characterized as collusive and harmful by those not a part of such relations. 
This chapter looked at the relationship between insiders and outsiders in a 
policy domain using two perspectives.  In the first perspective, worker and retiree 
activists were the outsiders who were seeking policy changes in order to fight benefit 
cutbacks.  In so doing, they wove together a claim that was partially based on 
narratives from their own experience as well as narratives supplied from third party 
sources that focused on political embeddedness and corruption.  Activists also drew on  
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a deep reservoir of cultural imagery of lobbying, some of which was detailed back in 
Chapter 2.  This use of narratives had practical functions, such as creating identity of 
the activists as well as mobilizing resources via identifying the problem and its source, 
and it likely had positive outcomes in terms of policy effects.  It is particularly 
important to note that the activist narrative was draped in “costumes of consensus” 
(Tarrow 1998) that make the claims resonate with broadly held values.  In the specific 
instance, the frame of the social contract between worker and employer was important 
as a foundation for the grievance and attributing blame.  Moreover, the frame of the 
democratic process was an important addition.  This frame not only created a 
motivation by framing what employers were doing as undemocratic by using secretive 
lobbying, but the frame also pointed to a remedy of collective action.  That is, if the 
workers and retirees could join together, the Congress would listen and act 
appropriately. 
As discussed above, the narratives employed by the activists were not simply 
instrumental conveniences in a negotiation with employers.  Certainly, the narratives 
had instrumental uses as the activist organizations attempted to mobilize and sustain 
their challenge over a period of years.  However, the belief in collusion was real; these 
people were angry about the political process.  The wrongs that they experienced could 
not have happened in an open, transparent political process. 
Did the narrative as used by the activists have an effect?  First, it is difficult to 
say because it is hard if not impossible to connect cultural items and framings to 
quantifiable outcomes like voting.  Second, even if I could quantify the narrative in 
some way, I do not have access to other relevant variables like the number of letters 
written to members of Congress by activists in order to control for the narrative’s 
effect.    
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However, the activists were partially successful over the 1999-2006 time 
period.  Late in 1999, IBM did partially back-off from its cash balance conversion by 
giving older workers a choice between the traditional DB and cash balance pension 
plans.  Later, when the IRS and Treasury were considering regulations to clarify the 
treatment of cash balance plans, Representative Sanders of Vermont successfully 
sponsored Treasury budget bill amendments that shut off funding for the regulatory 
effort, eventually resulting in Treasury shelving the regulatory project in 2004.  While 
larger tax and pension bills in the House of Representatives were generally passed 
along party lines, Representative Sanders, who caucused with the Democrats, regularly 
attracted Republican votes for his amendments.  More broadly, employers never got 
the “legislative fix” in terms of retroactive protection for past cash balance conversions 
despite intense lobbying in 2006.  In addition, there were over two dozen class action 
lawsuits, some of which are not resolved.  Finally, a consensus developed within the 
employer community that while cash balance plans were not inherently bad greater 
care must be taken when incorporating existing workers, and very few employers took 
up cash balance plans in the wake of the controversy. 
The narratives of collusion employed by the activists contributed to these 
partial successes.  The use of the narrative was important because it helped broadened 
their claim beyond a specific employer and it created a rationale for the grassroots 
activism that we saw in the NRLN’s appeals.  Simply put, the message was they had to 
do a grassroots campaign because the corporations, lobbyists, and politicians are 
colluding in secret to get something they could not through normal political means.  
This broad narrative was facilitated by brokers like the journalists and policy experts 
aligned with worker interests and who could bring them together. 
An important question is whether the activists would have adopted the collusion 
narrative in the absence of close-knit ties among lobbyists and social distance between  
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the activists and lobbyists.  While I cannot discount the counterfactual completely, I 
have put forward evidence against it.  First, the qualitative evidence indicated that the 
activists were acutely aware of their outsider status (and indeed, reveled in it when one 
said he did not wear a tie!).  Second, their public statements did not just randomly 
focus on any lobbying organizations or persons or even just on their former/current 
employer firms.  Their public claims focused on a few, very specific organizations like 
the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC).  Those few organizations are at the center of 
the close-knit community of pension organizations.  All of the actors (journalists, 
policy experts, activists) making collusion-based claims knew exactly who mattered in 
making retirement policy.  In Chapter 1, I argued that in the case of highly embedded 
lobbyists, social activists would not target the ‘system’ as corrupt or collusive, but 
they would target the most central players or interests within a close-knit group as the 
parties responsible for generating the collusion that blocks participation by activists.  
To the extent that specific organizations were named, the ac 
The second perspective of the principal-agent was not so much about outsiders 
as about quasi-insiders who hired insider-lobbyists.  Because the stakes were so high 
for hiring corporations and financial firms, they could not afford to play by the 
standard rules of cooperative norms.  Direct control over policy positions was 
paramount to principals in this case, and they were suspicious of compromises among 
insider-lobbyists.  This provides a fascinating parallel with the perspective of the 
activist-outsider and is in line with the collusion argument of the activists.  Here, the 
lobbyists are colluding to compromise because of their loyalty to the close-knit 
community rather than zealously pursuing their clients’ interests.  Of course, the 
clients have the power to police these relationships whereas the activists do not except 
through allies like the newsmedia.  Both perspectives indicate that close-knit relations 
and associated trust-based norms among lobbyists are susceptible to external pressure.   
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Despite the possibilities for better policy from cooperative and trust-based interactions, 
those not party to such relations can view cooperation as a threat, which in some cases 
it may be.  The next chapter builds on these tensions in discussing the social 
ambivalence of lobbying. 
The next chapter provides a short concluding discussion of this project.  In it, I 
hope to draw out some implications from this and the preceding chapters as well as 
possibilities for future work.  
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CHAPTER 8: 
CONCLUDING SUMMARY AND EXTENSIONS 
 
This final chapter summarizes the prior seven, poses some unanswered 
questions, and provides some possible extensions of this project.  I do not view this 
project as being ‘done’ or ‘complete’, but I hope in connecting the main points of the 
prior chapters that I can provide the basis for the general claims that motivated this 
research.  This chapter is organized as follows:  I first summarize the theoretical basis 
for this work and the associated findings, which will lead to a brief discussion of 
confirmation or disconfirmation of the hypotheses posed in Chapter 3.  I then discuss 
certain (but likely not all) possible questions that remain as well as possible ways to 
address such questions.  I then conclude this chapter and the study with some thoughts 
on risk and ambivalence. 
Summary 
To restate the question asked in Chapter 1, why should embeddedness matter 
in political life?  Whether it’s sharing common policy interests and goals, being at the 
‘center of the action’, or belonging to ‘webs of affiliations’, embeddedness enables 
faster and ‘thicker’ flows of information; it establishes trust and thereby the reliability 
of information; and it helps solve problems of collective action and cooperation 
among parties that are in some ways competitors.  Political institutions foster deep and 
durable ties by creating conditions of repeated exchange, rewards for cooperation, and 
positive incentives for collective action.  Chapter 4 was concerned about the Policy 
Domain proposition, which stated that embedded networks of organizations that 
replicate themselves over time constitute policy domains.  In that chapter, I showed 
that within the overall group of organizations, there existed a smaller set of lobbying 
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organizations that consistently worked on retirement policy.  Embedded relations 
formed through time among these long-term organizations made shared interests more 
likely and ties seemed more durable.  Chapter 4 also examined the Coalition 
Proposition, which argued that embedded ties facilitate greater participation in 
coalitions.  Coalition participation was a function of increased centrality in the 
network of association memberships and for-hire relationships as well as work in prior 
coalitions.  In turn, coalition participation seemed to be strongly associated with 
influence, which was conceptualized in Chapter 5 as testifying before congressional 
committees and being mentioned in news media stories.  However, we did not see 
significant effects on influence by the social network measures.  Chapter 6 focused on 
the Cooperative Norms Proposition, which holds that lobbyists in embedded 
relationships are likely to uphold trust-related social norms that maximize group 
welfare.  In the qualitative data, lobbyists discussed the importance of trust in their 
daily dealings with each other and with politicians, and cooperative norms figured 
very prominently in their descriptions of routine interactions.  Sanctions for violations 
of cooperative norms, however, were carefully selected probably because of the highly 
dense relations within the policy domain.  Finally, Chapter 7 discussed how such 
embedded relations are viewed by those outside of such relations, primarily by social 
activists but also by those principals who hire lobbyists.  Outsiders created narratives 
that incorporated cultural views of lobbying, and these narratives became part of the 
claims pressed by activists.  Principals who hired lobbyists were similarly concerned 
about the effects of embedded relations as they “policed” their trade association 
lobbyists, searching for signs of “weakness” and “compromise” in the everyday policy 
interactions.   
In general, the hypotheses of this study could not be disconfirmed, and 
evidence was provided that support the propositions set forth in this dissertation.   
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Lobbyists with deep ties to each other obtain advantages over others on the periphery.  
There are costs, however, both in terms of norm violations and in terms of reactions by 
those outside of these embedded relations. 
How broadly applicable are these arguments?  It is hard to say; even the 
lobbyists interviewed felt that the retirement policy domain was unlike other areas of  
lobbying.  While this is likely to be an empirical question, and one that I intend to 
pursue in future research, I think the institutional framework that I described in 
Chapters 1 and 2, with policy specialization and a linear process that incorporates both 
formal and informal interactions, makes it likely that such durable relations are seen in 
many other policy domains.  Moreover, while other policy domains may not be very 
similar to the retirement policy domain, embedded relations may nonetheless exist 
even if they take different forms.  For example, there may be more emphasis on 
lobbyist-politician relations rather than lobbyist-lobbyist relations such as through 
coalitions.   
Questions 
Before proceeding to some thoughts on two broad topics, I think it might be 
worthwhile to highlight some things this study did not do or things that it did not do so 
well as a guide for future work.  First, while I did look at some different levels of 
relationships among lobbyists (issue-based, coalitions, membership, for-hire 
contracting), there are other levels of interest.  One such level is that of providing 
services, such as when an actuarial firm provides actuarial services to an employer.  
We glimpsed this kind of relation in the description of the cash balance narrative of 
Chapter 7.  These service-based relationships may also be conduits of information 
about policy developments and spurs to lobbying.  Another level is that of campaign 
contributions.  Similarity in campaign contributions between any two organizations 
may be an outgrowth of other relationships, but it would indicate a deepening of a  
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relationship between two lobbying organizations.  Moreover, it would connect our 
lobbyists to the members of Congress who receive such contributions.  Finally, an 
interesting area for research would be a meta-level approach that incorporates all 
levels of relationships such that we can differentiate organizations that might be highly 
embedded on one level versus that other organizations that have strong relations 
across multiple levels. 
A second area of research is looking at the transitions in the different networks 
over time.  There are logistic-like models that model how one actor changes or creates 
network ties.  In addition, new software is available that models transitions in the 
overall network structure (as opposed to modeling changes in individual networks) 
according to various parameters.  Both approaches would be interesting avenues for 
research against the backdrop of policy development and change in lobbying in a 
policy domain over time. 
For the topic of influence, two ideas may be useful contributions to the existing 
literature.  One idea is studying the development of an issue from bill introduction to 
ultimate disposition in terms of how it diffuses across the lobbying community.  Of 
specific interest here is whether more embedded lobbying organizations serve as 
indicators of bill importance such that over time they influence what other lobbying 
organizations are doing.  Another related idea is more closely modeling the process of 
similarity in agenda overlap (recall from Chapter 3 that agenda overlap is the number 
of common issues between any two organizations divided by the square root of the 
total number of issues between them).  How does agenda overlap change over time 
given the attributional and relational qualities of the organizations involved? 
A fourth area of interest is the source of an organization’s network position.  
While some of the variables used in this study would be relevant (particularly time 
spent in retirement policy), the personal biographies of the individuals working for the  
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organization may also be a factor in an organization’s network position.  Does prior 
government service matter?  What about turnover in personnel?  These qualities and 
others seem to speak to trust and credibility and hence to organizational position in a 
policy network. 
Finally, I would like to update the data to include lobbying through the year 
2007.  A major pension bill was passed in August of 2006.  Did lobbying drop off in 
2007?  If so, who exited from the policy domain?  In terms of substantive policy, how 
did the issue composition change? 
There are undoubtedly many other topics of interest as well as questions that 
could be pursued.  However, at this point, I would like to discuss two broad topics, 
risk and social ambivalence, that I believe are connected to the larger processes 
explored in this study. 
Risk 
As discussed in Chapter 3, four important stakeholders – employers, workers, 
financial service firms, and the government – comprise the major classes of actors in 
this research, and I had described the political and economic context in which they 
operate.  The source of these interests flow in large part from the structure of legal and 
political institutions that govern retirement policy and it is this structure that promotes 
a tendency to fragmentation rather than aggregation in terms of economic and political 
action. 
Specifically, the nature of the pension policy system works to spread risk 
differentially across the stakeholders, which in turn affects their interests. 
·  The government alternates between fiscal prudence and providing old age 
income security due to contradictory interests.  
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·  Financial service firms see the political structure as a source of competition 
and opportunity to achieve an advantage in financial retail and wholesale 
markets. 
·  Employers have seen in the past couple of decades an increase in financial 
risk from pensions due to changes in demographic trends, organizational 
assumptions, and financial governance regimes, and they are shifting this 
risk to workers. 
·  Workers are assuming additional risks of income insecurity in old age due 
to the shifting of risks from employers, the reduced role of government in 
promoting an income security policy, and the growth of a financial services 
industry that is marketing products that make risk-sharing regimes like 
traditional DB pensions less attractive.   
Risk, particularly that facing workers in particular, is part of a dynamic process 
within economic, social, and political institutions.  Tversky and Kahneman (1974; 
1981) identified three processes or heuristics that shape risk perceptions: the 
availability of information; the representativeness of the event or class associated with 
risk; and the reference point from which people makes estimates of risk.  From a 
sociological perspective, the key questions in specifying risk perceptions are what 
factors influence the availability of information; how ideas of representativeness are 
formed; where do reference points come from; who frames the choices; and whether 
others tend to accept the original frames or instead reframe issues (Heimer 1988).  
Heimer suggests that these considerations can be approached from both institutional 
and a purposive approaches. 
Using these questions as lenses through which to look at retirement policy and 
politics, we can understand how workers’ perceptions of risk are formed.  From an 
institutional perspective, the complicated structure of laws and regulations create an  
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illusion of lower risk for workers: For example, perceptions of risk are influenced by 
the existence of institutions, such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which 
is the agency that insures pensions for firms that fail.  In addition, laws and regulations 
require that employers must adhere to fiduciary standards and make annual disclosures 
to the government and to employees about plan conditions.  Moreover, by virtue of the 
fact that a pension is a choice on an employer-by-employer basis, the pension system 
isolates workers within companies such that corporate bankruptcy and pension loss at 
one firm does not mean that workers at other firms will identify with that loss.  Unlike 
executives who monitor each other through interlocking boards of directors and 
through trade association membership, workers do not necessarily have the industry-
wide perspective on which to make a representative frame, particularly given the 
decline in union membership. 
From a purposive perspective, the government, employers, and particularly the 
financial services industry have good reasons in creating a positive frame regarding 
the shift from relatively safe traditional defined benefit pensions to plans like the 
401(k) in which workers bear more risk.  As noted above, the government is an insurer 
of traditional DB pensions and thus bears some responsibility if DB pension plans fail 
– They have no similar formal responsibility for savings plans.  Employers see such 
plans as a drag on corporate earnings and balance sheets.  Financial service providers 
make more money when plan assets grow larger.  So, there have been extensive efforts 
to educate workers on saving more and investing more wisely in defined contribution 
plans like 401(k) plans.  In addition, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 blessed both 
the practice of auto-enrolling workers in savings plans, as long as workers could 
affirmatively opt out, and allowing plan investment managers to offer investment 
advice despite possible conflicts of interest.    
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As Heimer (1988) notes, we are more likely to accept the original frames 
regarding risk when the decisions seem trivial and when the frames come from more 
powerful actors.  For many workers, retirement and retirement planning are far down 
the time horizon such that the issues of income security only become relevant when 
retirement is looming, and workers are less powerful than the other stakeholders.   
However, new framings have begun, and they come from a variety of sources: 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, activists, the media, and politicians.  One new framing, what I 
called in Chapter 7 as the narrative, portrayed the imposition of cash balance plans and 
attendant changes in policy not as an inevitable consequence of population aging but 
as driven by corporate arrogance, fueled by short-term gain, and abetted by the 
collusive relations among policymakers and special interest lobbyists.  Similar re-
framings are occurring with regard to healthcare and executive pay.  This struggle, 
including that over how retirement policy issues should be framed, is likely to 
continue.  Thus, while the nature of relationships among lobbyists can be a hindrance 
to outsiders, such relationships are also a source for the important work of re-framing 
risk perceptions. 
The Social Ambivalence of Lobbying 
As a concluding thought, I want to expand somewhat on the lobbying as a 
socially ambivalent role in society.  What is social ambivalence in general, and what 
leads to social ambivalence?  If lobbying is socially ambivalent, how does that affect 
policy? 
First, what is ambivalence?  Ambivalence has been defined as (a) the 
simultaneous and contradictory attitudes or feelings (as attraction and repulsion) 
toward an object, person, or action; (b) continual fluctuation (as between one thing and 
its opposite); and (c) uncertainty as to which approach to follow (Merriam Webster  
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2008).  The term “ambivalence” has a long lineage in psychology with a first reference 
in the British medical journal Lancet in 1912.   
Social ambivalence is a more recent term, made most notable by Merton.  As 
distinguished from psychological ambivalence, one needs to examine ambivalence “in 
terms of the dynamics of social structure to see how and to what extent ambivalence 
comes to be built into the very structure of social relations” (Merton 1976: 4).  People 
occupying a status can be exposed to ambivalence not because of personal history but 
because ambivalence is inherent in the social positions that they occupy (Merton 
1976).  As applied to professionals, Merton writes: 
 
As the role of the professional is socially defined, he is to subordinate his own 
interests to the interests of the client he has accepted.  More strictly, he cannot 
legitimately advance his own interests at the expense of his clients’.  Yet the 
interests built into the professional role have a dual character: they require him 
to give the best possible service to his clients, to remove or ameliorate their 
troubles so far as he can, and at the same time the continuing problems of 
clients provide him with his livelihood.  It is in this objective sense that 
professionals have an institutionalized stake in trouble, that they ‘live off’ the 
troubles of their clients (Merton 1976: 27). 
 
How do such conflicting expectations become attached to different positions in 
the social structure?  Smelser suggests dependence as one source: “My general 
proposition is that dependent situations breed ambivalence, and correspondingly, 
models of behavior based on the postulate of ambivalence are the most applicable” 
(Smelser 1998: 8).  For example, common adult relationships in which ambivalence is 
most evident are those in which one is dependent on another – between lovers, friends, 
or intimates.  These relationships often involve other kinds of dependence, such as 
friendships between political and status unequals (Smelser 1998:9).  Certain social 
structures can be seedbeds of ambivalence because their participants are ‘locked in’ by  
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personal or institutional commitment or other situational circumstances and can escape 
only at great cost.   
 
The general principle is that constraint generates ambivalence, and that, as a 
special case, the difficulty involved in withdrawing from a group into which 
one is ‘locked’ increases ambivalence toward that group and its members.  
People have to live with one another, but this does not mean they have to love 
one another; it implies, rather, that they both love and hate one another 
(Smelser 1998: 9).   
 
Hirschman provides a similar perspective but includes not just being locked in 
but also the inability to express dissent or disapproval: 
 
There is no doubt that, as many commentators have pointed out, that passivity, 
acquiescence, inaction, withdrawal, and resignation have held sway much of 
the time over wide areas of the social world.  This is largely the result of 
repression of both exit and voice – a repression that has flourished in spite of 
the fact that all human organizations could put to good use the feedback 
provided by the two reaction modes (Hirschman 1987). 
 
How does social ambivalence function in the social role or position of 
lobbying?  I am going to briefly provide a sort of classification of roles for those 
activities.  From there, I will illustrate some of the conflicting or opposing 
expectations or norms that are part of those roles.   
I return with an overview of the different relationships that involve lobbying.  
Figure 8.1, which reproduces Figure 1.1 from Chapter 1, illustrates these relationships.  
Lobbyists can often work with a variety of types of people.  The primary relationship 
is that with the client.  Representing a client often involves getting to know the client’s 
issues and concerns, researching the problem they are facing, finding out the status of 
political activities on the issues, advocating the client’s position before relevant  
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decision-makers, and giving feedback to the client.  It also involves a business 
relationship in which the lobbyist depends on the client for fees. 
Another relationship involves a lobbyist working with other lobbyists, usually 
out of shared interests.  A third relationship is that between the politician and the 
lobbyist.  Finally, the lobbyist can interact with the media and the general public, 
which I group together here as external publics for convenience.  The important point 
is that all of these relationships are occurring simultaneously and sometimes in the 
same room as when a lobbyist brings a client to a meeting with other lobbyists and 
politicians (such as at a Hill meeting or a fundraiser). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: The Structure of Relationships for Lobbyists 
Lobbyist 
Client 
Politicians 
The Public 
And Media 
Other 
Lobbyists  
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With these activities and relationships in mind, we can now ask what are the 
sources of ambivalence or the ‘dynamic organization of norms and counter-norms’ for 
lobbyists?  One source is the formal institutions of government and politics; these 
shape the structure of social roles that policy actors – politicians, staffers, bureaucrats, 
and lobbyists – occupy.  As discussed in Chapter 1, formal institutions create a 
division of labor in the policy process:  We have jurisdictional divisions for 
congressional committees and bureaucratic agencies.  This means that there may be 
dependence/non-choice of those with whom you work.  Political institutions also 
foster a linear policy process, from bill introduction to passage in Congress to 
implementation by the bureaucracy.  During this process, there are points at which 
informal lobbying and more formal processes take place concurrently.  Different roles 
may come to the fore simultaneously depending on the stage of the process. 
Additional sources of social ambivalence in lobbying include dual loyalties to 
clients and other policy actors (agency versus embeddedness) and shifting 
alliances/relationships with same people (friend today, foe tomorrow).  Finally, there 
is the tension between how one should act according to democratic ideals versus the 
norms of ‘practical politics’. 
For lobbyists, therefore, ambivalence is multidimensional, flowing from 
various roles or positions that the different relationships described previously require.  
Roles and examples of associated norms in lobbying could be classified as follows: 
·  Professional: A lobbyist needs to acquire and keep clients 
·  Insider (lobbyist-lobbyist): Cooperation; Reciprocity 
·  Power (lobbyist-politician): Present both sides fairly; Confidentiality 
·  Agent (lobbyist-client): Represent your client zealously against opposing 
interests  
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·  Societal (lobbyist-public/media): Democracy should be open to all; Democracy 
should be transparent 
When roles combine or intersect, norms and counter-norms also intersect.  It is 
the connection of norms and counter-norms that produce ambivalence.
144  Some 
examples, but not an exhaustive list, of overlapping  roles and associated norms and 
counter-norms include: 
·  Insider/Agent: Lobbyists should work together to achieve goals, BUT a 
lobbyist has to represent a client’s interests against others.  For example, a 
coalition of lobbyists trying to reach a common policy position may require 
compromises from lobbyists in terms of their clients’ positions.  Alternatively, 
a lobbyist might be constrained in the actions he or she could take on behalf of 
a client because of obligations to allied lobbyists.  This might lead lobbyists to 
increase their future discount rate and encourage rent-seeking.  Perhaps this 
explains what lobbyists in the prior chapter meant when they stated the 
common observation that (a) trust matters, (b) people often violate trust-based 
expectations, and (c) no one really does anything about it. 
·  Power/Agent: Lobbyists should always present both sides of an argument, 
BUT a lobbyist should represent a client’s interests against others.  For 
example, when presenting an issue to a friendly politician, many note the 
importance of the lobbyist giving both sides of an argument so the politician is 
not caught off-guard by opposing interests.  However, presenting both sides 
may not help in convincing the politician to take action on the lobbyist’s 
behalf.  Perhaps more accurately, the lobbyist may shade or skew the 
                                                 
144 There are other sources of social ambivalence towards lobbying that do not involve norms and 
counter-norms.  For example, the public might feel that lobbyists make democracy less open (violating 
social norms relating to democracy), but they may also feel that lobbying is desireable and glamorous 
(the latter involving stereotypes of a highly paid profession and exciting entertainment activities like 
golf and expensive dinners).  
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description of the other side’s position in a way that makes his argument seem 
more attractive, and some seemed to suggest this was possible. 
·  Agent/Professional: A lobbyist should represent a client’s interests against 
others, BUT a lobbyist needs to acquire clients.  For example, lawyers who act 
as lobbyist may not be adhering to the American Bar Association Code of 
Ethics on conflicts of interest in representation.  Thus, the lobbyist might be 
representing competing interests.  While there may be no initial conflict 
because the issues do not overlap, conflicts could arise over time. 
What are the implications of ambivalence for politics and democracy?  Does it 
matter for policy?  First, Merton identified the mechanism associated with social 
ambivalence as a dynamic alternation of norms and counter-norms rather than a mere 
combination of their dominant attributes.
145  Within Smelser’s ‘locked in’ 
organizations, one can see the consequences of ambivalence in the form of spite, petty 
wrangling, struggles for recognition, and vicious politics even though the political 
stakes are not very high. 
When lobbyists are not ‘locked in’ they can exit from the community, 
coalition, trade association, etc., but those lobbyists that are substantially vested in a 
particular policy domain and cannot easily exit are more likely to be subject to 
ambivalence and its consequences.  Recall the example from Chapter 7 of the norm 
against putting names on coalition letters without permission. 
Social ambivalence may also be a possible source for the disruptions in policy 
equilibria (Baumgartner and Jones 2005).  What are policy equilibria?  The idea is that 
policy is generally marked with very little change such that there is a status quo.  
                                                 
145 See also Gambetta’s (1998:110) discussion of cognitive dissonance, which can evaporate rapidly in 
favor of a dominant behavior.  
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Periodically, however, an event punctuates this equilibrium to cause a large change in 
policy for a brief period, after which the policy returns to a period of incrementalism.   
How does this work?  The embedded relationships and path dependencies 
usually provide ‘negative feedback’ such that policies change very little, but these 
negative feedback loops are vulnerable when external events apply pressure.  Due to 
the alternating mechanism, the sudden swing to counter-norms allows positive 
feedback and the political system overreacts.  Why does it overreact?  Overreaction 
occurs from an underlying tension from interests that are pushing for particular 
proposals but previously were unable to achieve their goals.
146  An example might be 
the Enron and related accounting scandals of 2001-2002.  Prior to the Enron scandal, 
there was an underlying push for accounting reform from the SEC that was actively 
opposed by the accounting profession and allies.  When the scandals hit, the 
accounting lobbyists lost their ability to provide an opposing voice, and politicians 
were eager to enact a quick reform in the form of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Of course, an argument of this project is that the institutions and norms 
attached to ambivalent positions and roles are themselves ambivalent and objects of 
contestation in times of stress.  The norms related to embeddedness become contested 
and, at least temporarily, pushed aside as in the case of the cash balance controversy 
and in the case of the corporations that hire lobbyists in pressure-filled times and that 
do not want to see “weakness” on the part of their lobbyists. 
 
                                                 
146 “Garbage can” models of policymaking seem applicable at this point (Kingdon 1984; March and 
Olsen 1976).  
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Data Sources 
Lobbyist Disclosure Reports – Much of the data used in this study is taken 
from lobbyist disclosure reports that are filed with the U.S. Congress, which makes the 
reports available to the public through a searchable database.  As the focus was on 
retirement policy, I searched for disclosure reports that were filed for retirement policy 
(denoted in the reports by the code RET – lobbying disclosure report issue codes are 
set forth below).  The first available time period is the first half of 1998, reflecting 
changes in lobbying disclosure laws in 1995 and 1996.  I chose the last time period in 
order to have the most recent and complete Congress, which meant that I stopped 
collecting data at the end of 2004.   
The first page of the reports provides the name of the registrant as well as 
basic organizational information such as address; the name of the client (if any); and 
the amount of expenses spent (if self-represented) or income received (if representing 
another entity) for lobbying activities during the time period.  On separate pages, one 
for each issue area (like retirement policy), the registrant must indicate the issue(s) on 
which they lobbied, the governmental organizations contacted, and the name of the 
individual lobbyists who worked on that issue area.  
I entered this information by hand into a Microsoft Access database.  Only 
organizations that filed as lobbying on retirement policy and that had Washington-area 
offices were included.  I did not include organizations located outside of Washington 
as this study is concerned with the development of ties and norms in a close-knit 
group, and geographical proximity appears important in determining the close-knit 
nature of the group.  I did include organizations that had a Washington-area office 
even if their headquarters were located in other areas of the country.   
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I was concerned with mistakes in reporting and so I checked when possible for 
possible mistakes.  For example, I often reviewed the entire report to see if retirement 
issues were listed in other sections.  However, I did not check other issue areas like 
taxation to see if retirement issues were covered because of the large number of 
reports. 
The data from the lobbyist registration reports for each of the 14 six-month 
time periods (January-June 1998 through July-December 2004) was entered into 
matrices in which the rows represent lobbying organizations and the columns 
represent different legislative bills or issues.  These organization-by-issue matrices 
were transformed into organization-by-organization affiliation matrices based on 
common issues as the tie between organizations.  This transformation occurs when the 
original organization-by-issue matrix, A, is multiplied by its transpose, A’.  Fourteen 
affiliation matrices were thus created, and within each matrix a set of network 
measures (centrality, betweeness, and cliques) and non-network measures (lobbying 
expenses, total policy domains) were created, which are more fully discussed 
below.
147   
Note on Coding of Relationships – One issue is the fact that within one policy 
domain some organizations both represent themselves and hire other lobbyists to 
represent them on issues.  For example, trade association XYZ lobbyists on certain 
issues and also hires law firm ABC to represent its interests on other issues because of 
lack of internal staff resources.  This can be more complicated if a corporation belongs 
to trade association XYZ, hires law firm ABC to handle other issues, and employs its 
own in-house lobbyist to lobby independently on issues and manage the trade 
association and law firm relationships.  While this might be handled in different ways, 
                                                 
147 However, each of these measures was averaged across the 14 time periods in which an organization 
was actively lobbying on retirement policy; that is, time periods in which an organization was not 
actively lobbying were disregarded for averaging purposes.  
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I am interested in the social organization of lobbyists in a particular policy domain so I 
want to represent all organizations active in that domain.  Thus, initially I will not 
collapse entities based on relationships of representation or membership (although I 
may do this for subsequent analysis).  Moreover, I will code the different types of 
relationships (law firm representation, trade association membership, coalition 
participation, etc.) as the data permits. 
Data and Variable Codes – The following issue codes are used in completing 
lobbyist registration reports.  I use them in this project in order to track activity by 
organizations outside of the policy domain of interest. 
 
ACC – Accounting 
ADV – Advertising 
AER – Aerospace 
AGR – Agriculture 
ALC – Alcohol & Drug Use 
ANI – Animals 
APP – Apparel/Clothing 
Industries/Textiles 
ART – Arts/Entertainment 
AUT – Automotive Industry 
AVI – Aviation/Aircraft/Airlines 
BAN – Banking 
BNK – Bankruptcy 
BEV – Beverage Industry 
BUD – Budget/Appropriations 
CHM – Chemicals/Chemical Industry 
CIV – Civil Rights/Civil Liberties 
CAW – Clean Air & Water (Quality) 
CDT – Commodities (Big Ticket) 
COM – Communications, 
Broadcasting, Radio, TV 
CPI – Computer Industry 
CSP – Consumer 
Issues/Safety/Protection 
CON – Constitution 
CPT – Copyright/Patents/Trademark 
DEF – Defense 
DOC – District of Columbia 
DIS – Disaster Planning/Emergencies 
ECN – Economics/Economic 
Development 
EDU – Education  
310 
 
ENG – Energy/Nuclear 
ENV – Environment/Superfund 
FAM – Family Issues, Abortion, 
Adoption 
FIR – Firearms/Guns/Ammunition 
FIN – Financial 
Institutions/Securities/Investments 
FOO – Food Industry (Safety, 
Labeling, etc.) 
FOR – Foreign Relations 
FUE – Fuel/Gas/Oil 
GAM – Gaming/Gambling/Casinos 
GOV – Government Issues 
HCR – Health Issues 
HOM – Homeland Security 
HOU – Housing 
IMM – Immigration 
IND – Indian/Native American Affairs 
INS – Insurance 
LBR – Labor 
Issues/Antitrust/Workplace 
LAW – Law 
Enforcement/Crime/Criminal Justice 
MAN – Manufacturing 
MAR – 
Marine/Maritime/Boating/Fisheries 
MIA – Media (Information/Publishing) 
MED – Medical, Disease Research, 
Clinical Labs 
MMM – Medicare/Medicaid 
MON – Mining/Money/Gold Standard 
NAT – Natural Resources 
PHA – Pharmacy 
POS – Postal 
RRR – Railroads 
RES – Real Estate/Land 
Use/Conservation 
REL - Religion 
RET – Retirement 
ROD – Roads/Highway 
SCI – Science/Technology 
SMB – Small Business 
SPO – Sports/Athletics 
TAX – Taxation/Internal Revenue 
Code 
TEC – Telecommunications 
TOB – Tobacco 
TOR – Torts 
TRD – Trade (Foreign & Domestic) 
TRA – Transportation 
TOU – Travel/Tourism 
TRU – Trucking/Shipping  
311 
 
URB – Urban 
Development/Muncipalities 
UNM – Unemployment 
UTI – Utilities 
VET – Veterans 
WAS – Waste 
(hazardous/solid/interstate/nuclear) 
WEL - Welfare 
 
In terms of issues, I tried to stay as close as possible to what was entered in the 
lobbyist disclosure reports.  In the majority of cases, lobbying organizations provided 
the actual bill number when asked to specify the issue on which they lobbied.  In many 
other reports, they also provided descriptions of varying lengths and specificity.  In 
this latter situation, I had to code the descriptions according to my understanding of 
the issues.  When a disclosure report simply indicated a very generic description like, 
“pension issues,” I coded it as “general.”  The following codes (with some 
descriptions in parentheses) were used for the 65 issues in the retirement policy 
domain: 
o  30yr (interest rate relief for 
funding) 
o  401k (plans) 
o  403b (plans) 
o  457 (plans) 
o  529 (plans) 
o  Accounting 
o  Actuaries 
o  Advice (investment advice 
for defined contribution 
plans) 
o  Airlines (issues related to 
airlines) 
o  Annuity  
o  Bankruptcy (how pensions 
are treated in bankruptcy) 
o  Blackout (blackout trading 
periods for plan assets) 
o  Cash (cash balance plans) 
o  Charitable (transferring plan 
assets to charities) 
o  Church (plans for churches)  
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o  Coal (plans for coal 
companies and workers) 
o  CoStock (company stock 
held in pension plans) 
o  CrossTrades (asset 
management) 
o  DBPlans (general defined 
benefit plan issues) 
o  DCPlans (general defined 
contribution plan issues) 
o  DeferredComp (executive 
deferred compensation) 
o  Determination (determination 
letters issued by the IRS) 
o  Disability (issues within 
plans) 
o  Distributions (rules for 
payouts from plans) 
o  Dividends (payment into plan 
assets) 
o  Drugs (drug benefits for 
workers) 
o  EGTRRA (Economic Growth 
and Tax Relief and 
Reconciliation Act of 2001) 
o  ERISA (Employee 
Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974) 
o  ESOP (employee stock 
ownership plans) 
o  Fiduciary 
o  FinServices (issues important 
to financial service firms) 
o  Flex (flexible benefit plans) 
o  Funding (issues related to 
funding pensions) 
o  GATT (General Agreement 
on Trade and Tarriffs; prior 
GATT laws included pension 
funding provisions) 
o  General (catch-all category) 
o  GPO (Social Security-related 
issue) 
o  Indians (native American 
benefits) 
o  IRA (individual retirement 
accounts) 
o  LSA (Bush proposal on 
pensions) 
o  LTC (long-term care) 
o  Medical (medical issues 
within pensions)  
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o  Medicare  
o  Military (pensions) 
o  Mortality (tables used for 
calculating benefits) 
o  Multiemployer 
(multiemployer plans are 
joint union-employer plans 
usually covering an industry) 
o  MutualFunds (plan 
investment in mutual funds) 
o  Options (stock options) 
o  PBGC (Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation)  
o  Phased (phased retirement) 
o  Portability (of benefits) 
o  Public (state, local, and 
federal benefits) 
o  QDRO (divorce issues) 
o  Railroads (railroad pensions) 
o  Reform (general reform 
measures; usually covering 
many other issues) 
o  Reporting (to the 
government) 
o  RetireeHealth (health 
insurance to retirees) 
o  Savings (proposals for 
boosting savings) 
o  Security (income security 
issues) 
o  Spousal (issues for providing 
spousal coverage) 
o  SSaccounts (Social Security 
privatization) 
o  SSreform (general Social 
Security reform other than 
privatization) 
o  SurplusAssets (issues related 
to over-funding of plans) 
o  Teachers (education-related 
plans) 
o  Termination (of plan issues) 
o  Women (issues related to 
women)  
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The following codes were used for organizational type in the retirement policy 
domain:  
o  1 – Membership organizations (e.g., trade association, union, public 
interest group) 
o  2 – Single self-representing organization (e.g., corporation, non-profit 
organization) 
o  3 – For-hire organization (e.g., public relations, consulting, or law firm) 
Interest Type Coding – The following codes were used to denote types of 
interests: 
o  1 – Employer/management 
o  2 – Financial services 
o  3 – Public interest 
o  4 – Public employer/employee 
o  5 – Labor (union or employee association) 
o  6 – Military 
o  7 - Professional 
Creation of Agenda Overlap measure – One variable was created to capture the 
degree to which two organizations had a common agenda in terms of issues.  I could 
have just used the number of issues that two organizations had in common, but such a 
measure would not have captured the quality of the overlap in issues.  For example, 
two organizations sharing three issues but each having only three issues each in total 
(a complete overlap) is a different overlap than two organizations sharing three issues 
but with each having 15 other, non-overlapping issues.  The following steps were 
followed in creating an agenda overlap measure that reflected the total number of 
issues: 
o  Create common issue matrix  
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o  Take out the diagonal of the common issue matrix (transform ￿ diagonal) 
o  Take the transpose of the diagonal (data ￿ transpose) 
o  Create a matrix of the joint product of issues for each dyad (__joint = 
prod(diagonal, diagonal-transpose) 
o  Create the set of factors (1/(square root of joint issue product)) (in matrix 
algebra, __factor = rec(sqrt(__joint)) 
o  Create the similarity score matrix (__simscore = mul(__factor, __aff)) 
 
Individual Interviews 
I conducted a number of interviews with lobbyists, policymakers, and activists 
from January through September of 2006.  These interviews were semi-structured in 
that I used an interview schedule, but I allowed respondents to expand on certain 
topics or I probed certain topics with additional questions.  Below is the Interview 
Schedule of Questions that I used: 
 
Introduction 
·  Major focus: Why people cooperate in policy areas, how that cooperation is 
sustained over time, and the role of trust and norms. [cite business studies?] 
·  Why I choose you 
·  Confidentiality – masking, erasing, and review 
·  Consent form 
 Background and Warm-up Questions 
·  How long have you worked in Washington? 
·  Why advocacy work?  Why pensions?   
·  What do you like about lobbying? 
·  What, in your view, are the downsides to lobbying?  
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Retirement Policy Domain 
·  Describe the level of cooperation among retirement policy advocates and 
policymakers. 
·  Has that level of cooperation and goodwill changed over time?  Why or why 
not?  Can you give more details about that?  What issues are driving any 
change? 
Lobbying Generally 
·  What makes for effective lobbying in this area? 
·  Is trust important?  How important is a reputation for trustworthiness?  How 
does trust compare with size, resources, etc.? 
·  If norms are expectations of behavior, the violations for which are punished in 
some way, are there norms among lobbyists?  Examples? 
·  What is the basis of a good relationship with other lobbying organizations?  
With policymakers? 
·  House versus Senate: Do you lobby the chambers differently?  Offices v. 
committees? 
Social Activities 
·  Do you socialize (lunches, dinner, cocktails) with other retirement policy 
lobbyists? 
·  How important are social connections in establishing trust? 
o  Role of ‘clicking’ with a lobbyist/staffer/policymaker? 
Information Gathering and Sharing 
·  How important is past interactions in getting different types of information?   
·  If you hear about new and nonpublic information (e.g., a draft bill or 
regulation), do you share that information with others? 
o  Under what conditions?  
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o  When you learn of new information from someone, do you feel 
obligated to reciprocate in any way?   
o  If someone were to leak that information in an inappropriate way, what 
would you do? 
o  Do other lobbyists contact you looking for information?   
Services 
·  It’s not uncommon for organizations to supply services to policymakers, such 
as draft legislative and regulatory language, questions for committee hearings, 
and review and feedback of draft bills and other proposals, for example. 
o  How does that work – Who initiates that?  Do you do that or do others 
in your organization do that?  Does it matter whom it is for? 
o  Have you ever declined to provide such services?   
Coalitional Activity 
·  Who initiates a coalition?   
o  (Is it the larger organizations, organizations with expertise, those with a 
particularly large stake in the issue, or does it depend?)? 
o  If you have been involved in many coalitions, are the same groups the 
initiators or do different groups start coalitions?  Why is that, do you 
think? 
·  If you can generalize, what types of groups tend to be more active? 
o  About groups that are passive participants:  Do the more active 
organizations express frustration over their lack of activity?   
o  Are more active participants less willing to share information with less 
active participants? 
Group Visits with Congressional Staffers 
·  Who typically arranges the visit?   
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o  Do large organizations take the lead in setting up meetings, do different 
reps volunteer to schedule meetings, does it depend on contacts with a 
particular office, or what? 
·  At the meeting, who initiates the conversation?   
o  How do different representatives participate in the meeting (i.e., do you 
take turns, follow a ‘script’, etc.)?     
·  Now about written materials or ‘leave behinds.’  Who prepares them and 
brings them?   
o  Do you each leave your own materials?   
o  How long should they be?   
o  What do staffers look for in written materials that accompany a 
meeting? 
·  Has it ever happened that lobbyists have not worked with the group on a visit, 
such as not following the script or common message? 
o  What happened? 
o  What did you do, if anything? 
o  What about other lobbyists – what did they do?   
o  Did you talk about it with others? 
 
Methods 
Quadratic Assignment Procedures (QAP).  The QAP analysis (Hubert and 
Baker 1978; Baker and Hubert 1981) provides Pearson correlations of network 
structures such that we can identify in a statistically significant way whether one 
network structure is similar to another.  In general, QAP indexes the probability that 
the similarity between two matrices can be explained as a random permutation of the 
rows and columns of either matrix – The lower that probability, the more likely it is  
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that the two matrices are in fact similar (Walsh 1994).  In the permutation process, 
QAP entails first computing the Pearson correlation between two matrices, then 
holding one matrix constant and randomly altering the rows and columns of the 
second matrix.  By altering rows and columns rather than the individual cells, the 
dependence within rows and columns is built into the significance test.  An empirical 
distribution of correlations over some number of random permutation trials is thereby 
generated and the observed correlation prior to any permutations is compared to the 
values in this distribution.  The p-value is the proportion of correlations in the 
permutation trials that are equal to or greater than the observed correlation.  The 
minimum p-value that can be attained is equal to 1/k, where k is the number of trials 
(Walsh 1994). 
Negative Binomial Regression – The analysis of continuous outcome data 
using linear regression models assumes that the errors are independent and identically 
distributed with a mean of 0.  Because discrete data often do not follow this 
underlying assumption of normality, other analytic methods should be considered, 
particularly when the distribution is highly skewed as when there are many counts of 
zero.  Absent the ability to transform the variable, such as through a logarithmic 
transformation, other modeling approaches for discrete outcomes should be used such 
as the Poisson regression.  In this study, the variables for coalition participation, 
appearing before congressional committees, and news media mentions are count 
variables, and they resemble a Poisson distribution.   
However, a classic Poisson distribution is characterized by a mean that is equal 
to its variance (Kennedy 1998).  In many studies of discrete outcomes, the sampling 
distribution often results in a higher variance or overdispersion than would be 
expected from a Poisson distribution.  Therefore, a different model that accommodates 
overdispersion usually is used.  An alternative strategy for analyzing discrete data is to  
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fit a negative binomial regression model (Allison 1999).  This model is a 
generalization of the Poisson regression model that accounts for overdispersion by 
including a disturbance or error term.  The usual functional form of the negative 
binomial model is given by 
 
Log λi = β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + βkxik + σεi 
 
where λi is the expected value of the outcome variable yi for subject i, xi are the 
independent variables with corresponding regression coefficients βn, and σεi 
is the disturbance term.  One important benefit of this methodology is that it accounts 
for the dependence among observations that arises from clustering or from repeated 
samples or observations being taken from the same respondent over time (Byers, 
Allore, Gill, and Peduzzi 2003).   
While the negative binomial model takes overdispersion into account, it may 
not deal adequately with a high number of zeros in the count data.  When the 
dependent variable has a large number of zeroes, an important consideration is 
whether different processes are producing the excess number of zeroes.  Zero-inflated 
probability models assume that a dual-state process is responsible for generating the 
data.  For example, an organization may not be participating in a coalition because it 
may decide that the coalition is not a good use of that organization’s resources.  
Alternatively, it may also be that the organization is not currently lobbying on 
retirement policy issues and therefore has no need for a retirement policy coalition.  
Thus, two states are present, the former being a normal count-process state, and the 
latter is a zero-count state, in which we have an organization that is referred to as a 
‘certain zero’.  Thus, the number of zeroes may be inflated and the number of 
organizations with zero participation in coalitions cannot be explained in the same  
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manner as the number of organizations that participated in one or more coalitions.  A 
standard negative binomial model does not distinguish between these two processes, 
but a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model allows for the different processes 
and permits testing between the standard negative binomial model and the zero-
inflated negative binomial. 
ZINB regression generates two separate models and then combines them.  
First, a logit model is used to determine whether selected independent variables 
predict whether or not an organization would be a “certain zero”.  Then, a negative 
binomial model is generated predicting the counts for those organizations that are not 
certain zeroes.
148   
For the Influence Proposition and hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, a negative binomial 
regression methodology will be used with some differences.  The two dependent 
variables that proxy for influence, one for testifying at a congressional hearing and the 
other for mentions in the news media, are count variables whose means are much less 
than their variances.  However, these measures differ somewhat from the coalition 
participation measures in that I have exact dates for both hearing appearances and 
mentions in the news media (the coalition data did not indicate when a coalition began 
or ended).  Therefore, I can more fully exploit the over time nature of the data using a 
multilevel method, which controls for multiple observations for an organization over 
time.  However, the longitudinal nature of the data complicates the modeling strategy 
by violating the independence assumption of conventional negative binomial models 
(Long 1997).  Problems with autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity result, producing 
spuriously low standard error estimates.  Random effects models for cross-sectional 
time-series data have been developed to account for the non-independence of events.  I 
use a random-effects rather than a fixed-effects model because time-invariant 
                                                 
148 The regression results were produced by the zinb routine in STATA version 10.  
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parameters are difficult to estimate with a fixed-effects model and because variables 
with a zero outcome, which as noted above are quite a few, are dropped from fixed-
effects analysis (Cole 2006).  For both dependent variables, estimates are obtained 
using the “xtnbreg” command in Stata version 10, with standard error estimates 
adjusted for clustering within countries.      
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